The United Kingdom And Nuclear Deterrence

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

"Volume II of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government's strategic nuclear policy from 1964 to 1970. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, Volume II examines the controversies that developed over nuclear policy following the arrival in office of a Labour government led by Harold Wilson in October 1964 that openly questioned the independence of the deterrent. Having decided to preserve the Polaris programme, Labour ministers were nevertheless committed not to develop another generation of nuclear weapons beyond those in the pipeline, placing major doubts over the long-term future of the nuclear programme and collaboration with the United States. Defence planners also became increasingly concerned that the deployment of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences around Moscow threatened to undermine the ability of Polaris to fulfil its role as a national strategic nuclear deterrent. During 1967, under heavy pressures to control defence spending, a protracted debate was conducted within Whitehall over the future of Polaris and how to respond to the evolving ABM challenge. The volume concludes with Labour's defeat at the general election of June 1970, by which time the Royal Navy had assumed the nuclear deterrent role from the RAF, and plans had already been formulated for a UK project to improve Polaris which could both ensure its continuing credibility and rejuvenate the Anglo-American nuclear relationship."--Back cover.

In this White Paper, the Government reaffirms its commitment to maintain Britain's independent nuclear capability by investing in a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missile. However, in order to ensure the deterrent system is the minimum necessary to provide effective deterrence, there will be a further 20 per cent reduction in operationally available warheads. The Government believes this decision balances the interests of national security against its undertaking to work towards multilateral disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation, and it is fully compatible with Britain's international legal obligations. The White Paper discusses the policy context and sets out the reasons why decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent system are needed now, as well as considering the various options and their costs, and the industrial aspects involved in building the new submarines in the UK.

The Trident nuclear-deterrent program is one of the United Kingdom's largest-ever military acquisitions. Planned and initiated during the Cold War, it is now coming to fruition at a time when the most obvious justification for it--the Soviet threat to Western Europe--has disappeared. With the money largely spent or committed, Britain's continuance as a nuclear-weapon state until well into the twenty-first century seems certain. But with what point and purpose? This report examines the history, the underlying issues, the policy options, and the risks related to redefining a rationale for Britain's nuclear-deterrence program. The author reviews the role the United States has played in the development of Britain's nuclear policy and discusses how a new rationale might affect U.S.-U.K. relationships.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland’s west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK’s complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons—internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

The United Kingdom was the first country to undertake atomic energy research and development for military purposes. In April 1940 the British government commissioned a group of scientists to study the possibilities of manufacturing a ‘uranium bomb’ in wartime. Originally published in 1984, this book traces the development of British nuclear weapons from those early times to the present. It examines the decisions of Atlee and the MacMillan governments in sustaining the nuclear deterrent through the hydrogen bomb and the Polaris programme, and discusses in detail the decision to proceed with Trident. Throughout the narrative is set against the background of British domestic politics and Anglo-American relations. The book demonstrates why for nearly forty years British governments remained committed to an independent nuclear deterrent as the last line of defence should NATO fail.

The programme aims to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent beyond the life of the current system, with the introduction into service of the first of a new class of submarines in 2024. The timetable is challenging and the MoD needs to manage key risks if continuous nuclear deterrence is to be maintained. The current two year initial concept phase for the new class of submarines requires a series of important and difficult decisions to be taken by September 2009 to keep the programme on track. The MoD has appointed a Senior Responsible Owner to co-ordinate these decisions. The current predicted cost of procuring the new nuclear deterrent is between �15 billion and �20 billion (2006-7 prices), as outlined in the 2006 White Paper, The future of the UK's nuclear deterrent (Cm. 6994, ISBN 9780101699426). The estimated operating costs once the new class of submarines comes into operation are similar to those of the current deterrent, and the MoD recognises the need by September 2009 to produce robust estimates of whole-life costs. There are major areas of uncertainty in the budget, including the provision for contingency and VAT. The submarine industry is a highly specialised industrial sector with a number of monopoly suppliers and there are real difficulties in providing the right incentives for these suppliers to deliver to time and budget. The tight timetable set for ensuring the seamless transition from the present Vanguard class of submarines to the future class is challenging. A further risk to the programme is a shortage of nuclear-related skills in industry and within MoD - potentially aggravated by competition from civil nuclear projects.