The United States Army In Somalia 1992 1994

The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, covers the period when the United States intervened in the east African country of Somalia to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of forty-two members of the armed forces, resulting in the impression of chaos and disaster. Richard W. Stewart in his essay analyzes how a mission that had accomplished so much had ended in such circumstances. Stewart concludes that the military and diplomatic peace operation was doomed to failure because there was no peace to keep: The factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not yet willing to stop killing each other or anyone caught in the middle. The dedication and sacrifices made by soldiers in that war-torn country provide a lesson in heroism that remains compelling today.

CMH Pub 70-81-1. Prepared to honor the 10th anniversary of Operation Restore Hope. Places the events of the firefight of 3-4 October 1993 into the wider context of the United States humanitarian, political, and military operation to rescue a people and a state from anarchy and chaos.

This study examines the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu. That original focus can be found in the following pages, but the authors address other, broader issues as well, to include planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand.

"My Clan Against the World": US and Coalition Operations in Somalia, 1992-94 represents another in a series of military case studies published by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The impetus for this project came from the commanding general, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, who directed CSI to examine the American military's experience with urban operations in Somalia, particularly in the capital city of Mogadishu.

As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the United States had a military presence in Somalia from December 1992 to the end of March 1994. A principal aim of the authors was to provide an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. The authors address planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse of "lessons learned."