The Politics Of Command

Using examples from a wide variety of conflicts, Lawrence Freedman shows that successful military command depends on the ability not only to use armed forces effectively but also to understand the political context in which they are operating. Command in war is about forging effective strategies and implementing them, making sure that orders are appropriate, well-communicated, and then obeyed. But it is also an intensely political process. This is largely because how wars are fought depends to a large extent on how their aims are set. It is also because commanders in one realm must possess the ability to work with other command structures, including those of other branches of the armed forces and allies. In The Politics of Command, Lawrence Freedman explores the importance of political as well as operational considerations in command with a series of eleven vivid case studies, all taken from the period after 1945. Over this period, the risks of nuclear escalation led to a shift away from great power confrontations and towards civil wars, and advances in communication technologies made it easier for higher-level commanders to direct their subordinates. Freedman covers defeats as well as victories. Pakistani generals tried to avoid surrender as they were losing the eastern part of their country to India in 1971. Iraq's Saddam Hussein turned his defeats into triumphant narratives of victory. Osama bin Laden escaped the Americans in Afghanistan in 2001. The UK struggled as a junior partner to the US in Iraq after 2003. We come across insubordinate generals, such as Israel's Arik Sharon, and those in the French army in Algeria, so frustrated with their political leadership that they twice tried to change it. At the other end of the scale, Che Guevara in Congo in 1966 and Igor Girkin in Ukraine in 2014 both tried to spark local wars to suit their grandiose objectives. Freedman ends the book with a meditation on the future of command in a world that is becoming increasingly reliant on technologies like artificial intelligence. A wide-ranging and insightful history of the changing nature of command in the postwar era, this will stand as a definitive account of a foundational concept in both military affairs and politics.

Details the relationship between the Continental Congress and its army. Discusses Congress's attempt to maintain civil authority over a military establishment as well as the all-to-familiar political infighting of groups within both the Congress and the army as they schemed to advance certain individuals into positions of command. This reinforced fractional divisions already found within the Congress and the army. Specifically recounts the rivalry between Generals Philip Schuyler and Horatio Gates for the command of the northern department and the Conway cabal to replace General Washington with General Gates by the Continental Congress as examples of the history of politico-military infighting during the Revolution that almost caused the destruction of the American Union. At the end of the study, the author presents two letters, one from Colonel Richard Varick and another from Philip Schuyler, recounting a bizarre story of attempted "murder" with Varick as the intended target.

In December 1943, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton resigned from command of the 1st Canadian Army amidst criticism of his poor generalship and of his abrasive personality. Despite McNaughton's importance to the Canadian Army during the first four years of the Second World War, little has been written about the man himself or the circumstances of his resignation. In The Politics of Command, the first full-length study of the subject since 1969, John Nelson Rickard analyses McNaughton's performance during Exercise SPARTAN in March 1943 and assesses his relationships with key figures such as Sir Alan F. Brooke, Bernard Paget, and Harry Crerar. This detailed re-examination of McNaughton's command argues that the long-accepted reasons for his relief of duty require extensive modification. Based on a wide range of sources, The Politics of Command will redefine how military historians and all Canadians look at not only "Andy" McNaughton but also the Canadian Army itself.

In December 1943, Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton resigned from command of the 1st Canadian Army amidst criticism of his poor generalship and of his abrasive personality. Despite McNaughton's importance to the Canadian Army during the first four years of the Second World War, little has been written about the man himself or the circumstances of his resignation. In The Politics of Command, the first full-length study of the subject since 1969, John Nelson Rickard analyzes McNaughton's performance during exercise SPARTAN in March 1943 and assesses his relationships with key figures such as Sir Alan F. Brooke, Bernard Paget, and Harry Crerar. This detailed re-examination of McNaughton's command argues that the long-accepted reasons for his relief of duty require extensive modification. Based on a wide range of sources, The Politics of Command will redefine how military historians and all Canadians look not only at "Andy" McNaughton, but the Canadian Army as well.

This book examines the pressures brought to bear upon Jefferson Davis as he decided the South's military strategy.

George C. Schreiber was a twenty-five year old second lieutenant in charge of an Air Police guard unit in Pusan, Korea. A year earlier, in 1951, he had innocently been teaching fifth and sixth grade children in Brookfield, Illinois. A year later, he was convicted by a general court-martial of premeditated murder. The unconscionable injustice made no sense to twenty-three year old Air Force lawyer Robert A. Shaines and Schreiber’s story has haunted his thoughts ever since. Command Influence chronicles Shaines’ first hand observation of the dramatic events leading up to the trial of Schreiber and two of his contemporaries and shows how he, Schreiber and others became pawns in a power game among ambitious and vindictive men eager only to please those who could advance their military careers. This series of events would ultimately involve the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Governor of Illinois, the President and the Supreme Court of the United States and bring about a change in the law which would reach the highest levels of government. A fascinating tale of military and legal history, Command Influence is also a captivatingly personal vindication of the conscience of the author, who comes to understand that he and Schreiber were a couple of dedicated, but naive and trusting young fellow officers whose lives and characters became permanently shaped by these events. Both were victims in their own ways.

Originally published in 1976 and based upon the extensive use of original archival material, this book provides a detailed account of the 2 years in which the German army enjoyed unprecedented power and influence. The rise of Hindenburg and Ludendorff is seen against the background of the failure of the army to win a decisive victory in the early stages of the war. The book provides insights into the dynamics of German militarism and imperialism, and is an important contribution to the discussion of the continuity of German history.