The Rise And Fall Of National Security Decisionmaking In The Former Ussr

This report examines the Soviet political-military mechanisms used in the Gorbachev era for national security decisionmaking and explains how the struggle over control of those mechanisms contributed to the events that led to the failed August 1991 coup. The report argues that during the months leading up to the August coup, the leaders of the military-industrial complex discovered that the centrifugal process in the USSR steadily whittled away at their traditional ability to use central institutions to carry out unilateral decisions affecting the republics, and that a prominent motive for the coup was the hope of halting that process by preventing the imminent signing of a union treaty that would formalize a vast further reduction in the degree of influence those leaders enjoyed. The critical issue of the ideological leanings of the actors involved in whatever new supreme institutions for national security coordinating and decisionmaking eventually reemerge in Russia was underscored in the spring of 1992 by disturbing signs that Yeltsin was coming under increasing pressure to make concessions to the traditionally dominant forces in the military institution.

This work examines the CFE Treaty as a factor in Russia’s foreign and security policy. Moscow showed amazing persistence in their relationship with the "cornerstone of European security." Their approach to the treaty was a genuine attempt to shape the security environment in Europe and the former USSR. The treaty also enabled the dismantling of large conventional forces as they returned from Eastern Europe and transitioned into the armies of the newly independent states of the former USSR. The CFE Treaty, though, proved ineffective at constraining the enlargement of NATO. Simultaneously, Moscow’s foreign and security policy evolved from one that focused on the domestic development of the country to that of a more confident state reasserting itself as a great power. Drawing extensively on primary sources and analyses by Russian authors, this book employs two historical narratives, case studies, and a conceptual framework to show that while Moscow remained engaged with the CFE Treaty, undesired effects on Russia’s national interests gradually accrued at the expense of desired ones, leading Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russia from the treaty as an act of de-coupling from the "collective West." This book is relevant to scholars and policymakers who want to understand Russia’s approach to arms control as an element of military security.

This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall of the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political realities, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late 1980s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in 1994 provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces in 1997-98, the momentum was not continued under the Putin government. It argues that Putin’s policies of bolstering central control over all aspects of decision making has left untouched many key problems facing the Russian military, including infighting between different force structures, lack of transparency and independent scrutiny over defence spending, and absence of consensus on the main threats to Russia and optimum force posture. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military.

Das Buch ist eine Analyse von Aufstieg und Fall des sowjetischen Herrschaftssystems in dem Gebiet, das zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges "Osteuropa" genannt wurde, und der Rolle, die das Deutschlandproblem dabei gespielt hat. Gestützt auf die Auswertung neuer Quellen aus den Partei- und Staatsarchiven ehemals kommunistischerer Länder rekonstruiert es die folgende Entwicklung: die Teilung Deutschlands und dabei die Rolle der Sowjetunion unter Stalin; das eiserne Festhalten seiner Nachfolger an der Teilung; ihr zunehmendes Bewusstsein der hohen Kosten, welche die Aufrechterhaltung des imperialen Systems in Ostmitteleuropa verursachte; der Fehlschlag ihrer Anstrengungen, die wachsende wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Abhängigkeit der DDR von der Bundesrepublik zu verhindern; und schließlich die Gründe dafür, warum Gorbatschow die Auflösung des sowjetischen Herrschaftsbereichs in Ostmitteleuropa hinnahm und sogar der Mitgliedschaft des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands in der Nato zustimmte."Angesichts der russischen Okkupation der Krim, der anhaltenden Krise in der Ostukraine und der dadurch ausgelösten Gegenreaktionen von NATO und EU scheint sich der Kalte Krieg in Europa zurückgemeldet zu haben. Geeigneter kann der Zeitpunkt für die überarbeitete Neuauflage des sich inzwischen zu einem Standardwerk entwickelten Buches von Hannes Adomeit nicht sein. Seine profunde Kenntnis und Auseinandersetzung mit sowjetischer und russischer Politik seit fünf Jahrzehnten und sein Zugang zu neuem russischen Archivmaterial qualifiziert ihn zu einem der besten und erfahrensten Experten auf internationaler Ebene. Wer die sowjetische Politik nach dem II. Weltkrieg bis zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und ihre Implikationen für die letzten 25 Jahre verstehen will, kommt an Adomeits Buch und seiner analytischen Brillanz nicht vorbei". Prof. Dr. h.c. Horst Teltschik, September 2015 "Of all of the analyses of the fall of the Soviet Union and reunification of Germany, Hannes Adomeit's 1998 classic, "Imperial Overstretch", has stood the test of time. Its re-publication here by Nomos, with some modest updates by the author, will be welcomed by scholars, students, the policy community, and the informed public, as a trenchant interpretation of what happened to the 'Soviet bloc', but also as an introduction to the assertive imperial politics of Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation." Norman M. Naimark, Stanford University, November 2015

