Turkey Greece And Nato

This publication shows that the Eastern Mediterranean, having been transformed from a region of secondary importance during the Cold War to one of greater importance for the western interests in the post-Cold War era, is in a state of flux. Despite sporadic periods of rapprochement, tensions between Greece and Turkey still exist. Therefore, one must question the grounds behind the lack of normal relations that exist between these two NATO members and its effects on the NATO organisation as a whole. Hence, this volume has two purposes first, to examine Greek and Turkish foreign, security and defence policies during and after the post-Cold War period and second, to investigate why these policies have been formulated.

The Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey is a persistent problem between the two allied states. Difference of interpretation of the treaties has contributed in the prevalence of the argument. This dispute consists of five key issues. Greece only accepts one, namely the delimitation of the continental shelf. However, Turkey has introduced and has persisted on the other four, which are the delimitation of the territorial seas, the national airspace and FIR controls over the Aegean Sea, the demilitarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands and finally the disputed islands, islets and rocks which have presented the grey zones issue. All of these matters have persisted for so long, especially after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 where the current status quo in the Aegean was introduced, due to economic, political and strategic reasons. The Aegean dispute does not only have consequences for Greece and Turkey; it also affects, negatively, NATO and the European Union. This is an ongoing problem, which if not solved it will produce future problems, not only for the two states, but also for NATO and the EU. A third party may be needed in order to assist in finding a just and permanent solution concerning this dispute, since Greece and Turkey seem incapable of solving this dispute by themselves.

Brown (political science, Southern Methodist U.) explores the uneasy relations between the two NATO members holding the eastern frontier of the alliance. He analyzes the internal politics of the two countries, how policy is formulated, the role of the military, their strategic geography, and their p

From the John Holmes Library collection.

Greece and Turkey have found themselves on the brink of war on several occasions over the last 50 years irrespective of the fact that both have been members to NATO since 1952. This book sets out to explore the effects this co-membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO has had on the course of their bilateral conflict while paying attention to the related theoretical debate and portraying the arguments of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. A further object of research is the impact of NATO membership on the democratic development of these countries. Overall, the conclusion is drawn that NATO has not played a prominent role in this conflict, and the effects of membership have been ambivalent. Moreover, NATO membership neither seems to have played a major role in shaping the fate of democratization in these countries. Nevertheless, the assertion is made that these findings do not contradict institutionalist argumentation, since the effects of institutions are expected to vary in different settings.

This volume discusses the entry of Greece and Turkey to NATO in 1952 from the perspective of history and international relations. The chapters were originally collected in 2012 to mark the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the accession of the two states to NATO. The focus is not on the diplomatic/political events that led to the accession (a subject which has already been extensively discussed in the available bibliography), but expands on a reassessment of this event for the two states as well as for the Balkans, covering aspects of the wider post-war period and providing perspectives for the policies of Turkey, Greece and NATO until the present day. This book was originally published as a special issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

Since 1974 the Aegean Sea has been a topic of much dispute for Greece and Turkey. In spite of many attempts to resolve the problems, the dispute goes on to this day. Over the years it has cost both countries some lives, cost Greece and Turkey politically and economically, and has been a detriment to NATO defense planning and operations. Continued tensions therefore not only hold the potential for disastrous war between two members of the same alliance but also hold the potential to pull other countries into this conflict. Stability in the region and, consequently, Europe is therefore at risk and must be restored through resolution of these disputes between Greece and Turkey. Resolution has not been attained, though, mainly because of each country's intense nationalism and pervasive mistrust of the other country. This nationalism and mistrust of the other country must be overcome if a resolution is to be reached. Fortunately, the current governments of both Greece and Turkey are much more moderate and pro-resolution than their predecessors, and an ironic amelioration of relations thanks to devastating earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey in 1999 indicate that the time is ripe for a push toward resolution. This thesis therefore examines the Aegean dispute in detail, shows its impact on NATO, looks at the attempts at resolution over the past thirty years, and discusses the current prospects for resolution.

As ambassador to Turkey during the Cyprus crisis (1965–1968), Parker T. Hart provides an insider’s view of the management of that crisis in NATO and Greek-Turkish relations. Greece and most Greek Cypriots favoredenosis(union with Greece), but Turkey and the Turk Cypriots were prepared to go to war to prevent such an annexation. A massacre of Turk Cypriot villagers in November 1967 focused the anger of Turkey, which was prepared to send troops to Cyprus to equalize the preponderance of forces led by General George Grivas. The determined mediation of special presidential envoy Cyrus R. Vance prevented the initiation of all-out hostilities. Vance engineered a withdrawal of mainland Greek forces in excess of existing treaty levels in exchange for a standdown of Turkish forces. The Vance mission diffused the crisis and salvaged the integrity of NATO, and a Greek-Turkish agreement to sponsor and encourage intercommunal negotiations followed. Hart has relied on his own papers from the period, as well as on United Nations sources from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, and on the papers of the other key participants in the Crisis, Ambassador to Greece Phillips Talbot, Ambassador to Cyprus Taylor G. Belcher, and Cyrus Vance, to provide a rare play-by-play analysis of the crisis and its resolution.