The Political Economy Of Bureaucracy

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Richardson offers a careful analysis of US federal agencies examining the interaction between executive and legislative branches of government, combining Austrian economics, Public Choice and Evolutionary methodology in his approach.

The Political Economy of Bureaucracy applies Public Choice theory and a complex systems view of government institutions to analyze policy implementation as an economic process. It addresses the common and vexing question of why managing federal agencies for results is so difficult by challenging traditional assumptions of institutional design and policy analysis. Using creative methods that focus on relationships that constrain the choices of executives and managers in a political hierarchy, the author reveals control and coordination as goals that are imperfectly achieved and often conflicting with one another. Despite decades of intense study, serious reform efforts and impressive technological advances, the U.S. government remains a typical bureaucracy that fails to meet citizens’ expectations. Clearly, policy analysis is missing something. The problem may rest with "machine" models of government. Rules, especially those governing expenditures, are assumed to be feasible and effective. Analysis of the federal government as a complex system of relationships between semi-autonomous agents helps explain the disconnect between policy and results. The solution is to roll back micro-management of ends and means; policymakers should focus on objectives and facilitate implementation by selectively relaxing constraints that prevent experimentation needed to determine the most effective methods. This book devotes unusual attention to the interaction between executive and legislative branches of government and between political appointees and career civil servants. Most studies of government policy take existing institutional structure for granted. Different conclusions emerge from this analysis by virtue of the systems view that accepts status quo hierarchies but questions the effectiveness of the rules that govern policy implementation. This book will be of interest to postgraduates and researchers focussing on Economic Theory, Public Choice, Institutional Economics and Political Science, as well as to those working in the public sector interested in Public Administration, Public Policy, and Organizational Behavior.

In a writing style that is suitable for both the graduate and undergraduate student as well as professional scholar in the fields of public administration, political science and organization theory, the author looks at the rise of public bureaucracy in government. He contends that the concept of citizenship (which he defines as the interaction between a person and his/her government) is most significantly experienced by people as bureaucratic constituents, clients and victims. This hypothesis is tested by applications to the areas of political economy, social welfare and defense. Originally published by Winthrop Publishers in 1977.

Corruption: A Study in Political Economy focuses on the problem of corruptions in political economy and functional bribery. This book is organized into four parts encompassing 11 chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 deal with the fundamental relationship among voters, legislators, and interest groups, as well as the role of the government bureaucracy in shaping legislative choices. Chapters 5 illustrates the basic relationships with an analysis of a monopolistic government official charged with allocating a benefit through a queuing system, while Chapter 6 retains the assumption of a single official with monopoly power but moves beyond the queuing model to consider alternative sanctioning strategies, a wider variety of bureaucratic tasks, and bribers who may be competitively or monopolisticly organized. Chapters 7 and 8 explore the potential of a system where officials are permitted to compete with one another in processing applications for governmental benefits. Under this system, an individual or firm rejected by one official can seek the benefit from other bureaucrats. Chapter 9 introduces a final administrative variable into the analysis, while Chapter 10 discusses the governmental corruption to analogous corrupt activities entirely within the private sector. Lastly, Chapter 11 looks into the relation between corruption and democratic theory, the possibility of reforming corrupt bureaucracies, and the link between economics and morality. This book will be of value to public servants, legislators, economists, sociologists, and researchers.

Traditional public policy and welfare economics have held that market failures are common, requiring the intervention of government in order to serve and protect the public good. In Beyond Politics, William C. Mitchell and Randy T. Simmons carefully scrutinize this traditional view through the modern theory of public choice. The authors enlighten the relationship of government and markets by emphasizing the actual rather than the ideal workings of governments and by reuniting the insights of economics with those of political science. Beyond Politics traces the anatomy of government failure and a pathology of contemporary political institutions as government has become a vehicle for private gain at public expense. In so doing, this brisk and vigorous book examines a host of public issues, including social welfare, consumer protection, and the environment. Offering a unified and powerful perspective on the market process, property rights, politics, contracts, and government bureaucracy, Beyond Politics is a lucid and comprehensive book on the foundations and institutions of a free and humane society.