The Politics Of Imf Lending

As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.

This is a clear and concise introduction to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and an overview of its debates and controversies. Where did the IMF come from? What does it do? Why do so many governments participate in its programs and what are their effects? How can we best reform this key global institution? These are some of the key questions addressed. In our age of thinking global, the IMF is a crucial institution and central to understanding international relations and current affairs. Founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, its basic purposes were to facilitate world trade and promote national prosperity. The founders hoped that never again would the world experience the trade policies that led up to the Great Depression. This book outlines and questions these targets and assesses actual achievements. It also details how despite originally focusing on Europe, the Fund has gradually shifted to involvement with poorer developing countries, but to what ends and with how much success? This study both poses and tackles the tough questions facing our global community today.

The International Monetary Fund has been criticised from both the right and the left of the political spectrum with the right arguing that it is too interventionist and creates more problems than it solves and the left on occasion demanding that it be abolished altogether. What seems almost beyond question is that the IMF needs to be reformed. Defining a future role for the IMF will always be a controversial issue, but vital to any considerations will be a measured assessment of how it has operated in the past. This excellent new book from an internationally respected expert on the IMF intends to do just that. Starting with an historical background tracing the evolution of the IMF, the book goes on to cover such themes as: *The circumstances under which countries turn to the IMF *The various aspects of IMF conditionality *Institutional issues such as lending facilities and how the fund is resourced. Bringing together an array of articles, this excellent new book will undoubtedly be required reading for anyone with a serious interest in development studies as well as being an eye-opening read for policy makers involved with the IMF.

This book aims to develop and test a model of International Monetary Fund (IMF) decision-making that will offer a better understanding of how the IMF applies its lending terms to individual countries such as Jamaica, Zaire, Sudan, India, United Kingdom, Turkey and Argentina.

Liam Clegg provides an innovative reading of where power lies in the institutions' concessional lending operations, drawing its focus on shareholders and stakeholders from staffs' own understandings of their operational environments.

The ideal book for students who need a clear and concise introduction to the IMF and an overview of its debates and controversies.

This Element argues that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their supporters, imposing adjustment costs upon the supporters of their opponents, who then protest in response. Using large-N micro-level survey data from three world regions and a global survey, it discusses the local political economy of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. It finds that opposition supporters in countries under IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP) are more likely to report that the IMF SAP increased economic hardships than government supporters and countries without IMF exposure. In addition, it finds that partisan gaps in IMF SAP evaluations widen in IMF program countries with an above-median number of conditions, suggesting that opposition supporters face heavier adjustment burdens, and that opposition supporters who think SAPs made their lives worse are more likely to protest.