The Worth Of Persons

The death of a person is a tragedy while the explosion of a lifeless galaxy is a mere firework. The moral difference is grounded in the nature of humans: humans have intrinsic worth, a worth that makes their fate really matter. This is the worth that the Australian philosopher James Franklin proposes as the foundation of ethics. In The Worth of Persons he explains that ethics in the usual sense of right and wrong actions, rights and virtues, and how to live a good life, is founded on something more basic that is not itself about actions, namely the worth of persons. Human moral worth arises from certain properties that distinguish humans from the rest of creation (though some animals share a lesser degree of those properties): rationality, consciousness, the ability to act for reasons, emotional structure and love, individuality. This complex package makes humans the "piece of work" of which Hamlet says, “How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty." In clear prose and deeply informed philosophical argument, The Worth of Persons establishes a foundation for ethics in the equal worth of persons, which makes ethics absolutely objective and immune to relativist attacks because it is based on the metaphysical truth about humans. The Worth of Persons will appeal to all those who feel that endless debate about ethical dilemmas, rules, and principles fails to connect with what is really important ethically, that is, what makes humans matter.

John Rawls is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and his work has permanently shaped the nature and terms of moral and political philosophy, deploying a robust and specialized vocabulary that reaches beyond philosophy to political science, economics, sociology, and law. This volume is a complete and accessible guide to Rawls' vocabulary, with over 200 alphabetical encyclopaedic entries written by the world's leading Rawls scholars. From 'basic structure' to 'burdened society', from 'Sidgwick' to 'strains of commitment', and from 'Nash point' to 'natural duties', the volume covers the entirety of Rawls' central ideas and terminology, with illuminating detail and careful cross-referencing. It will be an essential resource for students and scholars of Rawls, as well as for other readers in political philosophy, ethics, political science, sociology, international relations and law.

Contractarianism in some form has been at the center of recent debates in moral and political philosophy. Jean Hampton was one of the most gifted philosophers involved in these debates and provided both important criticisms of prominent contractarian theories plus powerful defenses and applications of the core ideas of contractarianism. In these essays, she brought her distinctive approach, animated by concern for the intrinsic worth of persons, to bear on topics such as guilt, punishment, self-respect, family relations, and the maintenance and justification of the state. Edited by Daniel Farnham, this collection is an essential contribution to understanding the problems and prospectus of contractarianism in moral, legal and political philosophy.

After we fulfill our basic needs, why don't we turn to creativity or even just relaxation and comfort? And why do we see robots and AI as a threat to jobs rather than an opportunity for leisure and self-realization? Instead of seizing new opportunities, we are driven by our fears and anxieties to seek enhanced worth of person - to magnify if not improve our experience, raise the level of our regard in the eyes of others, and buffer ourselves against future exigencies. That misdirected striving for worth of person is a major force behind the destruction of our social cohesion and of the natural environment, as well as a cause of our disorientation in the face of modern technology. This work seeks to map the complexities of worth of person and how we might redirect our efforts toward deeper levels of worth and a greater ability to benefit from new technologies.

“Bioethicists have achieved consensus on two ideas pertaining to beginning of life issues: (1) persons are those beings capable of higher-order cognition, or self-consciousness, and (2) it is impermissible to kill only persons. As a consequence, a consensus is reached regarding the permissibility of both destroying human embryos for research purposes and abortion. The present collection aims to interact critically with this consensus. Authors address various aspects of this ‘orthodoxy’. Issues discussed include: theories of personhood and in particular the role of thought experiments used in support of such theories; the notion of an intrinsic potential and the moral relevance of having one; new formulations of the virtue argument against abortion rights; four-dimensionalism and abortion; the notion of moral status and who (or what) has it; scientific accounts of what a human being is, as well as addressing empirical evidence of fetal consciousness; and analysis of the public policy implications given the epistemic status of pro-choice arguments. Given the issues discussed and that the arguments in critical focus are fairly new, the collection provides a novel, comprehensive, and rigorous analysis of contemporary pro-choice arguments.”

The idea that all persons are in some way moral equals or owe each other equal respect and concern has become dogma, and thinkers who question it are often reviled as "Nazis" or "racists". The authors in this volume, however, take a more reflective and critical attitude and try to clarify concepts, showing that the argument is far from obvious.

Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" is considered to be one of the most important treatises on ethics ever written. In an incredibly detailed study of virtue and vice in man, Aristotle examines one of the most central themes to man, the nature of goodness itself. In Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics," he asserts that virtue is essential to happiness and that man must live in accordance with the "doctrine of the mean" (the balance between excess and deficiency) to achieve such happiness.

Originally published in 1969, this book provides a sustained examination of the idea of the individual person as of supreme worth in the language of analytical philosophy. An important contribution to debates in moral philosophy, it will be of use to students in the philosophy of religion and education and to those who are interested in the contribution which philosophical analysis can make to the understanding of traditional moral and political ideas.