Thomas Reid And The Way Of Ideas

This book is meant to serve as an introduction to the philosophy of Thomas Reid by way of a study of certain themes central to that philosophy as we find it expounded in his extensive and influential published writings. The choice of these themes inevitably reflects philosophical interests of the author of this book to some extent but a main consideration behind their selection is that they are extensively treated by Reid in response to treatments by certain of his predecessors in an identifiable tradition called by Yolton 'The Way ofIdeas'. My interest in Reid's philosophy was first awakened by the brilliant writings of A.N. Prior, and in particular by Part II of his posthumous 'Objects of Thought' called 'What we think about' together with his suggestion that Reid was a precursor of Mill on the signification of proper names. It is my hope that the standard of exegesis and of discussion throughout the book, and especially in the case of these topics, is a not unworthy tribute to that thinker.

This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors. Turning to the positive part of Reid's programme, the author then develops a fresh interpretation of Reid as an anticipator of present-day 'reliabilism'. Throughout the book, Reid is presented as a powerful thinker with much to say to philosophers in the twenty-first century. The book will be of interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary epistemology.

This important book will do much to reestablish the significance of Thomas Reid for philosophy today. Nicholas Wolterstorff has produced the first systematic account of Reid's epistemology. Relating Reid's philosophy to present-day epistemological discussions the author demonstrates how they are at once remarkably timely, relevant, and provocative.There is no competing book that both uncovers the deep pattern of Reid's thought and relates it to contemporary philosophical debate. It must be read by historians of philosophy as well as all philosophers concerned with epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

The thesis that the mind cannot directly apprehend features of the physical world - what Reid calls the Way of Ideas - is a staple of Early Modern philosophical tradition. This commitment to the direct awareness of, and only of, mental representations unifies the otherwise divergent philosophical systems of Rationalists and Empiricists. Thomas Reid battles against this thesis on many fronts, in particular over the nature of perception.Ryan Nichols lays the groundwork for Reid's theory of perception by developing Reid's unheralded argument against a representational theory of thought, which Nichols applies to his discussion of the intentionality of perceptual states and Reid's appeal to 'signs'. Reid's efforts to preserve common sense epistemic commitments also lead him to adopt unique theories about our concepts of primary and secondary qualities, and about original and acquired perceptions. About the latter pair, Nicholsargues that most perceptual beliefs depend for their justification upon inferences. The Way of Ideas holds that sensations are objects of awareness and that our senses are not robustly unified. Nichols develops Reid's counter-proposals by examining his discussion of the evolutionary purpose ofsensations, and the nature of our awareness of sensations, as well as his intriguing affirmative answer to Molyneux's questions.Nichols brings to the writing of this book a consummate knowledge of Reid's texts, published and unpublished, and a keen appreciation for Reid's responses to his predecessors. He frequently reconstructs arguments in premise/conclusion form, thereby clarifying disputes that have frustrated previous Reid scholarship. This clarification, his lively examples, and his plainspoken style make this book especially readable. Reid's theory of perception is by far the most important feature of Reid'sphilosophical system, and Nichols offers what will be, for a long time to come, the definitive analysis of this theory.

This book bears witness to the current reawakening of interest in Reid's philosophy. It first examines Reid's negative attack on the Way of Ideas, and finds him to be a devastating critic of his predecessors. Turning to the positive part of Reid's programme, the author then develops a fresh interpretation of Reid as an anticipator of present-day 'reliabilism'. Throughout the book, Reid is presented as a powerful thinker with much to say to philosophers in the twenty-first century. The book will be of interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary epistemology.

A critical edition of one of philosopher Thomas Reid's most important works.