Tracking The Axis Enemy

Former US naval intelligence officer Bath describes how his own area (before he was in it) was as responsible as Allied warships in the successful 1942-43 campaign against German U-boats known as the Battle of the Atlantic. He describes the cooperation at all levels, in all theaters of war, and at all points in the cycle from gathering through analysis to dissemination. He also considers the naval intelligence in the South Pacific, throughout highlighting the contributions of Britain and other Commonwealth states. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Operational intelligence, knowledge of the enemy’s location and actions, is crucial to effective military operations. The Admirals’ Advantage offers a revealing look at naval operational intelligence based on the findings of a classified Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) Lessons-Learned Project and a 1998 Symposium at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center. Participants included senior intelligence and operational leaders who explored the evolution and significance of OPINTEL since World War II. Past and current practices were examined with inputs from fleet and shore commands and insights from interviews and correspondence with senior flag officers and intelligence professionals.

The Elusive Enemy explores the evolution of U.S. intelligence concerning the combat capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy and its air arm during the interwar period and the Pacific War. Ford contends that the US Navy could not accurately determine the fighting efficiency of Japan’s forces until it engaged them in actual battle conditions over an extended period. As the conflict progressed, the Americans were able to rely on a growing array of intelligence material, including POWs, captured documents, and specimens of captured enemy weapons. These sources often revealed valuable information on the characteristics of Japanese equipment, as well as some of the ideas and doctrines which governed how they carried out their operations. First-hand observations of the Japanese navy’s performance in battle were the most frequently used source of intelligence which enabled the US Navy to develop a more informed assessment of its opponent. Ship crews, along with US aviators, were tasked to collect information by making a thorough observation of how the Japanese fought. Action reports described how the Imperial fleet demonstrated a number of weaknesses, the most important of which was a shortage of modern equipment and, after 1942, diminished air power. Yet, he demonstrates how the Japanese remained a resilient enemy who could be defeated only when the Americans deployed sufficient equipment and used it in an appropriate manner. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as well as the intelligence services operating in the Pacific theater, thus had to assess a wide array of conflicting characteristics, and provide a balanced evaluation concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the Imperial navy. At the same time, a large part of the intelligence analysis was undertaken by commanders in the Pacific Fleet. Naval personnel and aircrews assessed the information gained through encounters with the enemy so that they could develop a set of methods whereby US forces were able defeat the Japanese without incurring excessive casualties and losses. The intelligence services, in turn, played an important role in disseminating the information on the most efficient tactics and weapons that could be used to defeat the Imperial Fleet. The Elusive Enemy aims to explain how American perceptions concerning the Japanese navy evolved during the conflict, with a particular focus on the role of intelligence. It also seeks to introduce a new perspective on the question as to why the U.S. Navy carried out its campaigns during the Pacific War in the manner that it did.

A new look at how Britain’s defence establishment learned to engage Japan’s armed forces as the Pacific War progressed. Douglas Ford reveals that, prior to Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of Japanese military prowess. He shows that the situation was not helped by the high level of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s war planning, as well as the absence of prior engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled the notion that the Japanese were incapable of challenging the West. British military officials acknowledged how their forces in the Far East were inadequate, and made a concerted effort to improve their strength and efficiency. However, because Britain’s forces were tied down in their operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, they had to fight the Japanese with limited resources. Drawing upon the lessons obtained through Allied experiences in the Pacific theatres as well as their own encounters in Southeast Asia, the British used the available intelligence on the strategy, tactics and morale of Japan’s armed forces to make the best use of what they had, and by the closing stages of the war in 1944 to 1945, they were able to devise a war plan which paved the way for the successful war effort. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, British military history and strategic studies in general.

