The Subject S Of Phenomenology

Bringing together established researchers and emerging scholars alike to discuss new readings of Husserl and to reignite the much needed discussion of what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about, this volume sets out to critically re-evaluate (and challenge) the predominant interpretations of Husserl’s philosophy, and to adapt phenomenology to the specific philosophical challenges and context of the 21st century. “What is phenomenology?”, Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks at the beginning of his Phenomenology of Perception – and he continues: “It may seem strange that this question still has to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. It is, however, far from being resolved.” Even today, more than half a century after Merleau-Ponty’s magnum opus, the answer is in many ways still up for grasp. While it may seem obvious that the main subject of phenomenological inquiry is, in fact, the subject, it is anything but self evident what this precisely implies: Considering the immense variety of different themes and methodological self-revisions found in Husserl’s philosophy – from its Brentanian beginnings to its transcendental re-interpretation and, last but not least, to its ‘crypto-deconstruction’ in the revisions of his early manuscripts and in his later work –, one cannot but acknowledge the fact that ‘the’ subject of phenomenology marks an irreducible plurality of possible subjects. Paying tribute to this irreducible plurality the volume sets out to develop interpretative takes on the phenomenological tradition which transcend both its naive celebration and its brute rejection, to re-articulate the positions of other philosophers within the framework of Husserl’s thought, and to engage in an investigative dialogue between traditionally opposed camps within phenomenology and beyond.

Bringing together established researchers and emerging scholars alike to discuss new readings of Husserl and to reignite the much needed discussion of what phenomenology actually is and can possibly be about, this volume sets out to critically re-evaluate (and challenge) the predominant interpretations of Husserls philosophy, and to adapt phenomenology to the specific philosophical challenges and context of the 21st century. "What is phenomenology?", Maurice Merleau-Ponty asks at the beginning of his Phenomenology of Perception - and he continues: "It may seem strange that this question still has to be asked half a century after the first works of Husserl. It is, however, far from being resolved." Even today, more than half a century after Merleau-Pontys magnum opus, the answer is in many ways still up for grasp. While it may seem obvious that the main subject of phenomenological inquiry is, in fact, the subject, it is anything but self evident what this precisely implies: Considering the immense variety of different themes and methodological self-revisions found in Husserls philosophy - from its Brentanian beginnings to its transcendental re-interpretation and, last but not least, to its 'crypto-deconstruction in the revisions of his early manuscripts and in his later work -, one cannot but acknowledge the fact that 'the subject of phenomenology marks an irreducible plurality of possible subjects. Paying tribute to this irreducible plurality the volume sets out to develop interpretative takes on the phenomenological tradition which transcend both its naive celebration and its brute rejection, to re-articulate the positions of other philosophers within the framework of Husserls thought, and to engage in an investigative dialogue between traditionally opposed camps within phenomenology and beyond.

The central task of phenomenology is to investigate the nature of consciousness and its relations to objects of various types. The present book introduces students and other readers to several foundational topics of phenomenological inquiry, and illustrates phenomenology’s contemporary relevance. The main topics include consciousness, intentionality, perception, meaning, and knowledge. The book also contains critical assessments of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method. It argues that knowledge is the most fundamental mode of consciousness, and that the central theses constitutive of Husserl’s "transcendental idealism" are compatible with metaphysical realism regarding the objects of thought, perception, and knowledge. Helpful tools include introductions that help the reader segue from the previous chapter to the new one, chapter conclusions, and suggested reading lists of primary and some key secondary sources. Key Features: Elucidates and engages with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind Provides clear prose explanations of the necessary distinctions and arguments required for understanding the subject Places knowledge at the center of phenomenological inquiry

Explores the connection between epistemological and moral "lying," interspersing a phenomenology of deceit with a continuing dialogue between the phenomenologist and one of her students.

This volume explores the essential issues involved in bringing phenomenology together with the cognitive sciences, and provides some examples of research located at the intersection of these disciplines. The topics addressed here cover a lot of ground, including questions about naturalizing phenomenology, the precise methods of phenomenology and how they can be used in the empirical cognitive sciences, specific analyses of perception, attention, emotion, imagination, embodied movement, action and agency, representation and cognition, inters- jectivity, language and metaphor. In addition there are chapters that focus on empirical experiments involving psychophysics, perception, and neuro- and psychopathologies. The idea that phenomenology, understood as a philosophical approach taken by thinkers like Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others, can offer a positive contribution to the cognitive sciences is a relatively recent idea. Prior to the 1990s, phenomenology was employed in a critique of the first wave of cognitivist and computational approaches to the mind (see Dreyfus 1972). What some consider a second wave in cognitive science, with emphasis on connectionism and neuros- ence, opened up possibilities for phenomenological intervention in a more positive way, resulting in proposals like neurophenomenology (Varela 1996). Thus, bra- imaging technologies can turn to phenomenological insights to guide experimen- tion (see, e. g. , Jack and Roepstorff 2003; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).

Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective Intentionality brings together insights from the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology and from recent discussions of collective intentionality. Eric Chelstrom offers a unique account of how consciousness is formative of the social world-that is, in some cases our collectively thinking something to be the case is what makes it so. For instance, that the money one uses on a daily basis is worth something is not because of its physical characteristics, but because we believe that those physical traits, printed by the right institutions, make it so. Our institutions only have authority because we believe they do. This book promotes a position between atomism and collectivism. Chelstrom argues that there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as collective consciousness. Further, this book disputes the atomistic conception of the human subject, the view that individuals are like islands unto themselves, able to develop their capacities independent from others, and free of necessary relations to others. The resulting analysis in the work offers a strong challenge to common interpretations of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Social Phenomenology is primarily written for phenomenologists concerned with the social world. Its broader aim, however, is to draw into dialogue both analytic and continental philosophers working in social philosophy, specifically on collective intentionality. Book jacket.

Shaun Gallagher offers an exciting contemporary perspective of the subject by retrieving many important insights made by the classic phenomenological philosophers, updating some of these insights in innovative ways, and showing how they directly relate to ongoing debates in philosophy and psychology.

The classic conception of human transcendental consciousness assumes its self-supporting existential status within the horizon of life-world, nature and earth. Yet this assumed absoluteness does not entail the nature of its powers, neither their constitutive force. This latter call for an existential source reaching beyond the generative life-world network. Transcendental consciousness, having lost its absolute status (its point of reference) it is the role of the logos to lay down the harmonious positioning in the cosmic sphere of the all, establishing an original foundation of phenomenology in the primogenital ontopoiesis of life. ​