Scholars attribute the collapse of the Soviet Union in part to the militarization of its economy. But during the Cold War, economic studies of the USSR largely neglected the military sector of the Soviet economy-its dominant and most successful part. This is all the more puzzling in that academic study of the Soviet economy in the US was specifically created to help fight the Cold War. If the rival superpower maintained the peacetime war economy, why did experts fail to tell us when it mattered? Vladimir Kontorovich shows how Western economists came up with strained non-military interpretations of several important aspects of the Soviet economy which the Soviets themselves acknowledged to have military significance. Such "civilianization" suggests that the neglect of the military sector was not forced on scholars of the Soviet economy by secrecy; it was their choice. The explanation of this choice in Reluctant Cold Warriors raises many questions about the internal workings of economic Sovietology and its intellectual and political background. Are peripheral academic fields mimicking the agenda of the discipline's mainstream more likely to produce faulty scholarship? Did the search for the essence of socialism distract researchers from the actual Soviet economy? Were economic Sovietologists under political pressure, and if so, in what direction? This book answers these questions in a way that has broad relevance for national security uses of social science today.

The legal foundation of the contemporary European security order is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Negotiated by NATO and the Warsaw Pact states as the Cold War was ending and implemented as the new Europe took shape, the CFE Treaty imposes strict limits on the armed forces of all the major European states. This book takes a detailed look at the origins and evolution of the CFE negotiations and the impact of the CFE Treaty on European Security. It draws extensively on interviews with participants in the CFE negotiations and offers a careful reconstruction of a process that contributed to the transformation of Cold War Europe, a critical assessment of the treaty's contribution to security in post-Cold War Europe, and an evaluation of the lessons of CFE for future conventional arms control initiatives. CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 6

Throughout the Cold War, people worldwide feared that the U.S. and Soviet governments could not prevent a nuclear showdown. Citizens from both East-bloc and Western countries, among them prominent scientists and physicians, formed networks to promote ideas and policies that would lessen this danger. Two of their organizations—the Pugwash movement and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—won Nobel Peace Prizes. Still, many observers believe that their influence was negligible and that the Reagan administration deserves sole credit for ending the Cold War. The first book to explore the impact these activists had on the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain, Unarmed Forces demonstrates the importance of their efforts on behalf of arms control and disarmament.Matthew Evangelista examines the work of transnational peace movements throughout the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev eras and into the first years of Boris Yeltsin's leadership. Drawing on extensive research in Russian archives and on interviews with Russian and Western activists and policymakers, he investigates the sources of Soviet policy on nuclear testing, strategic defense, and conventional forces. Evangelista concludes that transnational actors at times played a crucial role in influencing Soviet policy—specifically in encouraging moderate as opposed to hard-line responses—for they supplied both information and ideas to that closed society. Evangelista's findings challenge widely accepted views about the peaceful resolution of the Cold War. By revealing the connection between a state's domestic structure and its susceptibility to the influence of transnational groups, Unarmed Forces will also stimulate thinking about the broader issue of how government policy is shaped.

This book provides empirically grounded conceptual, design and practical advice on conducting process tracing, a key method of qualitative research.