Thomas Reid S Ethics

This is the first edited collection to bring together classic pieces and new work by leading scholars of Thomas Reid. The contributors explore key elements of Reid's ideas about moral epistemology, moral emotions, moral agency and practical ethics.

The pervasiveness of Protestant natural law in the early modern period and its significance in the Scottish Enlightenment have long been recognised. This book reveals that Thomas Reid (1710-1796) - the great contemporary of David Hume and Adam Smith - also worked in this tradition. When Reid succeeded Adam Smith as professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow in 1764, he taught a course covering pneumatology, practical ethics, and politics. This section on practical ethics took its starting point from the system of natural law and rights published by Francis Hutcheson. Knud Haakonssen has reconstructed it here for the first time from Reid's manuscript lectures and papers, and it provides a considerable addition to our understanding not only of Reid but of the thought of the Scottish Enlightenment and of the education system of the time. The present work is a revised version of a work first published by Princeton University Press in 1990 which has long been out of print.

This Element presents the rudiments of Thomas Reid's agency-centered ethical theory. According to this theory, an ethical theory must address three primary questions. What is it to be an agent? What is ethical reality like, such that agents could know it? And how can agents respond to ethical reality, commit themselves to being regulated by it, and act well in doing so? Reid's answers to these questions are wide-ranging, borrowing from the rational intuitionist, sentimentalist, Aristotelian, and Protestant natural law traditions. This Element explores how Reid blends together these influences, how he might respond to concerns raised by rival traditions, and specifies what distinguishes his approach from those of other modern philosophers.

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was one of the most daring and original thinkers of the eighteenth century. His work became the cornerstone of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy, and was highly influential in nineteenth-century America; it also anticipated the thinking of such twentieth-century figures as Moore and Wittgenstein. Now, after a long period of neglect, his philosophy is again the subject of increasing attention across the world. For Reid, knowing about ethics is a matter of having 'good evidence' supplied by a sense-like moral faculty. William Davis's book shows how such a view can be both consistent and plausible in the twenty-first century. Thomas Reid's Ethics begins by characterizing the state of moral epistemology at the time when Reid was writing. It goes on to recount Reid's central claims about the moral sense, and describes the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Davis lays the foundation for resolving these difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence which parallels the legal conception of evidence used by the Scottish courts of Reid's day. He then shows how Reid's claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of this legal model. The book concludes by responding to recent worries about 'moral sense' theories, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's ethical project. The book will be of substantial interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary ethics.

In this succinct and well-written book, one of our most eminent philosophers provides a fresh reading of the view of freedom and morality developed by Thomas Reid (1710-1796). Although contemporary theorists have written extensively about the Scottish philosopher's contributions to the theory of knowledge, this is the first book-length study of his contributions to the controversy over freedom and necessity. William L. Rowe argues that Reid developed a subtle, systematic theory of moral freedom based on the idea of the human being as a free and morally responsible agent. He carefully reconstructs the theory and explores the intellectual background to Reid's views in the work of John Locke, Samuel Clarke, and Anthony Collins. Rowe develops a novel account of Reid's conception of free action and relates it to contemporary arguments that moral responsibility for an action implies the power to have done otherwise. Distilling from Reid's work a viable version of the agency theory of freedom and responsibility, he suggests how Reid's theory can be defended against the major objections—both historical and contemporary—that have been advanced against it. Blending to good effect historical and philosophical analysis, Thomas Reid on Freedom and Morality should interest philosophers, political theorists, and intellectual historians.

Thomas Reid (1710-96) was one of the most daring and original thinkers of the eighteenth century. His work became the cornerstone of the Scottish School of Common Sense Philosophy, and was highly influential in nineteenth-century America; it also anticipated the thinking of such twentieth-century figures as Moore and Wittgenstein. Now, after a long period of neglect, his philosophy is again the subject of increasing attention across the world. For Reid, knowing about ethics is a matter of having 'good evidence' supplied by a sense-like moral faculty. William Davis's book shows how such a view can be both consistent and plausible in the twenty-first century. Thomas Reid's Ethics begins by characterizing the state of moral epistemology at the time when Reid was writing. It goes on to recount Reid's central claims about the moral sense, and describes the various problems that confront those who would explain and defend his views. Davis lays the foundation for resolving these difficulties by detailing an epistemological conception of evidence which parallels the legal conception of evidence used by the Scottish courts of Reid's day. He then shows how Reid's claims about evidence and self-evidence are best understood in light of this legal model. The book concludes by responding to recent worries about 'moral sense' theories, and offers a final assessment of the success of Reid's ethical project. The book will be of substantial interest not only to Reid scholars and historians of philosophy, but also to specialists and students in contemporary ethics.

Brings Thomas Reid into conversation with contemporary moral philosophyIs morality a subjective matter, dependent on our desires and interests, or are there objective moral truths? And if the latter, can we explain the objectivity of morality without appeal to metaphysics, a robust teleology or divine command? James J. S Foster argues that we find such an account of moral objectivity in Thomas Reid's defence of duty. This book provides an explanation of Reid's way of philosophy and his reasons for rejecting moral subjectivism, presents Reid's account of the concept, perception and motivational force of duty, and responds to contemporary challenges of moral subjectivism and pessimism from the perspective of Reid's moral philosophy. By illustrating how Thomas Reid provides this compelling interpretation of moral objectivism - which is both metaphysically modest and chimes with lived experience - Foster concludes that if Reid is correct, then there is an urgent need to reform current pedagogical practice and return to the teaching of practical ethics. Key Features? Appeals to readers interested in Reid and Scottish philosophy; and to those broadly interested in moral philosophy? Draws from Reid's entire corpus, not just his major published works, including 'Some Thoughts on the Utopian System', his correspondence and 'Lectures on Practical Ethics'? Explains Reid's Baconian approach to moral philosophy ? Discusses the implications of Reid's understanding of practical ethics and the limitations of speculative philosophy for moral educationJames J. S. Foster is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Theology and Director of the Honours Program at the University of Sioux Falls.

As the originator of the Scottish school of "common sense" philosophy and the foremost contemporary critic of David Hume's moral skepticism, Thomas Reid (1710-1796) played a hitherto unknown role in applying the tradition of natural law to morality and politics. When Reid succeeded Adam Smith as professor of moral philosophy in Glasgow in 1764, he taught a course covering pneumatology (theory of mind), practical ethics, and politics. In presenting for the first time the philosopher's manuscript lectures and papers on practical ethics, Knud Haakonssen shows how these writings not only add depth to Reid's criticism of Hume but also clarify his own social, moral, and political thought. As a whole, Reid's Practical Ethics constitutes a most significant addition of source material for the study of the Scottish Enlightenment. The papers assembled here demonstrate the extent to which the moral philosophy of the Enlightenment was influenced by natural jurisprudence. At the same time they reveal Reid's involvement with republican, utopian, and radical themes and elucidate the relations between religion and politics in the Enlightenment. Haakonssen's introduction is the first substantial systematic treatment of Reid's moral-political thought, connecting it with his general philosophy and setting it in the context of his life and time.