The Welfare Economics Of Markets Voting And Predation

This work dwells upon two themes, each of which differs from traditional welfare economics - predation or taking (as a source of inefficiency in the economy) and the tension between voting and markets as alternative methods of decision-making.

This thought-provoking introduction to economics exposes readers to the workings of the market in a democratic state. The text explains basic economic concepts from a political perspective: how the price mechanism substitutes for central authority in determining production and allocation of goods; the use of demand and supply curves to trace the impacts of tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quotas and patents; and the redistribution of income. Additionally the text explores political topics from an economic perspective, including the avoidance of anarchy and despotism; and the mutual dependence of markets, voting, public administration and law. Relies largely on stories and paradigms to convey important economic concepts. Explains basic economic concepts from a political perspective and explores political topics from an economic perspective. Covers topics such as the price mechanism, demand and supply curves, redistribution of income, anarchy, voting and public administration.

This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.

Welfare economics, and social choice theory, are disciplines that blend economics, ethics, political science, and mathematics. Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd Edition, include models of economic exchange and production, uncertainty, optimality, public goods, social improvement criteria, life and death choices, majority voting, Arrow??'s theorem, and theories of implementation and mechanism design. Our goal is to make value judgments about economic and political mechanisms: For instance, does the competitive market produce distributions of products and services that are good or bad for society? Does majority voting produce good or bad outcomes? How can we design tax mechanisms that result in efficient amounts of public goods being produced? We have attempted, in this book, to minimize mathematical obstacles, and to make this field accessible to undergraduate and graduate students and the interested non-expert.

Entrepreneurship is the engine of economic progress, but mainstream economic models of economic growth tend to leave out the entrepreneurial elements of the economy. This new book from Randall Holcombe begins by identifying areas in which evolutionary and Austrian approaches differ from the academic mainstream literature on economic growth, before moving on to distinguish growth from progress. The author then analyzes economic models of the firm based on the idea that it is entrepreneurship that drives economic progress. The book should prove to be a natural successor to recent Routledge books by Frederic Sautet and David Harper.

The economics of voting is about whether and to what extent self-interest may be relied upon in voting. The central proposition in economics is that the world’s work gets done satisfactorily when each person does what they think is best for themselves. The commonsense view of the matter is that this outcome alone would be chaos. This book examines voting in four key terms: self-interest, bargaining, duty and rights. Self-interest creates a voting equilibrium on various issues, notably the redistribution of income. Bargaining has a larger role to play in voting than in commerce, as it becomes essential in the formation of platforms of political parties and for the passage of laws. A duty to vote arises from the fact that a person’s vote has only an infinitesimal chance of influencing the outcome of an election. Rights are a democracy’s first line of defense against exploitation that, unless constrained, the majority rule voting enables voters to expropriate the corresponding minority, undermining democracy completely. Four key questions are asked in this book. When is there self-interest in majority rule voting comparable to the general interest in markets? To what extent does ‘government by majority rule voting’ depend upon bargaining as well as voting? Can willingness to vote be attributed to self-interest or is a sense of duty required? Does democracy require property rights? Through an examination of these terms, this book argues that they are indispensable requirements for the maintenance of government by majority rule voting. This book is essential for those who study political economy, economic theory and philosophy as well as political theory.

Focuses on leading economists who were born, or have spent the greater part of their lives, in America.

This book analyses conflict theory through one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation.