The Reconstruction Of The Juridico Political

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as the original proponents of two distinct and opposed processes of concept formation generating two separate and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. The Reconstruction of the Juridico-Political: Affinity and Divergence in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber contests the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law. Utilising the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume analyse central points of affinity and divergence in the work of these two influential figures. Thus, the chapters collected in The Reconstruction of the Juridico-Political offer a comprehensive reconsideration of these affinities and divergences, through a comparison of their respective reconstruction of the notions of democracy, the State, legal rights and the character of law. From this reconsideration a more complex understanding of their theoretical relationship emerges combined with a renewed emphasis upon the continued contemporary relevance of the work of Kelsen and Weber.

Hans Kelsen and Max Weber are conventionally understood as initiators not only of two distinct and opposing processes of concept formation, but also of two discrete and contrasting theoretical frameworks for the study of law. The Foundation of the Juridical-Political: Concept Formation in Hans Kelsen and Max Weber places the conventional understanding of the theoretical relationship between the work of Kelsen and Weber into question. Focusing on the theoretical foundations of Kelsen’s legal positivism and Weber’s sociology of law, and guided by the conceptual frame of the juridico-political, the contributors to this interdisciplinary volume explore convergences and divergences in the approach and stance of Kelsen and Weber to law, the State, political science, modernity, legal rationality, legal theory, sociology of law, authority, legitimacy and legality. The chapters comprising The Foundation of the Juridical-Political uncover complexities within as well as between the theoretical and methodological principles of Kelsen and Weber and, thereby, challenge the enduring division between legal positivism and the sociology of law in contemporary discourse.

Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition provides the first sustained examination of Hans Kelsen’s critical engagement, itself founded upon a distinctive theory of legal positivism, with the Natural Law Tradition.

This book critically examines the conception of legal science and the nature of law developed by Hans Kelsen. It provides a single, dedicated space for a range of established European scholars to engage with the influential work of this Austrian jurist, legal philosopher, and political philosopher. The introduction provides a thematization of the Kelsenian notion of law as a legal science. Divided into six parts, the chapter contributions feature distinct levels of analysis. Overall, the structure of the book provides a sustained reflection upon central aspects of Kelsenian legal science and the nature of law. Parts one and two examine the validity of the project of Kelsenian legal science with particular reference to the social fact thesis, the notion of a science of positive law and the specifically Kelsenian concept of the basic norm (Grundnorm). The next three parts engage in a critical analysis of the relationship of Kelsenian legal science to constitutionalism, practical reason, and human rights. The last part involves an examination of the continued pertinence of Kelsenian legal science as a theory of the nature of law with a particular focus upon contemporary non-positivist theories of law. The conclusion discusses the increasing distance of contemporary theories of legal positivism from a Kelsenian notion of legal science in its consideration of the nature of law.

In this book, experts from the fields of law and philosophy explore the works of Aristotle to illuminate the much-debated and fascinating relationship between emotions and justice. Emotions matter in connection with democracy and equity – they are relevant to the judicial enforcement of rights, legal argumentation, and decision-making processes in legislative bodies and courts. The decisive role that emotions, feelings and passions play in these processes cannot be ignored – not even by those who believe that emotions have no legitimate place in the public sphere. A growing body of literature on these topics recognizes the seminal insights contributed by Aristotle. This book offers a comprehensive analysis of his thinking in this context, as well as proposals for inspiring dialogues between his works and those written by a selection of modern and contemporary thinkers. As such, the book offers a valuable resource for students of law, philosophy, rhetoric, politics, ethics and history, but also for readers interested in the ongoing debate about legal positivism and the relevance of emotions for legal and political life in today’s world.

Can a constitutional democracy commit suicide? Can an illiberal antidemocratic party legitimately obtain power through democratic elections and amend liberalism and democracy out of the constitution entirely? In Weimar Germany, these theoretical questions were both practically and existentially relevant. By 1932, the Nazi and Communist parties combined held a majority of seats in parliament. Neither accepted the legitimacy of liberal democracy. Their only reason for participating democratically was to amend the constitution out of existence. This book analyses Carl Schmitt's state and constitutional theory and shows how it was conceived in response to the Weimar crisis. Right-wing and left-wing political extremists recognized that a path to legal revolution lay in the Weimar constitution's combination of democratic procedures, total neutrality toward political goals, and positive law. Schmitt's writings sought to address the unique problems posed by mass democracy. Schmitt's thought anticipated 'constrained' or 'militant' democracy, a type of constitution that guards against subversive expressions of popular sovereignty and whose mechanisms include the entrenchment of basic constitutional commitments and party bans. Schmitt's state and constitutional theory remains important: the problems he identified continue to exist within liberal democratic states. Schmitt offers democrats today a novel way to understand the legitimacy of liberal democracy and the limits of constitutional change.

What is more paradoxically democratic than a people exercising their vote against the harbingers of the rule of law and democracy? What happens when the will of the people and the rule of law are at odds? Some commentators note that the presence of illiberal political movements in the public arena of many Western countries demonstrates that their democracy is so inclusive and alive that it comprehends and countenances even undemocratic forces and political agendas. But what if, on the contrary, these were the signs of the deconsolidation of democracy instead of its good health? What if democratically elected regimes were to ignore constitutional principles representing the rule of law and the limits of their power? With contributions from judges and scholars from different backgrounds and nationalities this book explores the framework in which this tension currently takes place in several Western countries by focusing on four key themes: - The Rule of Law: presenting a historical and theoretical reconstruction of the evolution of the Rule of Law; - The People: dealing with a set of problems around the notion of 'people' and the forces claiming to represent their voice; - Democracy and its enemies: tackling a variety of phenomena impacting on the traditional democratic balance of powers and institutional order; - Elected and Non-Elected: focusing on the juxtaposition between judges (and, more generally, non-representative bodies) and the people's representation.

By re-examining the political thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen, this book offers a reflection on the nature of modern democracy and the question of its legitimacy. Pedro T. Magalhães shows that present-day elitist, populist and pluralist accounts of democracy owe, in diverse and often complicated ways, an intellectual debt to the interwar era, German-speaking, scholarly and political controversies on the problem(s) of modern democracy. A discussion of Weber’s ambivalent diagnosis of modernity and his elitist views on democracy, as they were elaborated especially in the 1910s, sets the groundwork for the study. Against that backdrop, Schmitt’s interwar political thought is interpreted as a form of neo-authoritarian populism, whereas Kelsen evinces robust, though not entirely unproblematic, pluralist consequences. In the conclusion, the author draws on Claude Lefort’s concept of indeterminacy to sketch a potentially more fruitful way than can be gleaned from the interwar German discussions of conceiving the nexus between the elitist, populist and pluralist faces of modern democracy. The Legitimacy of Modern Democracy will be of interest to political theorists, political philosophers, intellectual historians, theoretically oriented political scientists, and legal scholars working in the subfields of constitutional law and legal theory. The Open Access version of this book, available at https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315157566, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license