Three Tweets To Midnight

Disinformation and misinformation have always been part of conflict. But as the essays in this volume outline, the rise of social media and the new global information ecosystem have created conditions for the spread of propaganda like never before—with potentially disastrous results. In our "post-truth" era of bots, trolls, and intemperate presidential tweets, popular social platforms like Twitter and Facebook provide a growing medium for manipulation of information directed to individuals, institutions, and global leaders. A new type of warfare is being fought online each day, often in 280 characters or fewer. Targeted influence campaigns have been waged in at least forty-eight countries so far. We've entered an age where stability during an international crisis can be deliberately manipulated at greater speed, on a larger scale, and at a lower cost than at any previous time in history. This volume examines the current reality from a variety of angles, considering how digital misinformation might affect the likelihood of international conflict and how it might influence the perceptions and actions of leaders and their publics before and during a crisis. It sounds the alarm about how social media increases information overload and promotes "fast thinking," with potentially catastrophic results for nuclear powers.

The handbook delves into the shifting power dynamics in diplomacy, exploring the establishment of embassies in technology hubs, the challenges faced by foreign affairs departments in adapting to digital technologies, and the utilization of digital tools as a means of exerting influence.

Survival, the IISS’s bimonthly journal, challenges conventional wisdom and brings fresh, often controversial, perspectives on strategic issues of the moment. In this issue: · The Ukraine crisis: Robert Hunter argues that the most important requirement of successful US-led negotiations with Russia is that Moscow demonstrate that it is prepared to be a responsible international actor · Erin Sikorsky contends that climate change should have a larger role in the day-to-day national-security agendas of the United States and other countries · Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil warn that current US debates about no first use tend to underplay the broader alliance implications of any shift in US nuclear policy · Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada assess that, given the 2021 US FONOP targeting India, Washington and New Delhi need to better manage their diverse positions on global governance, especially in the maritime domain · Nien-chung Chang-Liao warns that pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy is waning and considers why Chinese diplomats have become so aggressive And nine more thought-provoking pieces, as well as our regular Book Reviews and Noteworthy column. Editor: Dr Dana Allin Managing Editor: Jonathan Stevenson Associate Editor: Carolyn West Assistant Editor: Jessica Watson

he first overview of US NC3 since the 1980s, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications explores the current NC3 system and its vital role in ensuring effective deterrence, contemporary challenges posed by cyber threats, new weapons technologies, and the need to modernize the United States’ Cold War–era system of systems.

The technology controlling United States nuclear weapons predates the Internet. Updating the technology for the digital era is necessary, but it comes with the risk that anything digital can be hacked. Moreover, using new systems for both nuclear and non-nuclear operations will lead to levels of nuclear risk hardly imagined before. This book is the first to confront these risks comprehensively. With Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, Herbert Lin provides a clear-eyed breakdown of the cyber risks to the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Featuring a series of scenarios that clarify the intersection of cyber and nuclear risk, this book guides readers through a little-understood element of the risk profile that government decision-makers should be anticipating. What might have happened if the Cuban Missile Crisis took place in the age of Twitter, with unvetted information swirling around? What if an adversary announced that malware had compromised nuclear systems, clouding the confidence of nuclear decision-makers? Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, the first book to consider cyber risks across the entire nuclear enterprise, concludes with crucial advice on how government can manage the tensions between new nuclear capabilities and increasing cyber risk. This is an invaluable handbook for those ready to confront the unique challenges of cyber nuclear risk.

The Nuclear Scholars Initiative is a signature program run by the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)—to engage emerging nuclear experts in thoughtful and informed debate over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2020 Nuclear Scholars Initiative. These papers explore a variety of topics such as the future of arms-control treaties, the role of artificial intelligence and cyber resilience in nuclear security, and the role of regional dynamics in nuclear security.

Narratives provide the storylines of conflict and in doing so become an arena of conflict themselves. When states mount information campaigns against each other, they are trying to change the narrative. The digital platforms of the new information environment have been identified by various analysts as a significant factor in contemporary strategy and crisis management. But while social media is noisier and more chaotic than traditional media, and unprecedented in its immediacy and accessibility, has it thus far been a game changer in strategic affairs? In this Adelphi book, Sir Lawrence Freedman and Heather Williams examine the impact of state-led digital information – or disinformation – campaigns in four contexts: the India–Pakistan crisis over Kashmir in 2019; the heightened tensions between the United States and Iran following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020; China’s messaging in response to the COVID-19 pandemic from 2020–22; and the Russia–Ukraine crisis from 2013–23. While noting the meaningful consequences of digital information campaigns, in each case the authors call for a sense of perspective. Such campaigns are only one aspect of wider political struggles. They are also difficult for their initiators to control, and less likely to influence foreign audiences than domestic ones. Overall, the authors argue, there is little evidence so far to suggest such campaigns will have as much influence over contemporary crises as the classical instruments of military and economic power.