The Political Economy Of Soviet Socialism The Formative Years 1918 1928

This book presents a narrative of one of the more interesting utopian experiments in comparative political and economic history: the first decade of the Soviet experience with socialism (1918-1928). Though historical and textual analysis, the book’s goal is to render this experience intelligible, to get at the meaning of the Soviet experience with socialism for comparative political economy today. The book examines the texts of Lenin, Bukharin, and other revolutionaries, as well as the interpretations of contemporary historians of the revolution and the writings of more recent interpreters of Soviet political and economic history. Arguing that the first three years of the Bolshevik regime (1918-1921) constitute an attempt to carry out the Marxian ideal of comprehensive central planning, and that the disastrous results, which all commentators agree occurred, were the inevitable outcome of this Marxian ideal coming into conflict with the economic reality of the coordination problem that all economic systems face, the book draws clear conclusions and elucidates the air of mystery that often surrounds the subject. Offering a radical challenge to contemporary comparative political economy at the level of high theory, applied research, and public policy, this book is appropriate for students and scholars interested in Marxism, economic history, political economy, and Austrian economics.

First published in 1979, this is an integrated selection of papers written over 12 years of Russian history, which offers a unique insight into some important and controversial issues. It discusses the ideas of Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin, the political economy of socialism, and the problems of the contemporary USSR.

Conventional wisdom has it that government management of the economy is the means to transform a backward economy into a dynamic, modern one. Yet, after decades of international aid programs, development planning is today largely perceived as a failure paralyzed by its own bureaucracy and inefficiency. Despite billions of dollars of investment, development successes are few and far between and waste and mismanagement abounds. This book showcases a diverse range of development experiences in order to ascertain the reasons for this quagmire. Case studies of development planning in China, India, post-WWII Japan, South Korea, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and of foreign aid programs (including the Marshall Plan) illustrate the insights an Austrian approach provides toward an understanding of the failure of government development planning. While economists working within the Austrian tradition have previously addressed development issues, this volume represents the first full-length treatment of the subject from a modern market process perspective. Exploding the hegemony of the traditional development paradigm, The Collapse of Development Planning addresses one of the most pressing issues of international political economy. Contributing to the volume are: George Ayittey (American University), Wayne T. Brough (Citizens for a Sound Economy, Washington, DC), Young Back Choi (St. John's University), Steven Hanke (Johns Hopkins University), Steve Horwitz (St. Lawrence University), Shyam J. Kamath (California State University, Hayward), Shigeto Naka (Hiroshima City University), David Osterfeld (St. Joseph's College), Manisha Perera (University of Northern Colorado), Jan S. Prybyla (Pennsylvania State University), Ralph Raico (State University College, Buffalo), Parth Shah (University of Michigan, Dearborn), Kurt Schuller (Johns Hopkins University), Kiyokazu Tanaka (Sophia University, Tokyo), and Mark Thorton (Auburn University).

This book uses the formerly secret Soviet state and Communist Party archives to describe the creation and operations of the Soviet administrative command system. It concludes that the system failed not because of the 'jockey'(i.e. Stalin and later leaders) but because of the 'horse' (the economic system). Although Stalin was the system's prime architect, the system was managed by thousands of 'Stalins' in a nested dictatorship. The core values of the Bolshevik Party dictated the choice of the administrative command system, and the system dictated the political victory of a Stalin-like figure. This study pinpoints the reasons for the failure of the system - poor planning, unreliable supplies, the preferential treatment of indigenous enterprises, the lack of knowledge of planners, etc. - but also focuses on the basic principal-agent conflict between planners and producers, which created a sixty-year reform stalemate.

An assessment of the first Soviet economic system, comparing programmes with outsomes, and theory with practice.

Bringing together the Soviet historical experience and Stalin-era art in novels, films, poems, songs, painting, photography, architecture and advertising, Dobrenko examines Stalinism's representational strategies and demonstrates how real socialism was begotten of Socialist Realism.