“Some historians are great because they write great books, others because they write books that need to be written. Mark A. Stoler... has done both. Allies in War offers an accessible and gracefully written synthesis of the wealth of new and important scholarship... addressing American and British grand strategy during World War II. Allies in War presents a global overview of Anglo-American cooperation against the Axis powers with a chronological account of the major diplomatic and military events. It begins with a brief summary of World War I and the interwar years, continues through the capitulation of Japan in September 1945, and concludes with a short discussion of the origins of the Cold War... Stoler’s story also covers the world war like a world war... Each chapter covers major developments in every theater... [Stoler] makes particular effort to recognize the critical role of the Soviet Union in winning World War II and its impact on Anglo-American strategy. Allies in War is a versatile work with a lot of uses. Both students and professionals will find rewards. This volume will be an excellent tool for teaching survey and elective history courses. It will also aid in understanding the dynamics that attend coalition warfare.” — The Journal of American History “[A] decided tour de force... Stoler provides an excellent and readable overview on a global scale of the interrelated wartime military, strategic, and diplomatic decisions and contributions of the United States and Great Britain... Stoler’s forte is elegantly concise syntheses of massive outpourings of scholarship in both military and diplomatic history and judicious, balanced, and stimulating assessments of often controversial issues... Lucid, balanced, nuanced, and acute, giving equal space to the wars in both Europe and Asia, Stoler’s interpretive overview is a valuable and welcome addition to its field.” — The Journal of Military History “This is the work of a mature historian, comfortably in command of his material, using his considerable experience to construct a tightly controlled narrative that carries the reader forward with little effort on his or her part; a sure sign of considerable effort on the part of the writer... Stoler’s book is much more than the synthesis it might appear to be... It is a masterly summary of existing scholarship, but one enriched by his own knowledge of the archival and secondary material... this book shines when it comes to grand strategy; the reader wanting a potted (and accurate) evolution of Anglo-American grand strategy will find all he or she will need here.” — The International History Review “Mark Stoler... is supremely well qualified to undertake this volume... Previous studies of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War tend to focus on either the war in Europe or the war in the Pacific. The originality of Stoler’s approach is that he wants to cover both. He seeks as well to incorporate the results of relatively recent publications on the Second World War... The results are impressive... Stoler’s writing is a major strength of this book... Stoler provides admirable surveys of the major historical controversies of the Anglo-American war against the Axis powers, such as the efficacy of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the utility of the Italian campaign, and the continuing debate over the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anyone who teaches courses on the history of the Second World War will find this volume a valuable resource.” — The Journal of Modern History “Allies in War is... a solid survey of the war... [an] effective synthesis of the most troublesome aspects of the special [Britain-US] relationship.” — Naval History Magazine “An important new study by one of the leading scholars in the field.” — David Reynolds, University of Cambridge

Product Description: Nineteen-Gun Salute: Case Studies of Operational, Strategic, and Diplomatic Naval Leadership during the 20th and Early 21st Centuries, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Bruce A. Elleman. This collection of brief biographies of nineteen U.S. Navy admirals, from W. S. Sims, to Joseph W. Preuher, with conclusions by the editors focusing particularly on leadership skills in the operational and strategic arenas, is sponsored by the Naval War College’s College of Operational and Strategic Leadership and has been jointly produced by the Naval War College Press and the Government Printing Office.

Without what the Allies learned in the Mediterranean air war in 1942–1944, the Normandy landings—and so, perhaps, the Second World War II—would have ended differently. This is one of many lessons of The Mediterranean Air War, the first one-volume history of the vital role of airpower during the three-year struggle for control of the Mediterranean Basin in World War II—and of its significance for the Allied successes in the war's last two years. Airpower historian Robert S. Ehlers opens his account with an assessment of the pre-war Mediterranean theater, highlighting the ways in which the players' strategic choices, strengths, and shortcomings set the stage for and ultimately shaped the air campaigns over the Middle Sea. Beginning with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Ehlers reprises the developing international crisis—initially between Britain and Italy, and finally encompassing France, Germany, the US, other members of the British Commonwealth, and the Balkan countries. He then explores the Mediterranean air war in detail, with close attention to turning points, joint and combined operations, and the campaign's contribution to the larger Allied effort. In particular, his analysis shows how and why the success of Allied airpower in the Mediterranean laid the groundwork for combined-arms victories in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean area, North Africa, and the Atlantic, northwest Europe. Of grand-strategic importance from the days of Ancient Rome to the Great-Power rivalries of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Middle Sea was no less crucial to the Allied forces and their foes. Here, in the successful offensives in North Africa in 1942 and 1943, the US and the British learned to conduct a coalition air and combined-arms war. Here, in Sicily and Italy in 1943 and 1944, the Allies mastered the logistics of providing air support for huge naval landings and opened a vital second aerial front against the Third Reich, bombing critical oil and transportation targets with great effectiveness. The first full examination of the Mediterranean theater in these critical roles—as a strategic and tactical testing ground for the Allies and as a vital theater of operations in its own right—The Mediterranean Air War fills in a long-missing but vital dimension of the history of World War II.

A rich and broadranging account of the Asia-Pacific campaigns of WWII.