The Threat Of Inadvertent Nuclear War In South Asia

This thesis assesses the potential for a specific type of accidental nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Known as inadvertent war, such a conflict would be the result of a mistaken attempt at preemption, the launching of a nuclear attack by one nation in the mistaken belief that the other was doing likewise or was about to do so. While nuclear weapons can ordinarily be expected to exert a sobering influence on decision-makers, an escalating spiral of military activity during a crisis may generate different situational imperatives. Inadvertent war becomes possible when decision- makers perceive that conflict is inevitable and that there is a significant advantage in striking first. Evidence suggests that there is good reason for concern about the threat of inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia. The nuclear force structures adopted by India and Pakistan can be expected to exert a particularly strong influence on the potential for both of the necessary conditions for inadvertent war. The current arsenals of these countries, small and heavily dependant upon aircraft for weapons delivery, may invite preemption in the event that nuclear war appears imminent. If India and Pakistan increase their nuclear delivery capabilities by deploying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the potential for inadvertent war will be even greater. In the context of a military confrontation in South Asia, ballistic missiles are likely to contribute both to perceptions of first-strike advantage and to reinforcing military alerts that can lead to the belief that nuclear war is inevitable.

Conventional warfare between India and Pakistan could inadvertently escalate to nuclear warfare. Asymmetries in military doctrine and capability undermine deterrence stability and could lead to the use of nuclear weapons if the two nations become engaged in a large-scale conventional conflict. Following the 1998 nuclear weapons test, the 1999 Kargil Conflict played out tinder the nuclear umbrella, but remained very limited. However, there is a growing gap in conventional military capabilities, and growing pressure in India to retaliate against Pakistan for its alleged support of terrorism and insurgency. India has invested heavily in force modernization, potentially changing the scope of conventional military operations and leading to Pakistan's inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. This thesis examines the possibility of inadvertent nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan. It analyzes the deterrence system that is evolving in South Asia, and describes the conditions tinder which the system could fail. Large-scale conventional war could threaten the survival of strategic forces, or threaten vital strategic command and control functions. Finally, Pakistan could adopt a launch-on-warning posture to guard against an Indian pre-emptive attack. This thesis concludes by recommending steps that the United States could take to ensure peace and decrease de-stabilizing factors in the region.

An impending nuclear holocaust is likely to happen, if the world community does not take action. A conflict that has been simmering for many years is beginning to spiral out of control. Two nuclear powers have an unresolved dispute that has increased tensions in the region. Both countries are purchasing and developing sophisticated state-of-the-art weapons that could unleash great terror and destruction on the populations of both countries – with also serious global ramifications. The world’s most dangerous flashpoint, has the highest chance of a nuclear war occurring – it is deemed by many to be more serious that the Cuban Missile Crisis and North Korea’s nuclear sabre rattling. The dispute needs to be amicably resolved between both nations and confidence building measures need to be implemented.

In May 1998 India tested a series of nuclear devices in Pokharan. Two weeks later Pakistan announced a matching series of its own tests. A year later, when the two countries had a bitter confrontation in Kargil, the worst fears of 'proliferation pessimists' appeared to be coming true. The alarm bells have never really stopped ringing since then. In Second Strike Rajesh Rajagopalan challenges much of the conventional wisdom on the perceived nuclear danger in the region and suggests that the nuclear situation in South Asia is far less dangerous, and much more stable, than it is generally given credit for. Presenting a threefold case, the author focuses on the impact of nuclear doctrines on stability, a hitherto neglected aspect of the nuclear debate, and argues that Indian and Pakistani doctrines reduce the pressures on the two nuclear forces. Next, he presents the view that the doctrines of the two countries lessen the likelihood of accidents and other dangers such as terrorists stealing nuclear weapons. - the crucial role played by political leaders - and contends that political leaders tighten control over nuclear weapons in critical situations.

This Book Examines The Prospects Of `Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Restraint Regime In South Asia` Which Would Minimize The Risks Of Accidental, Unauthorized, Or Inadvertent Use Of Indian And/Or Pakistani Nuclear Weapons. It Recommends Effective Barriers Against The Danger Of Loose Nukes And Facility-Related Problems. Furthermore, The Book Explains The Nuclear Perils In The South Asian Strategic Environment, Along With Possible Solutions For Viable Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures And A Nuclear Restraint Regime In South Asia.

In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Cases of near nuclear use due to misunderstanding demonstrate the importance of the human judgment factor in nuclear decisionmaking. This report applies a risk lens, based on factoring probability and consequence, to a set of cases of near use and instances of sloppy practices from 1962 to 2013.

This book presents an analytical account of the causes and dangerous consequences of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.