The Treaty Of Pelindaba On The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Includes the text of the treaty

There is growing interest world wide in nuclear-free zones. Originally published in 1987, this book explores the question of what constitutes a nuclear-free zone and charts the progress of the movement to establish them. The book shows how definitions of nuclear-free zones vary from those intended to exclude everything nuclear (including nuclear power installations and the dumping of nuclear waste) to those aiming to exclude nuclear weapons in a limited way. Special attention is paid to the three treaties which have established major international nuclear-free zones, (Latin America, South Pacific, Antarctica) examining their strengths and weaknesses as well as areas where the idea has been proposed (Balkans, Africa). The book concludes with a review of problems and prospects for the future.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

This book explores the conditions under which Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) can be established. It analyzes four hypotheses that explain the factors contributing to the formation of NWFZs, building upon realist, constructivist and liberal theories from international relations. Through structured focused comparison, the book presents and compares the emergence of NWFZs in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, which is a prospect for a NWFZ. The book argues that NWFZ projects depend on the following conditions: the security interest of regional states in avoiding nuclear threats, preexisting regional institutions and regional economic cooperation, leadership by a core of regional powers and shared interest in spreading non-proliferation norms. Democracy is not a necessary condition, but democratization can help overcome barriers presented by hesitant or opposed regional governments. As too many of the mentioned necessary conditions are lacking in the Middle East, a NWFZ project, thus, will be possible only after major political changes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, security studies and International Relations.

South Africa is the first country to dismantle its nuclear weapons capability voluntarily. All nuclear devices were destroyed in 1989 and in 1993 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that there were no nuclear weapons components that have not been "rendered useless or converted to commercial non-nuclear applications or peaceful nuclear usage". South Africa's decision was a challenge to the world to take firm steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and a demonstration of the benefits that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control hold for international peace and security.

This report, submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-fifth session, was prepared by the Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, which was appointed by the Secretary-General to assist in the preparation of a comprehensive report on that matter, in accordance with Assembly resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979. The subject matter falls within the context of denuclearization of Africa, which has been the subject of continuous and active concern in the United Nations since 1961.