Towards An International Code Of Conduct For Private Security Providers

The use of private security companies (PSCs) to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state presents a challenge to regulatory and oversight frameworks. Analyzing developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Security Providers (ICOC) and the ICOC Association, this paper argues that a multistakeholder approach to develop standards adapted for the private sector and which creates governance and oversight mechanisms fills some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches.

The use of private security companies (PSCs) to provide security services has been on the rise since the end of the Cold War, with PSCs operating in a number of contexts, including armed conflict and areas where the rule of law has been compromised. The use of private actors to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state is not limited to PSCs, but is emblematic of a growing trend by governments to outsource functions with a view to improving efficiency and cutting budgets. Privatization of public functions can, however, present a number of challenges to existing national and international regulatory and oversight frameworks. In the private security sector these challenges were brought to international attention after high-profile incidents in which PSCs injured civilians revealed difficulties in effectively holding international PSCs accountable. This paper argues that crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in which key stakeholders work together to develop standards that are appropriately adapted for the private sector, as well as to create governance and oversight mechanisms to hold these private actors to effective account, helps to fill some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. It recounts the developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICOC) and its governance and oversight mechanism, the ICOC Association, offering an example of the development of an initiative which sets new international standards and elaborates a multistakeholder framework and approach to governance for the private security sector. A recent trend of state and non-state clients requiring compliance with the ICOC initiative in their contracts with PSCs offers a new take on binding international regulation of private actors.

Many states view Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as crucial to implementing their security policy. However, reoccurring incidents of human rights violations have led the international community, private sector, and civil society to acknowledge the need for more control over the use of PMSCs. Growing state support for The Montreux Document and an ever growing number of signatory companies to the International Code of Conduct for Security Providers (ICoC) show that self-regulation through non-binding norms has shifted to the center of the debate. This book examines the promises and dangers of emerging non-binding PMSC regulation alongside more traditional forms of law-making, such as plans for an international convention on the use of PMSCs. It offers an in-depth analysis of legal and political developments that led to the proliferation of The Montreux Document and the ICoC. Identifying the state side of duties and corporate responsibility as leaving gaps and grey zones in international law, the book analyzes how both instruments address 'the responsibility to protect' and 'the responsibility to respect.' Covering the Private Security Providers' Association's Articles of Association, the most recent developments on the establishment of a PMSC oversight mechanism are included. Finally, the book provides an original theory of how both instruments could become more effective to protect victims against PMSC human rights violations: The Montreux Document, by developing into a form of customary international law, and the standards of the ICoC framework, by developing into more binding normative standards as a form of 'corporate custom.'

This book examines the self-representation and identity politics of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). PMSCs have become increasingly important over the past few decades. While their boom is frequently explained in functional terms, such as their cost-efficiency and effectiveness, this book offers an alternative explanation based on an analysis of the online self-presentations of forty-two US- and UK-based companies. PMSCs are shaping how they are perceived and establishing themselves as acceptable and legitimate security actors by eclectically appropriating identities more commonly associated with the military, businesses and humanitarian actors. Depending on their audience and clients’ needs, they can be professional hero warriors, or promise turn-key security solutions based on their exceptional expertise, or, in a similar way to humanitarians, reassure those in need of relief and try to make the world a better place. Rather than being merely public relations, the self-referential assertions of PMSCs are political. Not only do they contribute to a normalization of private security and reinforce an already ongoing blurring of lines between the public and private sectors, they also change what we deem to be ‘security’ and a ‘security actor’. This book will be of much interest to students of private military companies, critical security studies, military studies, security studies and IR.

The outsourcing of military and security services is the object of intense legal debate. States employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to perform functions previously exercised by regular armed forces, and increasingly international organisations, NGOs and business corporations do the same to provide security, particularly in crisis situations. Much of the public attention on PMSCs has been in response to incidents in which PMSC employees have been accused of violating international humanitarian law. Therefore initiatives have been launched to introduce uniform international standards amidst what is currently very uneven national regulation. This book analyses and discusses the interplay between international, European, and domestic regulatory measures in the field of PMSCs. It presents a comprehensive assessment of the existing domestic legislation in EU Member States and relevant Third States, and identifies implications for future international regulation. The book also addresses the crucial questions whether and how the EU can potentially play a more active future role in the regulation of PMSCs to ensure compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law.

This monograph examines and analyses the phenomenon of non-binding instruments (also known as 'soft law') in the law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law. It covers the benefits and drawbacks for States and non-States actors as well as their effectiveness and development in the context of armed conflict.

Legal Sources in Business and Human Rights takes stock of different aspects of Business and Human Rights practice in order to identify and explore some dynamics that are driving the evolution of the legal sources of international and EU law in the field of B&HRs.

This book examines the legitimation of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), focusing on the controversy between PMSCs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While existing studies disproportionately emphasizes the ability for companies and their clients to dominate and shape perceptions of the industry, this book offers an alternative explanation for the oft-cited normalization of PMSCs and the trend to privatize security by analyzing the changing relationship between PMSCs and NGOs. It uses the concept of ‘norm entrepreneurship’ to elucidate the legitimation game between these two dissimilar actors. Starting from the 1990s, the book shows that the relationship between PMSCs and NGOs has undergone a transition by literally moving from ‘the barricades to the boardrooms’. After years of fierce advocacy and PR campaigns against PMSCs, today both actors increasingly collaborate in multi-stakeholder initiatives, elevating the status of PMSCs from a scorned actor to a trusted partner in the regulation of the industry. The work offers a comprehensive explanation of when and why this kind of collective norm entrepreneurship is likely to occur. This book will be of interest to students of PMSCs, critical security studies, global governance, international norms, and International Relations.