The Theory Of Proper Names

This book proposes a new synthesis of the functions of proper names, from a semantic, pragmatic and syntactic perspective. Proper names are approached constructionally, distinguishing prototypical uses from more marked ones such as those in which names are used as common nouns. Since what is traditionally regarded as 'the' class of names turns out to be only one possible function of name-forms (though a prototypical one), the notion of 'proprial lemma' is introduced as the concept behind both proprial and appellative uses of such categories as place names and personal names. New formal arguments are adduced to distinguish proper name function from common noun or pronoun function. The special status of proper names is captured in a unified pragmatic-semantic-syntactic theory: a proper name denotes a unique entity at the level of langue to make it psychosocially salient within a given basic level category. The meaning of the name, if any, does not determine its denotation. An important formal reflection of this characterization of names is their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions as the poet Burns or Fido the dog. The neurolinguistic finding that proper names constitute a separate category is introduced and interpreted within a general linguistic frame of reference. The different kinds of meanings associated with names (categorical, associative, emotive, and grammatical) are shown to be presuppositional in nature. In addition, the book proposes an entirely new classification of proper names as forming a continuum ranging from prototypical (personal and place names) to nonprototypical categories (brand and language names) to citations and autonyms, and a new diachronic classification of family names and nicknames. This book fills an important gap in the current literature, because the most recent linguistic book in English on name theory dates back to 1973. It is explicitly interdisciplinary, taking into account linguistic, philosophical, neurolinguistic, sociolinguistic and dialect geographical aspects of proper names.

If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it. Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.

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Analytic philosophy is alive and in good health, as this collection of twenty, previously unpublished essays most ably demonstrates. The reader will find here assembled some of the finest writings of modern analytic philosophers at the top of their form. Matthews discusses Plato's attempt to deal with the problem of false belief about identities. Parson evaluates Russell's early theory of denoting phrases. Chisholm exhibits the utility of thirteen epistemic categories. Plantinga criticizes Chisholm's account of justification. Conee argues that solving the Gettier Problem is important, and Ginet proposes a solution to it. Lehrer criticizes an argument based on the simplicity of our belief in material objects and other minds. R. Feldman defends an account of having evidence. F. Feldman defends a propositional account of pleasure. Van Fraassen criticizes Garber's solution to the problem of old evidence. Castañeda investigates the nature of negation. McKay argues that de se analyses of belief do not account for belief de re. Richard argues that no Fregean semantics for belief attribution will succeed. Ryckman suggests that the Millian theory of names has little to do with the theory of belief is no threat to God's omniscience. Dunn investigates constraints imposed on non-classical modal logics by extensionality. Fitch argues that singular propositions perform important functions in modal logic. Jubien evaluates arguments for and against possible worlds. Ratzsch argues that there must be a deeper source of nomicality than ordinary subjunctives, and Stalnaker argues that there is room for determinancy of identity and indeterminacy in reference.

The authors discuss philosophical approaches to proper names. They assess traditional analyses and modern controversies and contribute to contemporary philosophy of language. Topics discussed include the philosophy of language, proper names, naming, definite descriptions and theories of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, J. S. Mill, Donald Davidson.