The Problem Of Political Obligation

00 Pateman examines the notion of political obligation in relation to the liberal democratic state and presents a vision of participatory democracy as a means to effect a more satisfactory relationship between the citizen and the state. She offers a general assessment of liberal theory and an interpretation of all familiar arguments about political obligation and democratic consent. Pateman examines the notion of political obligation in relation to the liberal democratic state and presents a vision of participatory democracy as a means to effect a more satisfactory relationship between the citizen and the state. She offers a general assessment of liberal theory and an interpretation of all familiar arguments about political obligation and democratic consent.

First published in 1987. This study is an attempt to distinguish the problem of political obligation as it was formulated in the ancient world from the problem as it has presented itself in the modern world, and assesses the idealist achievement in the philosophical treatment of the problem of political obligation. This title will be of interest to students of philosophy and politics.

First published in 1990. The individual’s obligation to obey the law, the state and the government is a fundamental part of contemporary political theory. The contributors to this volume, drawn from a variety of disciplines including philosophy, political science and law, take a fresh look at the dilemmas of political obligation. They discuss the extent to which we should allow the need for conformity to override individual liberties, and ask whether individualism is indeed feasible without a highly developed sense of the ‘public interest’ or the ‘common good‘. The contrast between individualism and communitarianism is examined throughout the book. The contributors also look at the various means through which the state can coerce or persuade the individual to be obedient. The emphasis throughout this collection is on the substantive problems themselves, rather than on the way these issues have been addressed in the history of political thought. The book offers a number of different perspectives on political obligation, and will be valuable to students of moral, political, social and legal philosophy.

Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the laws of my country tell me to do? Beginning with carefully argued accounts of social groups in general and political societies in particular, the author argues that in central, standard senses of the relevant terms membership in a political society in and of itself obligates one to support that society's political institutions. The obligations in questionare not moral requirements derived from general moral principles, as is often supposed, but a matter of one's participation in a special kind of commitment: joint commitment. An agreement is sufficient but not necessary to generate such a commitment. Gilbert uses the phrase 'plural subject' to referto all of those who are jointly committed in some way. She therefore labels the theory offered in this book the plural subject theory of political obligation.The author concentrates on the exposition of this theory, carefully explaining how and in what sense joint commitments obligate. She also explores a classic theory of political obligation --- actual contract theory --- according to which one is obligated to conform to the laws of one's country because one agreed to do so. She offers a new interpretation of this theory in light of a theory of plural subject theory of agreements. She argues that actual contract theory has more merit than has beenthought, though the more general plural subject theory is to be preferred. She compares and contrasts plural subject theory with identification theory, relationship theory, and the theory of fair play. She brings it to bear on some classic situations of crisis, and, in the concluding chapter,suggests a number of avenues for related empirical and moral inquiry.Clearly and compellingly written, A Theory of Political Obligation will be essential reading for political philosophers and theorists.

"Most recent discussions of the political authority of the liberal democratic state and the political obligation of its citizens are based on one of two assumptions: that general problems about political obligation have now been resolved or are easily resolvable; or that no such problems exist. One aim of this book is to show that the latter assumption is unfounded and that political obligation is inherently problematic. My larger aim, which is both more substantive and more controversial, is to show that political obligation in the liberal democratic state constitutes an insoluble problem; insoluble because political obligation cannot be given expression within the context of liberal democratic institutions. The problem of political obligation can be solved only through the development of the theory and practice of participatory or self-managing democracy." [Introduction].

This text reviews and criticizes the current justifications of political obligation - the relationship between the individual and the political community - in terms of contract, consent, utility, fair play, common good and suchlike, in addition to assessing the anarchist denial of political obligation. The book also sets out an alternative approach to the problem which challenges many of the standard ideas about political obligation.

The state is often ascribed a special sort of authority, one that obliges citizens to obey its commands and entitles the state to enforce those commands through threats of violence. This book argues that this notion is a moral illusion: no one has ever possessed that sort of authority.

What are the grounds for and limits to obedience to the state? This book offers a fresh analysis of the debate concerning the moral obligation to obey the state, develops a novel account of political obligation and provides the first detailed argument of how a theory of political obligation can apply to subjects of an unjust state.