The U S Army Ghq Maneuvers Of 1941

The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 is a masterful study of the largest military training exercises ever conducted by a military organization attempting to mobilize and modernize simultaneously during a rapidly changing international security environment. As suggested by Christopher R. Gabel, the maneuvers had an incalculable influence on the development of the American force structure in World War II, giving Army formations experience in teamwork and combined arms. Viewed by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as the "combat college for troop leading" for the rising crop of field-grade officers, they also served to test emerging assumptions about doctrine, organization, and equipment. Gabel's work assumes its rightful place as an important and useful addition to the body of historical literature on military training. The evolution of training in the U.S. Army, particularly the linkage between maneuvers and changes in doctrine and organization, is worthy of reflection by military students and those with an interest in maneuvers as field laboratories for simulating large-scale engagements.

The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 is a masterful study of the largest military training exercises ever conducted by a military organization attempting to mobilize and modernize simultaneously during a rapidly changing international security environment. As suggested by Christopher R. Gabel, the maneuvers had an incalculable influence on the development of the American force structure in World War II, giving Army formations experience in teamwork and combined arms. Viewed by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as the "combat college for troop leading" for the rising crop of field-grade officers, they also served to test emerging assumptions about doctrine, organization, and equipment. Gabel's work assumes its rightful place as an important and useful addition to the body of historical literature on military training. The evolution of training in the U.S. Army, particularly the linkage between maneuvers and changes in doctrine and organization, is worthy of reflection by military students and those with an interest in maneuvers as field laboratories for simulating large-scale engagements.

He made his name in the jungles of the Pacific theater, was featured on the cover of Time magazine, was tapped by Douglas MacArthur to lead the invasion of Japan, and made crucial contributions to the army's tactical and operational doctrine. Yet General Walter Krueger is still one of the least-known army commanders of World War II. Kevin Holzimmer's book resurrects the brilliant career of this great military leader while deepening our understanding of the Pacific War. As head of the Sixth U.S. Army, Krueger exemplified the art of command at the operational level of war and played a pivotal role in the defeat of Japan that until now has not been fully recognized. To the public he was a "mystery man," and his abrasive personality may have sometimes caused problems for MacArthur, but his commander credited him as "swift and sure in attack, tenacious and determined in defense, modest and restrained in victory." And although Krueger left no diaries or memoirs-and stubbornly refused to record many of his personal views-Kevin Holzimmer has mined military archives on Krueger and his Sixth Army to produce a compelling biography that finally acknowledges his importance. Holzimmer first analyzes the experiences of Krueger's prewar career: testing the triangular infantry division in the late 1930s, serving in the War Plans Division, and participating in peacetime maneuvers. This training prepared him for the challenges of command in the Pacific, where he successfully forged and led a large combined-arms effort that effectively integrated infantry, armor, artillery, naval, and air forces. Holzimmer then details Krueger's remarkable leadership in the military campaigns against the Japanese. By placing Krueger's philosophy of command within the context of evolving military doctrine, Holzimmer shows how he produced tough victories against a determined enemy in an enormously difficult war zone. Unlike some overly cautious commanders of the war, Krueger was aggressive when the situated dictated, and even MacArthur admitted that "history has not given him due credit for his greatness." By showing how he breathed life into Pacific war strategy and made sure it was executed successfully, this book gives him that credit and fills a glaring gap in American military history.

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In the seventy years that have passed since the tank first appeared, antitank combat has presented one of the greatest challenges in land warfare. Dramatic improvements in tank technology and doctrine over the years have precipitated equally innovative developments in the antitank field. One cycle in this ongoing arms race occurred during the early years of World War II when the U.S. Army sought desperately to find an antidote to the vaunted German blitzkrieg. This Leavenworth Paper analyzes the origins of the tank destroyer concept, evaluates the doctrine and equipment with which tank destroyer units fought, and assesses the effectiveness of the tank destroyer in battle.

Shakespeare famously wrote that some men are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them. Part military history and part group biography, Generals in the Making tells the amazing true story of how George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, George Patton, and their peers became the greatest generation of senior commanders in military history. As the U.S. Army’s triumphant homecoming from World War I was quickly forgotten amidst two decades filled with economic depression and growing isolationism, Marshall, Eisenhower, MacArthur, Patton, Omar Bradley, Lucian Truscott, Matthew Ridgway, and their brothers in arms toiled in a profession most Americans viewed with distrust. Before they became legends, these young officers served their country in posts from Washington D.C. to Panama, from West Point to war-torn China. They taught and studied together in the Army’s schools, attempting to innovate in an era of shrinking budgets, obsolete equipment, and skeletal forces. Beyond these professional challenges, they endured shattering personal tragedies: the sudden deaths of children or spouses, divorce, depression, and court martial. Yet when the world faced possibly its darkest hour, as fascism and barbarism were on the march, they stood ready to lead America’s young men in the fight for civilization. By the end of World War II, even German commanders expressed amazement at the dynamic change in American military leadership since the Great War. Generals in the Making is the first comprehensive history of America’s World War II generals between the wars, an invaluable prequel to every history of that war.