The Rise And Fall Of The Right Of Silence

Within an international context in which the right to silence has long been regarded as sacrosanct, this book provides the first comprehensive, empirically-based analysis of the effects of curtailing the right to silence. The right to silence has served as the practical expression of the principles that an individual was to be considered innocent until proven guilty, and that it was for the prosecution to establish guilt. In 1791, the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution proclaimed that none ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’. In more recent times, the privilege against self-incrimination has been a founding principle for the International Criminal Court, the new South African constitution and the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Despite this pedigree, over the past 30 years when governments have felt under pressure to combat crime or terrorism, the right to silence has been reconsidered (as in Australia), curtailed (in most of the United Kingdom) or circumvented (by the creation of the military tribunals to try the Guantánamo detainees). The analysis here focuses upon the effects of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in England and Wales. There, curtailing the right to silence was advocated in terms of ‘common sense’ policy-making and was achieved by an eclectic borrowing of concepts and policies from other jurisdictions. The implications of curtailing this right are here explored in detail with reference to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but within a comparative context that examines how different ‘types’ of legal systems regard the right to silence and the effects of constitutional protection.

Within an international context in which the right to silence has long been regarded as sacrosanct, this book provides the first comprehensive, empirically-based analysis of the effects of curtailing the right to silence. The right to silence has served as the practical expression of the principles that an individual was to be considered innocent until proven guilty, and that it was for the prosecution to establish guilt. In 1791, the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution proclaimed that none ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’. In more recent times, the privilege against self-incrimination has been a founding principle for the International Criminal Court, the new South African constitution and the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Despite this pedigree, over the past 30 years when governments have felt under pressure to combat crime or terrorism, the right to silence has been reconsidered (as in Australia), curtailed (in most of the United Kingdom) or circumvented (by the creation of the military tribunals to try the Guantánamo detainees). The analysis here focuses upon the effects of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 in England and Wales. There, curtailing the right to silence was advocated in terms of ‘common sense’ policy-making and was achieved by an eclectic borrowing of concepts and policies from other jurisdictions. The implications of curtailing this right are here explored in detail with reference to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but within a comparative context that examines how different ‘types’ of legal systems regard the right to silence and the effects of constitutional protection.

This edited collection explores the topic of disclosure of evidence and information in the criminal justice process. The book critically analyses the major issues driving the long-standing problem of dysfunctional disclosure practice, with contributions from academics, lawyers, former police officers, and current police policymakers. The ultimate objective is to review the key problems at the investigative, trial and post-conviction stages of criminal proceedings, and to suggest a way forward through potential routes of reform, both legal and cultural. The collection represents a significant and novel contribution to the policy debate regarding disclosure, and advances thought on resolving this issue in a fair and sustainable manner. The book provides a valuable resource for academics, practitioners and policymakers working on this vital aspect of criminal procedure.

Can we rely solely on statistics when we judge what is true and just? This book takes a holistic approach to addressing this question. It considers the legal trial as its paradigmatic case study before analysing a wide range of different cases, including profiling, the use of algorithms to predict students' grades, and the authorisation of automated cars. The book suggests that when we make judgements about the truth or about justice, approximations are not good enough. Truth and justice are uncompromising. They must be so, because the value that underlies them both is respect; and respect takes no compromise. Thus, in the search for truth as in the search for justice, a body of evidence that imposes a statistical compromise will not do. Only evidence that in principle allows reaching the truth and doing justice is good evidence. Once such evidence has been traced, the burden is on us to make good use of the evidence and reach truth and justice. We might or might not succeed, but once we have done our best on evidence that allows success, our judgements are justified; and as such, they can resolve conflicts over the truth and over justice.

In November 2016 the University of Brighton hosted a one day conference entitled “The Future of Human Rights in the UK”. Legal academics and practitioners from across the UK and Ireland attended to discuss the various topical issues that arise under the title of the conference. Papers were presented on terrorism and counter-terrorism, the role of the European Court of Human Rights, surrogacy and parental rights, union rights, social and economic rights and Brexit; to name but a few. This edited collection comprises a selection of the papers presented. It is a thought-provoking collection designed to make the reader ask themselves: what does the future of human rights in the UK look like?

The culture of defense work has undergone significant change over the course of the last twenty years. These changes may have generated confusion and uncertainty concerning the role of the defense lawyer in the modern era. If the lawyer is confused as to his role, is it possible to zealously advance the best interests of his client? While the role of the defense has been explored through the culture of their law firms, the individualized role of the defense lawyer in the context of criminal procedure and their contribution to adversarial justice is something that has not been exposed to scrutiny. This book explores how lawyers view their own individual role in the context of the changed obligations introduced by the CPIA 1996 and the CrimPR, looking at the defense lawyer as part of a system, rather than as part of a relationship. Through a theoretical lens, Ed Johnston provides a wider perspective on the changing nature of criminal justice and the place of a key actor within it to draw conclusions regarding the role of the defense lawyer in the modern era.

Roberts and Zuckerman's Criminal Evidence is the eagerly-anticipated third of edition of the market-leading text on criminal evidence, fully revised to take account of developments in legislation, case-law, policy debates, and academic commentary during the decade since the previous edition was published. With an explicit focus on the rules and principles of criminal trial procedure, Roberts and Zuckerman's Criminal Evidence develops a coherent account of evidence law which is doctrinally detailed, securely grounded in a normative theoretical framework, and sensitive to the institutional and socio-legal factors shaping criminal litigation in practice. The book is designed to be accessible to the beginner, informative to the criminal court judge or legal practitioner, and thought-provoking to the advanced student and scholar: a textbook and monograph rolled into one. The book also provides an ideal disciplinary map and work of reference to introduce non-lawyers (including forensic scientists and other expert witnesses) to the foundational assumptions and technical intricacies of criminal trial procedure in England and Wales, and will be an invaluable resource for courts, lawyers and scholars in other jurisdictions seeking comparative insight and understanding of evidentiary regulation in the common law tradition.

This volume considers the way in which the focus on individual rights may constitute an obstacle to ensuring fairness in criminal proceedings. The increasingly cosmopolitan nature of criminal justice, forcing legal systems with different institutional forms and practices to interact with each other as they attempt to combat crime beyond national borders, has accentuated the need for systems to seek legitimacy beyond their domestic traditions. Fairness, expressed in terms of the right to a fair trial in provisions such as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has emerged across Europe as the principal means of guaranteeing the legitimacy of criminal proceedings. The consequence of this is that criminal procedure doctrines are framed overwhelmingly in 'constitutional' terms – the protection of defence rights is necessary to restrict and legitimate the state's mandate to prosecute crime. Yet there are various problems with relying solely or predominantly on defence rights as a means of ensuring that proceedings are 'fair' or legitimate and these issues are rarely discussed in the academic literature. In this volume, scholars from the disciplines of law, philosophy and sociology challenge various normative assumptions underpinning our understanding of fairness in criminal proceedings.