The Raf And Aircraft Design 1923 1939

This work examines the evolution of the RAF's operational requirements for its home defence air force - for bombers to mount a deterrent counter offensive and for fighters to provide direct defence of Britain. It discusses the management processes, policies and decisions relevant to operational requirements on the basis of a detailed study of Air Ministry papers of the time. By tracing the development of operational requirements, the author exposes the thinking behind the RAF's quest for effective fighter and bomber aircraft. He describes the ideas and concepts of air warfare that were adopted in the 1920s, and shows how these evolved into the Air Staff's requirements for the aircraft which the RAF entered and fought in World War II.

This work describes the vitl role of the Air Ministry in the development of the RAF's fighters and bombers before WWII.

This work examines the evolution of the RAF's operational requirements for its home defence air force - for bombers to mount a deterrent counter offensive and for fighters to provide direct defence of Britain. It discusses the management processes, policies and decisions relevant to operational requirements on the basis of a detailed study of Air Ministry papers of the time. By tracing the development of operational requirements, the author exposes the thinking behind the RAF's quest for effective fighter and bomber aircraft. He describes the ideas and concepts of air warfare that were adopted in the 1920s, and shows how these evolved into the Air Staff's requirements for the aircraft which the RAF entered and fought in World War II.

This consequential work by a pioneer aviation historian fills a significant lacuna in the story of the defeat of France in May-June 1940 and more fully explains the Battle of Britain of July–October of that year and the influence it had on the Luftwaffe in the 1941 invasion of the USSR. Robin Higham approaches the subject by sketching the story and status of the three air forces--the Armée de l’Air, the Luftwaffe, and the Royal Air Force--their organization and preparation for their battles. He then dissects the the campaigns, their losses and replacement policies and abilities. He paints the struggles of France and Britain from both the background provided by his recent Two Roads to War: From Versailles to Dunkirk (NIP, 2012) and from the details of losses tabulated by After the Battle’s The Battle of Britain (1982, 2nd ed.) and Peter Cornwell’s The Battle of France Then and Now (2007), as well as in Paul Martin’s Invisible Vainqueurs (1990) and from the Luftwaffe summaries in the British National Archives Cabinet papers. One important finding is that the consumption and wastage was not nearly as high as claimed. The three air forces actually shot down only 19 percent of the number claimed. In the RAF case, in the summer of 1940, 44 percent of those shot down were readily repairable thanks to the salvage and repair organizations. This contrasted with the much lower 8 percent for the Germans and zero for the French. Brave as the aircrews may have been, the inescapable conclusion is that awareness of consumption, wastage, and sustainability were intimately connected to survival.

Following the Armistice of 1918, the British Air Industry and the newly founded RAF held a low place in national priorities. The RAF was rapidly run down, with the infant airlines being given the least possible help, and this neglect continued during the 1920s. The RAF's role was questioned and civilian air travel remained a dream for most and the province of the well-heeled few. But the breakdown of the Geneva Disarmament Talks led to renewed interest in the National Air Force, and the rise of the European dictators brought calls for rapid modernisation and interceptor aircraft, together with the development of further European civilian air routes. Here, Peter Reese charts the dramatic changes that swept aviation across the dynamic interwar period, revealing the transformative last-minute preparations for defence in a world where much depended on the contributions of some outstanding individuals.

Draws on 25 years of original and exhaustive researchRichly illustrated with many previously unpublished photographsContent and style will appeal to a wide readership The Royal Air Force is the world’s oldest independent air arm, yet little has been written about its logistics. This ground-breaking book, which draws on 25 years of original archival research, opens the hangar door on this highly important discipline that has been at the forefront of supporting British air power since 1918. Written by a former senior RAF logistics officer and supplemented by material from veterans and currently serving military personnel, Sustaining Air Power: Royal Air Force Logistics since 1918 explores the fascinating development of RAF logistics. This journey, just short of a century, explores the inter-war years, Second World War, Cold War and the major campaigns the service has been involved in since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990. The main narrative ends in 2014 with the RAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Dedicated chapters consider the more specialist aspects of logistics such as tactical and expeditionary logistics, fuels and explosives, transport, training, information technology and how the RAF has managed its extensive supply chain. Richly illustrated, its content and style will appeal to a wide readership.

Includes two new chapters! “One of the more interesting and better books on military aviation to appear in the last few years.”—Journal of Military History Since the publication of the first edition of Why Air Forces Fail, the debate over airpower’s role in military operations has only intensified. Here, eminent historians Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris assemble a team of experts to add essential new details to their cautionary tale for current practitioners of aerial warfare. Together, the contributors examine the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, this seminal study with two new chapters provides an essential and detailed analysis of defeat. “Contains many interesting insights and interpretations . . . an excellent introduction to the study of military failure in general and air forces in particular.”—Journal of America’s Military Past “I recommend this book to those who are interested in air forces and air power, whether amateur or professional, past, present and future.”—Richard Cobbold, Bryanston: The Yearbook “Provides an excellent analysis of the root causes of failure; this engaging study goes far beyond the aerial battlefield to examine the circumstances leading to defeat.”—Dennis Drew, Colonel, USAF (Ret.)

In May 1940, the opposing German and Allied forces seemed reasonably well matched. On the ground, the four allied nations had more troops, artillery and tanks. Even in the air, the German advantage in numbers was slight. Yet two months later, the Allied armies had been crushed. The Netherlands, Belgium and France had all surrendered and Britain stood on her own, facing imminent defeat. Subsequent accounts of the campaign have tended to see this outcome as predetermined, with the seeds of defeat sown long before the fighting began. Was it so inevitable? Should the RAF have done more to help the Allied armies? Why was such a small proportion of the RAF's frontline strength committed to the crucial battle on the ground? Could Fighter Command have done more to protect the British and French troops being evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk? This study looks at the operations flown and takes a fresh look at the fatal decisions made behind the scenes, decisions that unnecessarily condemned RAF aircrews to an unequal struggle and ultimately ensured Allied defeat. What followed became the RAF's finest hour with victory achieved by the narrowest of margins. Or was it, as some now suggest, a victory that was always inevitable? If so, how was the German military juggernaut that had conquered most of Europe so suddenly halted? This study looks at the decisions and mistakes made by both sides. It explains how the British obsession with bomber attacks on cities had led to the development of the wrong type of fighter force and how only a fortuitous sequence of events enabled Fighter Command to prevail. It also looks at how ready the RAF was to deal with an invasion. How much air support could the British Army have expected? Why were hundreds of American combat planes and experienced Polish and Czech pilots left on the sidelines? And when the Blitz began, and Britain finally got the war it was expecting, what did this campaign tell us about the theories on air power that had so dominated pre-war air policy? All these questions and more are answered in Greg Baughen's third book. Baughen describes the furious battles between the RAF and the Luftwaffe and the equally bitter struggle between the Air Ministry and the War Office - and explains how close Britain really came to defeat in the summer of 1940.