The War Making Powers Of The President

Since the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration has come under fire for its methods of combating terrorism. Waging war against al Qaeda has proven to be a legal quagmire, with critics claiming that the administration's response in Afghanistan and Iraq is unconstitutional. The war on terror—and, in a larger sense, the administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and the Kyoto accords—has many wondering whether the constitutional framework for making foreign affairs decisions has been discarded by the present administration. John Yoo, formerly a lawyer in the Department of Justice, here makes the case for a completely new approach to understanding what the Constitution says about foreign affairs, particularly the powers of war and peace. Looking to American history, Yoo points out that from Truman and Korea to Clinton's intervention in Kosovo, American presidents have had to act decisively on the world stage without a declaration of war. They are able to do so, Yoo argues, because the Constitution grants the president, Congress, and the courts very different powers, requiring them to negotiate the country's foreign policy. Yoo roots his controversial analysis in a brilliant reconstruction of the original understanding of the foreign affairs power and supplements it with arguments based on constitutional text, structure, and history. Accessibly blending historical arguments with current policy debates, The Powers of War and Peace will no doubt be hotly debated. And while the questions it addresses are as old and fundamental as the Constitution itself, America's response to the September 11 attacks has renewed them with even greater force and urgency. “Can the president of the United States do whatever he likes in wartime without oversight from Congress or the courts? This year, the issue came to a head as the Bush administration struggled to maintain its aggressive approach to the detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants in the war on terrorism. But this was also the year that the administration’s claims about presidential supremacy received their most sustained intellectual defense [in] The Powers of War and Peace.”—Jeffrey Rosen, New York Times “Yoo’s theory promotes frank discussion of the national interest and makes it harder for politicians to parade policy conflicts as constitutional crises. Most important, Yoo’s approach offers a way to renew our political system’s democratic vigor.”—David B. Rivkin Jr. and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, National Review

For this new edition, Louis Fisher has updated his arguments to include critiques of the Clinton & Bush presidencies, particularly the Use of Force Act, the Iraq Resolution of 2002, the 'preemption doctrine' of the current U.S. administration, & the order authorizing military tribunals.

Discussing what war powers involve and which branch of government should control them, Reverly grapples with the full historical, political and legal complexities of this matter. He identifies the issues that must be considered, given the division of power between the President and Congress and analyzes the four main factors that shape this division -- the text of the Constitution, the purposes of its framers and ratifiers, evolving beliefs about what the Constitution requires and the various divisions of power that have existed between the President and Congress over the past two centuries. Also makes recommendations to achieve a coherent, consistent and workable war-powers policy, without endangering national security or violating the Constitution.

The Constitution of the United States divides war powers between the executive and legislative branches to guard against ill-advised or unnecessary military action. This division of powers compels both branches to hold each other accountable and work in tandem. And yet, since the Cold War, congressional ambition has waned on this front. Even when Congress does provide initial authorization for larger operations, they do not provide strict parameters or clear end dates. As a result, one president after another has initiated and carried out poorly developed and poorly executed military policy. The Politics of War Powers offers a measured, deeply informed look at how the American constitutional system broke down, how it impacts decision-making today, and how we might find our way out of this unhealthy power division. Sarah Burns starts with a nuanced account of the theoretical and historical development of war powers in the United States. Where discussions of presidential power often lean on the concept of the Lockean Prerogative, Burns locates a more constructive source in Montesquieu. Unlike Locke, Montesquieu combines universal normative prescriptions with an emphasis on tailoring the structure to the unique needs of a society. In doing so, the separation of powers can be customized while maintaining the moderation needed to create a healthy institutional balance. He demonstrates the importance of forcing the branches into dialogue, putting them, as he says, “in a position to resist” each other. Burns’s conclusion—after tracing changes through Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s administration, the Cold War, and the War on Terror—is that presidents now command a dangerous degree of unilateral power. Burns’s work ranges across Montesquieu’s theory, the debate over the creation of the Constitution, historical precedent, and the current crisis. Through her analysis, both a fuller picture of the alterations to the constitutional system and ideas on how to address the resulting imbalance of power emerge.

The thesis of this book is that our modern Presidents have hijacked Congress's constitutional war-making powers, making themselves the "kings of war." Under the Constitution, only Congress has the power to declare war. However, beginning with President Truman, our Presidents have claimed the "inherent" power as commanders in chief to commit the nation to war without congressional authorization. This power grab has had a profound effect on the balance of power between Congress and the presidency. It is the key ingredient in our current "executive-centric" national government. The book first explores how and why this happened. It begins with an historical account of the Constitutional Convention's treatment of the war-making power and the system adopted by the framers that divided the responsibilities between Congress (which decided whether war should be conducted) and the President (who conducted the war, subject to Congress's on-going power of the purse). There is a major chapter on the Northwest Indian War, under the Washington administration, which was the first war fought under the Constitution. Washington presided at the Constitutional Convention and believed that the decision to go to war was committed to Congress. Accordingly, as that war unfolded, Washington repeatedly went to Congress to request the resources he needed to fight the war. The book then explores the drastic change in that system beginning with President Truman's unilateral decision to commit the nation to war on the Korean Peninsula, and its development through the Cold War, the Vietnam War and finally President George W. Bush's most aggressive claim to the President's war powers in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There is also a chapter on the special constitutional challenges presented by the advent of nuclear weapons. The book ends with an analysis of the factors that have allowed the presidency's power grab and proposes a legislative agenda to restore the war powers system to the one enshrined in the Constitution.

Over three decades after its initial publication, Louis Fisher’s durable classic remains at the head of its class—a book that Congressional Quarterly called “as close to being indispensable as anything published in this field.” This newly revised sixth edition emphatically reinforces that sterling reputation. Fisher dissects the crucial constitutional disputes between the executive and legislative branches of government from the Constitutional Convention through President Clinton’s impeachment battles to the recent controversies over President Bush’s conduct as commander in chief. He ventures beyond traditional discussions of Supreme Court decisions to examine the day-to-day working relationships between the president and Congress. By analyzing a mixture of judicial pronouncements, executive acts, and legislative debates, Fisher pinpoints the critical areas of legislative-executive tension: appointment powers, investigatory powers, legislative and executive vetoes, the budgetary process, and war powers. He then examines these areas of tension within a concrete political and historical context. To scholars, this book offers a comprehensive examination of the institutions and issues of public law. For practitioners, general readers, and students of American government, it demonstrates how constitutional issues shape and define current events. The new edition covers for the first time: * Obama’s military decisions in Afghanistan and Iraq * Military operations against Libya in 2011 * Threatened attacks on Syria in 2013 * Efforts to close Guantánamo * Obama’s recess appointments during a pro forma session * “Fast and Furious” scandal: Holder’s contempt and Obama’s executive privilege * The growth of presidential “czars” * Executive branch secrecy and lack of accountability * State Secrets Privilege after 9/11 * Distinguishing between “implied” powers (constitutional) and “inherent” powers (not constitutional) * Pocket vetoes and the growth of “hybrid vetoes” * New developments in the President’s removal power

Fisher chronicles the expansion of the president's power to make war.