The Rise And Fall Of The Grand Alliance 1941 45

This collection by leading British and American scholars on twentieth century international history covers the strategy, diplomacy and intelligence of the Anglo-American-Soviet alliance during the Second World War. It includes the evolution of allied war aims in both the European and Pacific theatres, the policies surrounding the development and use of the atomic bomb and the evolution of the international intelligence community. It also considers the origins and consequences of inter-allied economic relations as they emerged during the war and the personal relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Provides a guide to the extensive literature on the war in the East, including largely unknown Soviet writing on the subject. Sections on policy and strategy, the military campaign, the ideologically motivated war of annihilation in the East, the occupation, and coming to terms with the results of the war offer a wealth of bibliographic citations, and include introductions detailing history of the period and related issues. For military historians, and for scholars who approach this period in history from a socio-economic or cultural perspective. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies.

This “uncommonly astute study” examines the early development of the US-UK military alliance that would eventually lead to victory in WWII (Paul Miles, author of FDR’s Admiral). On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft sank the American gunboat Panay outside Nanjing, China. Although the Japanese apologized, President Roosevelt set Captain Royal Ingersoll to London to begin conversations with the British admiralty about Japanese aggression in the Far East. While few Americans remember the Panay Incident, it was the start of what would become the “Special Relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. In The Origins of the Grand Alliance, William T. Johnsen provides the first comprehensive analysis of Anglo-American military collaboration before the Second World War. He sets the stage by examining Anglo-French and Anglo-American coalition military planning from 1900 through World War I and the interwar years. Johnsen also considers the formulation of policy and grand strategy, operational planning, and the creation of the command structure and channels of communication. He addresses vitally important logistical and materiel issues, particularly the difficulties of war production. Drawn from extensive sources and private papers held in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, Johnsen’s exhaustively researched study casts new light on the twentieth century’s most significant alliance.

In April 1945, Churchill said to Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 'There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them!' When he became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940 Churchill was without allies. Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain saved Britain from immediate defeat, but it was evident that Britain alone could never win the war. Churchill looked to America. He said that until Pearl Harbor 'no lover ever studied every whim of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt'. But would Roosevelt have entered the war if Pearl Harbor had not taken place? Until then his actions were ambivalent, and even afterwards America's policy was largely shaped by self-interest and her idea of what a post-war world should be like.Lend-Lease, for instance, was far from what Churchill publicly described as 'the most unsordid act in the history of any nation', but rather a tool of American policy. Churchill's account of relations with his allies and associates was sanitised for the historical record and has been accepted uncritically. In reality he had to battle with the generals and the CIGS, Tory backbenchers and the War Cabinet, de Gaulle and the Free French and - above all - the Americans. Even his wife, Clementine, could on occasions be remarkably unsupportive. He told his secretary, 'The difficulty is not in winning the war; it is in persuading people to let you win it - persuading fools'. Walter Reid, the author of several acclaimed works on 20th-century military history, brings together the result of recent research to create a powerful narrative which reveals how much time and energy was devoted to fighting the war that was excluded from the official accounts, the war with the allies.

Although the years 1921-48 saw a gradual strengthening of the so-called 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain, anglophobia remained a potent force in American political life throughout that period. In Twisting the Lion's Tail , John E. Moser examines this phenomenon, showing how traditional American images of King George III and the redcoats were revived by immigrants, farmers and other groups hoping to advance an anti-British agenda.

Agreements between nations constitute the fundamental framework for the ordering of international affairs; and their successes and failures have led to some of the great turning points in modern history. The result of a unique collaboration by historians and political scientists, this book delineates, defines and assesses the idea of pacts and alliances as a key model of political organisation. Anchored by leading academics in the field, it presents numerous case studies covering a broad chronological sweep. Through theoretical and empirical methodology, the contributors address pacts and alliances from the fifteenth century onwards including, among others, the Korean-American and Moscow-Cairo alliances, the Sevres Pact, Turkey's accession to NATO and US alliances around the world. Through a close reading of these historical diplomatic relationships, fundamental yet relatively unaddressed research questions are developed and explored. First, what are the common denominators shared by successful alliances? Second, why do pacts and alliances disintegrate? Third, is the eventual demise of pacts and alliances inevitable? Finally, what are the implications of these issues on pact and alliance making today? This is the first volume to address this wide range of issues, and to bring together researchers and theorists from the historical and political disciplines to provide original and groundbreaking theories of diplomacy. Together, these case studies explore why alliances succeed, why they fail and why it matters. Pacts and Alliances in History is therefore not only important reading for the next generation of policymakers, but will also help frame scholars' enquiries as they try to understand key events in international relations and history.