Towards A Philosophy Of Real Mathematics

In this ambitious study, David Corfield attacks the widely held view that it is the nature of mathematical knowledge which has shaped the way in which mathematics is treated philosophically and claims that contingent factors have brought us to the present thematically limited discipline. Illustrating his discussion with a wealth of examples, he sets out a variety of approaches to new thinking about the philosophy of mathematics, ranging from an exploration of whether computers producing mathematical proofs or conjectures are doing real mathematics, to the use of analogy, the prospects for a Bayesian confirmation theory, the notion of a mathematical research programme and the ways in which new concepts are justified. His inspiring book challenges both philosophers and mathematicians to develop the broadest and richest philosophical resources for work in their disciplines and points clearly to the ways in which this can be done.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four George Orwell gives a description of different forms of suppression. We learn about the telescreens placed everywhere, through which it is possible for Big-Brother to watch the inhabitants of Oceania. However, it is not only important to control the activities of the inhabitants, it is important as well to control their thoughts, and the Thought Police are on guard. This is a very direct form of monitoring and control, but Orwell also outlines a more imperceptible and calculated line of thought control. In the Appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell explains some struc tures of 'Newspeak', which is going to become the official language of Oceania. Newspeak is being developed by the Ministry of Truth, and this language has to substitute 'Oldspeak' (similar to standard English). Newspeak should fit with the official politics of Oceania ruled by the Ingsoc party: "The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impos sible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc - should be literally unthink able, at least as far as thought is dependent on words.

A fascinating journey through intriguing mathematical and philosophical territory - a lively introduction to this contemporary topic.

In the words of Bertrand Russell, "Because language is misleading, as well as because it is diffuse and inexact when applied to logic (for which it was never intended), logical symbolism is absolutely necessary to any exact or thorough treatment of mathematical philosophy." That assertion underlies this book, a seminal work in the field for more than 70 years. In it, Russell offers a nontechnical, undogmatic account of his philosophical criticism as it relates to arithmetic and logic. Rather than an exhaustive treatment, however, the influential philosopher and mathematician focuses on certain issues of mathematical logic that, to his mind, invalidated much traditional and contemporary philosophy. In dealing with such topics as number, order, relations, limits and continuity, propositional functions, descriptions, and classes, Russell writes in a clear, accessible manner, requiring neither a knowledge of mathematics nor an aptitude for mathematical symbolism. The result is a thought-provoking excursion into the fascinating realm where mathematics and philosophy meet — a philosophical classic that will be welcomed by any thinking person interested in this crucial area of modern thought.

This is a concise introductory textbook for a one-semester (40-class) course in the history and philosophy of mathematics. It is written for mathemat ics majors, philosophy students, history of science students, and (future) secondary school mathematics teachers. The only prerequisite is a solid command of precalculus mathematics. On the one hand, this book is designed to help mathematics majors ac quire a philosophical and cultural understanding of their subject by means of doing actual mathematical problems from different eras. On the other hand, it is designed to help philosophy, history, and education students come to a deeper understanding of the mathematical side of culture by means of writing short essays. The way I myself teach the material, stu dents are given a choice between mathematical assignments, and more his torical or philosophical assignments. (Some sample assignments and tests are found in an appendix to this book. ) This book differs from standard textbooks in several ways. First, it is shorter, and thus more accessible to students who have trouble coping with vast amounts of reading. Second, there are many detailed explanations of the important mathematical procedures actually used by famous mathe maticians, giving more mathematically talented students a greater oppor tunity to learn the history and philosophy by way of problem solving.

Covers the state of the art in the philosophy of maths and logic, giving the reader an overview of the major problems, positions, and battle lines. The chapters in this book contain both exposition and criticism as well as substantial development of their own positions. It also includes a bibliography.

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox (Russell's Paradox), a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician (the 'mathematical intuitionism' of Brouwer), a new foundational school (Hilbert's Formalism), and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably (but in different ways) with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field.

In line with the emerging field of philosophy of mathematical practice, this book pushes the philosophy of mathematics away from questions about the reality and truth of mathematical entities and statements and toward a focus on what mathematicians actually do—and how that evolves and changes over time. How do new mathematical entities come to be? What internal, natural, cognitive, and social constraints shape mathematical cultures? How do mathematical signs form and reform their meanings? How can we model the cognitive processes at play in mathematical evolution? And how does mathematics tie together ideas, reality, and applications? Roi Wagner uniquely combines philosophical, historical, and cognitive studies to paint a fully rounded image of mathematics not as an absolute ideal but as a human endeavor that takes shape in specific social and institutional contexts. The book builds on ancient, medieval, and modern case studies to confront philosophical reconstructions and cutting-edge cognitive theories. It focuses on the contingent semiotic and interpretive dimensions of mathematical practice, rather than on mathematics' claim to universal or fundamental truths, in order to explore not only what mathematics is, but also what it could be. Along the way, Wagner challenges conventional views that mathematical signs represent fixed, ideal entities; that mathematical cognition is a rigid transfer of inferences between formal domains; and that mathematics’ exceptional consensus is due to the subject’s underlying reality. The result is a revisionist account of mathematical philosophy that will interest mathematicians, philosophers, and historians of science alike.