The Sino Indian War Of 1962

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of maps -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on contributors -- Introduction -- Part 1 Bilateral perspectives -- 1 India's relations with China, 1945-74 -- 2 Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt and the prehistory of the Sino-Indian border war -- 3 From 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' to 'international class struggle' against Nehru: China's India policy and the frontier dispute, 1950-62 -- 4 The strategic and regional contexts of the Sino-Indian border conflict: China's policy of conciliation with its neighbours -- Part 2 International perspectives

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 forms a major landmark in South Asian, Asian and Cold War history. Among others, it resulted in an unresolved conflict permanently hindering rapprochement between China and India, the establishment of the Sino-Pakistani axis, the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split and had a lasting impact on Indian domestic affairs. This volume draws on new documentary evidence to re-evaluate perceptions, motivations and decision-making processes of both antagonists, but also of third powers immediately affected by the conflict. It also investigates the effect on India’s internal politics, its Constitution, the Communist Party of India and the fate of Indians of Chinese origin. Finally, it analyses how the conflict is viewed in India today and its ramifications for India–China relationship. A major intervention in the Asian historical landscape, this book will be indispensable to scholars and researchers of modern history, especially of modern South Asia and China, international relations, defence and strategic studies, international politics and government. It will also be useful for think-tanks and government agencies.

For a hundred years, British and Chinese territorial claims in the Himalayas conflicted, with Indian historians claiming that the region was the fountainhead of Hindu civilization. In the halcyon days of the Raj, London saw Afghanistan and Tibet as buffers against Russian and Chinese imperialism. In 1913, an ephemeral agreement between Britain, Tibet and China was signed, recognizing the McMahon Line as the border of the disputed territory. China, however, failed to ratify the agreement, while India protested against a loss of historical land.After the Second World War, India became independent of Britain and Chinese Communists proclaimed a peoples republic. Despite cordial overtures from Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in late 1950 the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet. In the ensuing twelve years, Indian diplomacy and Chinese cartographic aggression were punctuated by border incidents, particularly in 1953 when armed clashes precipitated a significant increase in the disposition of troops by both sides. In the spring of 1962, Indian forces flooded into the Ladakh region of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, to check the Chinese.In a spiralling game of brinkmanship, in September, ground forces were strategically deployed and redeployed. On 10 October, thirty-three Chinese died in a firefight near Dhola.Embittered by Moscows support of India against a sister communist state, and in a bid to clip Nehrus belligerent wings, on 20 October, the PLA launched a two-pronged attack against Indian positions.

Bruce Riedel provides new perspective and insights into Kennedy's forgotten crisis in the most dangerous days of the cold war. The Cuban Missile Crisis defined the presidency of John F. Kennedy. But during the same week that the world stood transfixed by the possibility of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Kennedy was also consumed by a war that has escaped history's attention, yet still significantly reverberates today: the Sino-Indian conflict. As well-armed troops from the People's Republic of China surged into Indian-held territory in October 1962, Kennedy ordered an emergency airlift of supplies to the Indian army. He engaged in diplomatic talks that kept the neighboring Pakistanis out of the fighting. The conflict came to an end with a unilateral Chinese cease-fire, relieving Kennedy of a decision to intervene militarily in support of India. Bruce Riedel, a CIA and National Security Council veteran, provides the first full narrative of this crisis, which played out during the tense negotiations with Moscow over Cuba. He also describes another, nearly forgotten episode of U.S. espionage during the war between India and China: secret U.S. support of Tibetan opposition to Chinese occupation of Tibet. He details how the United States, beginning in 1957, trained and parachuted Tibetan guerrillas into Tibet to fight Chinese military forces. The United States did not abandon this covert support until relations were normalized with China in the 1970s. Riedel tells this story of war, diplomacy, and covert action with authority and perspective. He draws on newly declassified letters between Kennedy and Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, along with the diaries and memoirs of key players and other sources, to make this the definitive account of JFK's forgotten crisis. This is, Riedel writes, Kennedy's finest hour as you have never read it before.

The Sino-Indian War of 1962 delivered a crushing defeat to India: not only did the country suffer a loss of lives and a heavy blow to its pride, the world began to see India as the provocateur of the war, with China ‘merely defending’ its territory. This perception that China was largely the innocent victim of Nehru’s hostile policies was put forth by journalist Neville Maxwell in his book India’s China War, which found readers in many opinion makers, including Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. For far too long, Maxwell’s narrative, which sees India as the aggressor and China as the victim, has held court. Nearly 50 years after Maxwell’s book, Bertil Lintner’s China’s India War puts the ‘border dispute’ into its rightful perspective. Lintner argues that China began planning the war as early as 1959 and proposes that it was merely a small move in the larger strategic game that China was playing to become a world player—one that it continues to play even today.

This is one of those rare books that puts an entirely new light on a chapter of history, and it must be read by anyone concerned with international affairs. Although cool and scholarly it unrolls like a fascinating thriller. It is an important work of revisionist history and a gruesome study of the way in which wars start, superbly documented (largely from official Indian sources but also from secret Indian papers) and beautifully sustained. By showing how India led the world up the garden path it demolishes and throws to the wind a pillar of the 'contain China' doctrine -- the belief that in 1962 India was the victim of unprovoked Chinese aggression. Maxwell's book is magnificent on every count, an historical achievement of the first rank.