The Referendum On Separation For Scotland Session 2012 13

For related report, see HCP 542 (ISBN 9780215047519)

For related report, see HCP 542 (ISBN 9780215047489)

Widening the number of options to be put in front of the voters in a referendum may at first sight be an attractive proposition but it suffers a number of defects. The Scottish Government does not have a mandate to hold a referendum on greater devolution. What it promised was a referendum on separation, and that has been agreed. There are very serious unanswered questions about how a three-option referendum would work. There are a number of potential ways in which the results could be calculated and aggregated, and the choice of voting and counting mechanism could well determine the outcome. The outcome should be determined by the choices of voters - it should be clear to them what the consequences of their decision will be. It is probably for this reason that multi-option referendums are very uncommon internationally, on national issues of this sort. International experience strongly suggests that they are inappropriate because they do no lead to effective decisions

Government response to HC 892, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215052506)

Incorporating HC 139-xv - HC 139-xx, session 2012-13 and follows on from HC 139-II, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215052551). For related report, see HCP 542 (ISBN 9780215047489)

Scotland can only separate from the UK if the Scottish people make that decision in a referendum. The Committee says any such referendum must have an unchallengeable legal and moral basis, to avoid delays and challenges to the legitimacy of the process and its result. The Scottish Parliament can legislate only on devolved matters, and the Union between Scotland and England is a reserved matter. The Scottish Government has argued that Holyrood is legally competent to set up a referendum but the Committee can find no evidence for this and the Scottish Government has provided no legal justification for this view. Any attempt to conduct a referendum on a dubious legal basis would inevitably be challenged in the courts and could take years to be resolved. No-one should be allowed to use legal wrangles to put off a referendum even longer than is currently planned. The Committee says the best way to ensure a sound legal basis for the referendum is for the UK and Scottish Governments and Parliaments to agree the specific detail of an order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 to give the Scottish Parliament power to conduct a referendum. The Committee further believes that any Section 30 order proposed by the Government should be subject to pre-legislative scrutiny by the Scottish Affairs Committee and to approval by all of Scotland's MPs before being proceeded with. However, this should not be used to allow those who anticipate being defeated to stall or derail the process

Earlier volumes of evidence published as HC 1608, session 2010-12 (ISBN 9780215044211), HC 139-I, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215047519), HC 139-II, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215052551) and HC 140-I, session 2013-14 (ISBN 9780215062482)

Scottish Separation creates the prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament being imposed upon the Royal Navy and UK government for an indeterminate period, and says that the UK and Scottish government must fully detail the consequences of the removal of Trident as part of the whole secession agreement as soon as is practical. No vote on separation should go ahead without the Scottish people fully understanding the consequences of separation for defence and the UK's nuclear deterrent. The UK's entire nuclear deterrent is based and serviced in Scotland. The Committee has heard in evidence that nuclear weapons in Scotland could be disarmed within days and removed within months. Since the construction of facilities elsewhere could take upwards of 20 years, such speedy action would inevitably create the prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament being imposed upon the Royal Navy and UK government for an indeterminate period. The SNP has a commitment to a policy of the "speediest safe transition" of the Trident nuclear deterrent out of Scotland. The Committee says that any insistence on the speediest possible removal of nuclear weapons from a separate Scotland would undoubtedly have consequences for the negotiation of the terms of secession and upon a future separate Scotland's relationship with other countries and international organisations. The Committee says that the people of Scotland deserve to know the full consequences of separation before, rather than after, they vote, and recommends that the UK and Scottish governments establish the consequences of the removal of Trident as part of the whole secession agreement as soon as possible