Towards Effective Macroprudential Policy Frameworks

A number of countries are reviewing their institutional arrangements for financial stability to support the development of a macroprudential policy function. In some cases, this involves a rethink of the appropriate institutional boundaries between central banks and financial regulatory agencies, or the setting up of dedicated policymaking committees. In others, efforts are underway to enhance cooperation within the existing institutional structure. Against this background, this paper provides basic guidance for the design of effective arrangements, in a manner that can provide a framework for country-specific advice. After reviewing briefly the main institutional elements of existing and emerging macroprudential policy frameworks across countries, the paper identifies stylized institutional models based on key features that distinguish institutional arrangements. It develops criteria to assess the effectiveness of models, examines the strengths and weaknesses of models against these criteria, and explores ways to improve existing setups. The paper finally distills lessons and sets out desired principles for effective macroprudential policy arrangements.

MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

Emerging market central banks have a long history of using macroprudential instruments. But while most central banks carry a heavy responsibility for financial stability, legal objectives are generally vague, do not define success or failure, and say nothing about competing objectives. This complicates both accountability and the communication of macroprudential decisions. Participants drew several lessons from their experience with implementing macroprudential instruments. First, macroprudential authorities need to act early if they want to address systemic risk effectively. Second, building buffers or shifting the composition of credit is easier than managing the cycle. Third, macroprudential measures tend to be better at constraining booms than at dampening busts. Fourth, although macroprudential tools could, in principle, be targeted very precisely, circumvention by lenders and borrowers require more broad-based approaches. Fifth, macroprudential measures and monetary policy can reinforce each other when used in the same direction. Sixth, the jury is still out whether macroprudential instruments could be used effectively to address regional disparities within economies. This volume collects the background papers of a meeting of Deputy Governors of central banks from emerging market economies to exchange their experience with designing macroprudential frameworks and implementing macroprudential instruments.

Macroprudential policy focuses on the financial system as a whole, as distinct from individual institutions, and its objective is to limit the costs to the real economy from system-wide distress of the financial sector. This book helps readers discover and decipher the multi-faceted and fascinating area of macroprudential policy through taking a theoretical, interdisciplinary and legal-focused approach.

This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries

A framework for macroprudential regulation that defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, describes macroprudential tools, and surveys the effectiveness of existing macroprudential regulation. The recent financial crisis has shattered all standard approaches to banking regulation. Regulators now recognize that banking regulation cannot be simply based on individual financial institutions' risks. Instead, systemic risk and macroprudential regulation have come to the forefront of the new regulatory paradigm. Yet our knowledge of these two core aspects of regulation is still limited and fragmented. This book offers a framework for understanding the reasons for the regulatory shift from a microprudential to a macroprudential approach to financial regulation. It defines systemic risk and macroprudential policy, cutting through the generalized confusion as to their meaning; contrasts macroprudential to microprudential approaches; discusses the interaction of macroprudential policy with macroeconomic policy (monetary policy in particular); and describes macroprudential tools and experiences with macroprudential regulation around the world. The book also considers the remaining challenges for establishing effective macroprudential policy and broader issues in regulatory reform. These include the optimal size and structure of the financial system, the multiplicity of regulatory bodies in the United States, the supervision of cross-border financial institutions, and the need for international cooperation on macroprudential policies.

Giving stress tests a macroprudential perspective requires (i) incorporating general equilibrium dimensions, so that the outcome of the test depends not only on the size of the shock and the buffers of individual institutions but also on their behavioral responses and their interactions with each other and with other economic agents; and (ii) focusing on the resilience of the system as a whole. Progress has been made toward the first goal: several models are now available that attempt to integrate solvency, liquidity, and other sources of risk and to capture some behavioral responses and feedback effects. But building models that measure correctly systemic risk and the contribution of individual institutions to it while, at the same time, relating the results to the established regulatory framework has proved more difficult. Looking forward, making macroprudential stress tests more effective would entail using a variety of analytical approaches and scenarios, integrating non-bank financial entities, and exploring the use of agent-based models. As well, macroprudential stress tests should not be used in isolation but be treated as complements to other tools and—crucially—be combined with microprudential perspectives.