Thomas Reid On The Ethical Life

This Element presents the rudiments of Thomas Reid's agency-centered ethical theory. According to this theory, an ethical theory must address three primary questions. What is it to be an agent? What is ethical reality like, such that agents could know it? And how can agents respond to ethical reality, commit themselves to being regulated by it, and act well in doing so? Reid's answers to these questions are wide-ranging, borrowing from the rational intuitionist, sentimentalist, Aristotelian, and Protestant natural law traditions. This Element explores how Reid blends together these influences, how he might respond to concerns raised by rival traditions, and specifies what distinguishes his approach from those of other modern philosophers.

The pervasiveness of Protestant natural law in the early modern period and its significance in the Scottish Enlightenment have long been recognised. This book reveals that Thomas Reid (1710-1796) - the great contemporary of David Hume and Adam Smith - also worked in this tradition. When Reid succeeded Adam Smith as professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow in 1764, he taught a course covering pneumatology, practical ethics, and politics. This section on practical ethics took its starting point from the system of natural law and rights published by Francis Hutcheson. Knud Haakonssen has reconstructed it here for the first time from Reid's manuscript lectures and papers, and it provides a considerable addition to our understanding not only of Reid but of the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment and of the education system of the time. The present work is a revised version of a work first published by Princeton University Press in 1990 which has long been out of print.

This is the first edited collection to bring together classic pieces and new work by leading scholars of Thomas Reid. The contributors explore key elements of Reid's ideas about moral epistemology, moral emotions, moral agency and practical ethics.

Current patterns of global economic activity are not only unsustainable, but unethical - this claim is central to Materialist Ethics and Life-Value. Grounding the definition of ethical value in the natural and social requirements of life-support and life-development shared by all human beings, Jeff Noonan provides a new way of understanding the universal conception of "the good life." Noonan argues that the true crisis affecting the world today is not sluggish rates of economic growth but the model of measuring economic and social health in terms of money-value. In response, he develops an alternative understanding of good societies where the breadth and depth of life-activity and enjoyment are dependent on dominant institutions. The more social institutions satisfy the necessary requirements of human life, the more they empower each person to develop and enjoy the capacities that make human life valuable and meaningful. A well-reasoned synthesis of traditional philosophical concerns and contemporary critiques of global capitalism, this book is a forward-looking treatise that defends political struggle and reconsiders what is most important for a happy life.

John Dewey was America’s greatest public philosopher. His work stands out for its remarkable breadth, and his deep commitment to democracy led him to courageous progressive stances on issues such as war, civil liberties, and racial, class, and gender inequalities. This book collects the clearest and most powerful of his public writings and shows how they continue to speak to the challenges we face today. An introductory essay and short introductions to each of the texts discuss the current relevance and significance of Dewey’s work and legacy. The book includes forty-six essays on topics such as democracy in the United States, political power, education, economic justice, science and society, and philosophy and culture. These essays inspire optimism for the possibility of a more humane public and political culture, in which citizens share in the pursuit of lifelong education through participation in democratic life. The essays in America’s Public Philosopher reveal John Dewey as a powerful example for anyone seeking to address a wider audience and a much-needed voice for all readers in search of intellectual and moral leadership.

Reid in context / Alexander Broadie -- Thomas Reid and the culture of science / Paul Wood -- Reid on common sense / Nicholas Wolterstorff -- Reid's theory of perception / James Van Cleve / Reid's reply to the skeptic / John Greco -- Nativism and the nature of thought in Reid's account of the external world / Lorne Falkenstein -- Reid and the social operations of mind / C.A.J. Coady -- Reid on memory and the identity of persons / René Van Woudenberg -- Thomas Reid's theory of freedom and responsibility / William L. Rowe -- Reid's moral philosophy / Terence Cueno -- Reid's philosophy of art / Peter Kivy -- Reid's philosophy of religion / Dale Tuggy -- Reid's influence in Britain, Germany, France, and America / Benjamin W. Redekop

Tests the views and metaphor of 19th-century utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick against a variety of contemporary views on ethics, determining that they are defensible and thus providing a defense of objectivism in ethics and of hedonistic utilitarianism.

"Here is a central issue in Hume scholarship: what is the relationship between Hume's early Treatise of Human Nature and his later Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding? Is the Enquiry a mere simplified restatement of the contents of the Treatise, or do the two substantially differ? Here is another critical issue in Hume scholarship: what is the relationship between Hume's scepticism and his naturalism? How can we reconcile Hume's extreme brand of scepticism with his positive ambitions of providing an account of human nature? Hume's Epistemological Evolution argues that these two issues are intimately related. In particular, this book argues that Hume's Enquiry indeed differs from the Treatise, precisely because he changes his response to scepticism between the two works. Because the Treatise has as its primary focus the psychological naturalistic project, its treatment of epistemological issues arises unsystematically from the psychological investigation. Consequently, Hume finds himself forced into an unsatisfactory response to scepticism founded on the Title Principle (THN 1.4.7.11). However, this response is deeply problematic, as Hume himself seems to recognise. In contrast to the Treatise, the Enquiry emphasises the epistemological aspects of Hume's project, and offers a radically different and more sophisticated epistemology. This framework addresses the weaknesses of the earlier one, and also constitutes a 'compleat answer' to two of his most prominent critics, Thomas Reid and James Beattie. Hume's epistemology thus undergoes an evolution between these two works"--