The Vietnamese Air Force 1951 1975 An Analysis Of Its Role In Combat And Fourteen Hours At Koh Tang

Illustrated with over 30 maps, diagrams and photos As the final days of Vietnam unfolded, the question was raised, “What happened to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)?" This monograph addresses that question in considerable detail. In order to sift out the story, three periods in the life of VNAF were selected-the Tet offensive of 1968, the Easter offensive of 1972, and lastly the March offensive of 1975. By examining each of these time periods, the factors at work in each period could be isolated so as to determine the performance of the VNAF. The role of the USAF was dominant in the 1968 and 1972 offensives. Although VNAF had grown in size to about 44 squadrons and 42,000 people by the time of the 1972 offensive, application of airpower at the major points of the enemy assault was U.S. Further, the bombing of the North Vietnam heartland during these two periods was the compelling leverage that resulted in the initiation and pursuit of active negotiations to stop the war. The intervening period between the peace agreement of January 27, 1973 and the North Vietnamese offensive of March 1975, was marked by fundamental changes in the character of the NVA forces and their deployment for battle. The NVA moved its center of logistics near the DMZ and into South Vietnam proper. The magnitude of SAM and AAA defenses constituted a major departure from those of the 1968 and 1972 campaigns. The VNAF, structured for a low scale war, was confronted with an enemy having the most sophisticated air defense weapons of the day.

"In this volume are two major contributions to the "airpower story.""The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951-1975, An Analysis of its Role in Combat, was written by General William W. Momyer, USAF (Ret), former commander of the air forces in Vietnam. It presents an objective review of the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and the role played by the U. S. Air Force in VNAFs short 14-year life span. To provide the necessary perspective to this complex subject, the author presents a comparative analysis of the successes and failures of airpower during the three major enemy offensives of 1968, 1972, and 1975."The conclusions touch upon some of the fundamental doctrinal principles of airpower and highlight areas that must be carefully considered in any future employment."The second monograph, although not directly related to the war in Vietnam, took place in Southeast Asia, and were performed by the same men, organizations, and machines which fought so gallantly in that war. It is almost a step-by-step account of the "Mayaguez Affair" and the role of airpower in its successful outcome. Particular emphasis is given to the courage and determination of the young helicopter pilots during the delivery and recovery of U. S. Marines from Kho Tang Island."These two monographs provide the student of airpower with an excellent case study in the tactical employment of air resources at two widely separated points in the spectrum of conflict. For the general reader, they provide a vivid and substantive discussion on the use of combat airpower and should give some understanding of the magnitude and complexity of any airpower operation, large or small." General William V. McBride Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force