The Rules Of Federalism

This book examines patterns of environmental regulation in the European Union and four federal polities--the United States, Germany, Australia, and Canada. Daniel Kelemen develops a theory of regulatory federalism based on his comparative study, arguing that the greater the fragmentation of power at the federal level, the less discretion is allotted to component states. Kelemen's analysis offers a novel perspective on the EU and demonstrates that the EU already acts as a federal polity in the regulatory arena. In The Rules of Federalism, Kelemen shows that both the structure of the EU's institutions and the control these institutions exert over member states closely resemble the American federal system, with its separation of powers, large number of veto points, and highly detailed, judicially enforceable legislation. In the EU, as in the United States, a high degree of fragmentation in the central government yields a low degree of discretion for member states when it comes to implementing regulatory statutes. Table of Contents: Acknowledgments 1. Regulatory Federalism and the EU 2. Environmental Regulation in the EU 3. Environmental Regulation in the United States 4. Environmental Regulation in Germany 5. Environmental Regulation in Australia and Canada 6. Food and Drug Safety Regulation in the EU 7. Institutional Structure and Regulatory Style Notes References Cases Cited Index R. Daniel Kelemen's The Rules of Federalism is an important contribution to both the literature on federalism and on the European Union. It makes an original theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of regulatory federalism and sheds new light on the federal systems which it compares. It will open up new avenues of inquiry. --Alberta Sbragia, University of Pittsburgh The Rules of Federalism makes a significant contribution to the literature on regulatory federalism. Keleman's original theoretical perspective is made plausible through a series of fascinating case studies. The book will be of interest to scholars of federalism, constitutional design, environmental policy, and the European Union. --Susan Rose-Ackerman, Yale Law School

Early Americans were suspicious of centralized authority and executive power. Casting away the yoke of England and its king, the founding fathers shared in this distrust as they set out to pen the Constitution. Weighing a need for consolidated leadership with a demand for states' rights, they established a large federal republic with limited dominion over the states, leaving most of the governing responsibility with the former colonies. With this dual system of federalism, the national government held the powers of war, taxation, and commerce, and the ability to pass the laws necessary to uphold these functions. Although the federal role has grown substantially since then, states and local governments continue to perform most of the duties in civil and criminal law, business and professional licensing, the management of infrastructure and public services: roads, schools, libraries, sanitation, land use and development, and etc. Despite the critical roles of state and local governments, there is little awareness-or understanding-of the nature and operations of the federal system. This Very Short Introduction provides a concise overview of federalism, from its origins and evolution to the key events and constitutional decisions that have defined its framework. Although the primary focus is on the United States, other federal systems, including Brazil, Canada, India, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the EU, are addressed.

With the increased mobility and interdependence brought on by globalisation, governments can no longer deal effectively with what were traditionally regarded as «domestic issues» unless they cooperate among themselves. International law may once have been a sort of inter-state law concerned mostly with relations between states, but it now looks increasingly inside state borders and has become, to a large degree, a trans-governmental law. While this creates significant challenges even for highly-unified «nation-states», the challenges are even greater for federations in which powers have been divided up between the central government and federated states. What roles should central governments and federated states play in creating and implementing this new form of governance? Using the Canadian federation as its starting point, this case study illustrates a range of factors to be considered in the appropriate distribution of treaty powers within a federation. Professor Cyr also shows how - because it has no specific provisions dealing with the distribution of treaty powers - the Canadian constitution has «organically» developed a tight-knit set of rules and principles responding to these distributional factors. This book is therefore both about the role of federated states in the current world order and an illustration of how organic constitutionalism works.

The authors of this engaging book discuss whether federalism promotes or undermines rights. With emerging democracies in Europe and elsewhere currently attempting to design constitutions that combine effective government, recognition of ethnic diversity within their populations, and protection of individual rights, the importance of these questions cannot be overstated. The authors examine both the theoretical perspectives on the relationship between federalism and rights, and the historical and contemporary relationship between federalism and rights in the United States. The contributors to this volume analyze the U.S. federal system as a potential model for contemporary constitution-makers as well as explore how its system can serve as a cautionary example. Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Federalism. Contributors include: Dorthy Toth Beasley; Irwin Cotler; Talbolt Dslemberte; Daniel J. Elazar; A.E. Dick Howard; Gary J. Jacobsohn; Koen Lenaerts; Jean Yarborough; Michael P. Zuckert.

This book examines the theory, law, and reality of preemption choice. The Constitution's federalist structures protect states' sovereignty but also create a powerful federal government that can preempt and thereby displace the authority of state and local governments and courts to respond to a social challenge. Despite this preemptive power, Congress and agencies have seldom preempted state power. Instead, they typically have embraced concurrent, overlapping power. Recent legislative, agency, and court actions, however, reveal an aggressive use of federal preemption, sometimes even preempting more protective state law. Preemption choice fundamentally involves issues of institutional choice and regulatory design: should federal actors displace or work in conjunction with other legal institutions? This book moves logically through each preemption choice step, ranging from underlying theory to constitutional history, to preemption doctrine, to assessment of when preemptive regimes make sense and when state regulation and common law should retain latitude for dynamism and innovation.

Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide "one voice" in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad.

"Federalism, defined generally as a collection of self-governing regions under a central government, is widely viewed as a sensible choice of polity both for emerging democracies and for established states. But while federal institutions are positively correlated with valued economic, democratic, and justice outcomes, ultimately it is unclear how they are connected and which cause which. In Democratic Federalism, Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld explore how federalism works and propose concrete and proven policy guidance on how federalist policies can be designed and implemented successfully. The authors define federalism according to three parameters: how much federal revenue comes through local governmental bodies, the number of local governmental bodies, and the extent to which these local bodies are represented federally. In applying these parameters to economic concepts and theory, Inman and Rubinfeld explain how federalism works in a way meant to engage scholars in political science and sociology and policymakers drafting regulation in federalist governments. The book offers applicable ideas and comparative case studies on how to assess potential policies and how to actually design federalist institutions from scratch. Both authors have real experience with both, most notably in their work advising the South African government on how to build a federalist democracy. This book will be an essential guide to understanding and applying federalist concepts and principles"--