The Presidency In The Constitutional Order

This classic collection of studies, first published in 1980, contributes to the revival of interest in the powers and duties of the American presidency. Unlike many previous books on the constitution and the president, the contributors to this volume are political scientists, not law professors. Accordingly, they display political scientists' concern with structures as well as power, with conflict between the branches of government as well as their functional separation, and with political prescription as well as legal analysis. Underlying the entire volume is a persistent attention to the nature of executive power and its particular manifestation in the American system. Part One introduces the foundations that underlie contemporary issues, including the famous James Madison-Alexander Hamilton debate over the powers of the presidency. Contemporary political and scholarly controversies, which are the subjects of Part Two, include the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the legislative veto, executive privilege and secrecy, the character of the presidency, presidential selection, and the nature of executive power. The essays in The Presidency in the Constitutional Order represent some of the most cogent thought available about the highest elected office in America, and the themes of the volume continue to be timely and provocative.

Originally published: Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, c1981.

The Obama administration is shaping up to be one of the most consequential in recent American history. In this book, a diverse group of presidential scholars step back from the partisan debate to consider the first two years of the Obama presidency through the lens of the U.S. constitution's theory, structure, and powers. They ask how Barack Obama understands and exercises the President's formal constitutional and informal powers and responsibilities of the president, from foreign policy and public policyto his political leadership of the Democratic party and the nation as a whole.

Following the election of Donald Trump, the office of the U.S. president has come under scrutiny like never before. Featuring penetrating insights from high-profile presidential scholars, The Presidency provides the deep historical and constitutional context needed to put the Trump era into its proper perspective. Identifying key points at which the constitutional presidency could have evolved in different ways from the nation’s founding days to the present, these scholars examine presidential decisions that determined the direction of the nation and the world. Contributors Bradley R. DeWees, U.S. Air Force * Richard J. Ellis, Willamette University * Stefanie Georgakis Abbott, University of Virginia * Joel K. Goldstein, Saint Louis University * Jennifer Lawless, University of Virginia * Sidney M. Milkis, University of Virginia * Sairkrishna Bangalore Prakash, University of Virginia * Russell L. Riley, University of Virginia * Andrew Rudalevige, Bowdoin College * Sean Theriault, University of Texas at Austin

Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself. Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.

Since 1981, when Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey K. Tulis first published The Presidency in the Constitutional Order, the study of the constitutional powers of the presidency has advanced considerably. Bessette and Tulis continue the conversation almost 30 years later, presenting original research on the most significant issues regarding presidential power and the Constitution. After introducing and identifying the main approaches to the study of the constitutional presidency and the nature of executive power, Bessette and Tulis, along with other constitutional scholars, cover a wide range of topics. These include the logic and meaning of Article II of the Constitution; the constitutional and political debate over Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793; the contribution of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft to the constitutional foundations of the modern presidency; the controversy over the presidential election of 2000 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore; military tribunals and the war on terrorism; executive orders; growing presidential influence over the budgeting process; executive privilege; impeachment; and demagoguery in democratic regimes. The book conjoins political and legal modes of analysis and shows how constitutional interpretation is indispensable to an adequate description of political behavior and serves as the source of standards for evaluating presidential conduct. The contributors offer new and distinctive arguments, especially in light of the renewed debate over executive power during the George W. Bush administration.

In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton announced that the "age of big government is over." Some Republicans accused him of cynically appropriating their themes, while many Democrats thought he was betraying the principles of the New Deal and the Great Society. Mark Tushnet argues that Clinton was stating an observed fact: the emergence of a new constitutional order in which the aspiration to achieve justice directly through law has been substantially chastened. Tushnet argues that the constitutional arrangements that prevailed in the United States from the 1930s to the 1990s have ended. We are now in a new constitutional order--one characterized by divided government, ideologically organized parties, and subdued constitutional ambition. Contrary to arguments that describe a threatened return to a pre-New Deal constitutional order, however, this book presents evidence that our current regime's animating principle is not the old belief that government cannot solve any problems but rather that government cannot solve any more problems. Tushnet examines the institutional arrangements that support the new constitutional order as well as Supreme Court decisions that reflect it. He also considers recent developments in constitutional scholarship, focusing on the idea of minimalism as appropriate to a regime with chastened ambitions. Tushnet discusses what we know so far about the impact of globalization on domestic constitutional law, particularly in the areas of international human rights and federalism. He concludes with predictions about the type of regulation we can expect from the new order. This is a major new analysis of the constitutional arrangements in the United States. Though it will not be received without controversy, it offers real explanatory and predictive power and provides important insights to both legal theorists and political scientists.