Toward Sustainable Federalism

The study includes a useful historical perspective on Canadian fiscal federalism and a program-by-program review of the system's key features. Drawing on this analysis, the authors present innovative proposals for reform of EPF and the CAP.

Table of contents

The Rowell-Sirois Commission and the Remaking of Canadian Federalism investigates the groundbreaking inquiry launched to reconstruct Canada’s federal system. In 1937, the Canadian confederation was broken. As the Depression ground on, provinces faced increasing obligations but limited funds, while the dominion had fewer responsibilities but lucrative revenue sources. The commission’s report proposed a bold new form of federalism based on the national collection and unconditional transfers of major tax revenues to the provinces. While the proposal was not immediately adopted, this incisive study demonstrates that the commission’s innovative findings went on to shape policy and thinking about federalism for decades.

First published in French in 2006, Le fédéralisme canadien contemporain was immediately recognised as the most comprehensive collection of reflections on Canadian federalism by leading Québécois scholars. This remarkable translation of a range of Québécois voices makes their insightful and underrepresented perspectives available to English-language audiences. Offering alternative views of the Canadian federal model's realities by covering its foundations, traditions, and institutions, Contemporary Canadian Federalism considers the ways in which federalism relates to issues such as regionalism, multiculturalism, rights and freedoms, financial distribution, and public policy. Filled with stimulating work that bridges the gap between distinctive traditions in English- and French-Canadian scholarship on federalism, this important volume is required reading for understanding provincial-federal relations and Canadian governance.

The Case for Decentralized Federalism brings together an array of experts around one key idea: decentralized federalism as the best political arrangement for a diverse nation like Canada, Edited by Ruth Hubbard and Gilles Paquet, this book argues that decentralized federalism can most effectively address Canada's regional differences and cultural diversity by dividing the work of public governing among different levels of government, allowing each to address the needs and aspiration of its citizens. With contributions from Thomas J Courchene, Ian Peach, Gerard Belanger, Hugh D. Segal, Francois Rocher, Marie-Christine Gilbert, Ruth Hubbard and Gilles Paquet, this book presents various arguments for decentralized federalism that show how a variety of issues nagging Canada today---nation-building, subsidiarity, competition, innovation---might be resolved through decentralized federalism. For the case against decentralization, look for The Case for Centralized Federalism edited by Gordon DiGiacomo and Maryantonett Flumian, also published by the University of Ottawa Press.

The Canadian federal system was never designed to recognize Indigenous governance, and it has resisted change. But Indigenous communities have successfully negotiated the creation of self-governing regions. Most of these are situated within existing units of the Canadian federation, creating forms of nested federalism. This governance model is transforming Canada as it reformulates the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the state. Nested Federalism and Inuit Governance in the Canadian Arctic traces the journey toward self-governance in three northern regions: Nunavik, the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, and Nunatsiavut. This meticulous analysis provides new insight into the evolution and consequences of Indigenous self-government.

Sections include: "Setting the scene: old questions or new?", "Drivers for change: new approaches to federalism and regionalism", and "New institutions? Approaching the challenge of reform."

The Robust Federation offers a comprehensive approach to the study of federalism. Jenna Bednar demonstrates how complementary institutions maintain and adjust the distribution of authority between national and state governments. These authority boundaries matter - for defense, economic growth, and adequate political representation - and must be defended from opportunistic transgression. From Montesquieu to Madison, the legacy of early institutional analysis focuses attention on the value of competition between institutions, such as the policy moderation produced through separated powers. Bednar offers a reciprocal theory: in an effective constitutional system, institutions complement one another; each makes the others more powerful. Diverse but complementary safeguards - including the courts, political parties, and the people - cover different transgressions, punish to different extents, and fail under different circumstances. The analysis moves beyond equilibrium conceptions and explains how the rules that allocate authority are not fixed but shift gradually. Bednar's rich theoretical characterization of complementary institutions provides the first holistic account of federal robustness.