U S Counterterrorism In Sub Saharan Africa

Failed states offer attractive venues for terrorist groups seeking to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). State failure entails, among its other features, the disintegration and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative structure responsible for overseeing those forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation. These circumstances make identification of terrorist groups operating within failed states very difficult, and action against such groups, once identified, problematic. Terrorist groups that are the focus of the current GWOT display the characteristics of a network organization with two very different types of cells: terrorist nodes and terrorist hubs. Terrorist nodes are small, closely knit local cells that actually commit terrorist acts in the areas in which they are active. Terrorist hubs provide ideological guidance, financial support, and access to resources enabling node attacks. An examination of three failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa - Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia - reveals the presence of both types of cells and furnishes a context for assessing the threat they pose to the national interests of the United States and its partners.

Since the terrorist attacks on the American homeland on September 11, 2001, fighting the menace has become the frontier issue on the U.S.’ national security agenda. In the case of the African Continent, the United States has, and continues to accord major attention to the West African sub-region. This book : Evaluates where we can place West Africa within the broader crucible of the U.S. war on terrorism Establishes the key elements of the U.S.’ counter-terrorism policy in West Africa? Examines the U.S. counter-terrorism strategies in West Africa, and evaluates if they are being pursued both at the bilateral and multilateral levels in the region Interrogates the relationship between stability in the sub-region and the waging of the U.S.’ war on terrorism. Specifically, the book examines the crises of underdevelopment—cultural, economic, environmental, political, security and social—in the sub-region, especially their impact on shaping the conditions that provide the taproots of terrorism. Clearly, addressing these multidimensional crises of underdevelopment is pivotal to the success of the U.S. war on terrorism in the sub-region. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of terrorism, homeland security, African Studies, conflict management, and political violence.

What is the most effective long-term approach to U.S. counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)? The purpose of this paper is to lay the framework for answering this central question. The current struggle of the United States and its allies against terrorist groups and individuals motivated by Islamic extremism consumes U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies. Never a centerpiece of U.S. foreign and defense policy, SSA is now a front in the conflict to counter global Islamic extremism. As in the past, however, SSA remains largely misunderstood and misperceived in the United States. Yet, the U.S. Government (USG) is now embarked on reform of U.S. policy toward the African continent with uncertain consequences. Following an introduction (Section I), this Letort Paper next analyzes the policy debate in Washington, DC. The focus is on two fundamentally divergent theoretical approaches to U.S.counter-terrorism policy in SSA-development and defense. The former prescribes civilian countermeasures; the latter, military. Examples of the development approach to counterterrorism in SSA range from humanitarian aid to financial and legal assistance to law enforcement training; the approach does not involve the use of the military. In contrast, the defense approach involves any and all uses of the military; this includes the use of the military for nonmilitary purposes such as humanitarian assistance and intervention. Section II, "The Debate in Washington," considers the benefits and costs of the defense approach; the benefits and costs of the development approach; and the metrics for success and failure. What becomes clear is that both metrics-oriented U.S. counterterrorism approaches do not account fully for the patterns and complexities throughout SSA. Furthermore, the extent to which U.S. policy has countered terrorism in the region remains unclear. Only through recognition and understanding of the diverse perspectives across SSA may sound counterterrorism policy be formulated. From the debate in Washington, therefore, the paper moves across the Atlantic Ocean to discuss the attitudes and views of terrorism and counterterrorism in SSA. Due to geographic size and scope, SSA is divided into East, West, and Southern Africa sub-regions so as to highlight the different geographies, histories, threats, and perceptions. Section III, "The Perspectives from SSA," examines African views of terrorism and counterterrorism; the current state of civil military and civil-law enforcement relations; and, ultimately, what counterterrorism is in SSA, and what counterterrorism means to Africans themselves. Discussion of perspectives from the three sub-regions suggests the paramount importance of understanding local identities and cultures, as well as the variegated influence of history on views of terrorism and counterterrorism. Based on the research and findings, the paper concludes with Section IV which provides a summary and recommendations for a new grand strategic approach to U.S. counterterrorism in the region, which should focus on attaining three standards: 1. Seizing and holding the moral high ground. Seizing the moral high ground does not mean conducting actions better than the enemy. Rather, it means understanding what is moral in SSA and striving to achieve that level of morality in all policy considerations and actions. 2. Winning the struggle for perceived legitimacy. Much like morality, legitimacy varies from one group or individual to another. What is crucial here for U.S. counterterrorism policy is to understand perceptions from sub-region to sub-region, country to country, and small folk community to small folk community. 3. Pursuing restrained counterterrorism responses. After a terrorist attack, how the USG and the Department of Defense (DoD), in particular, respond is critical. The main point of restrained counterterrorism responses is the need for unity of effort.

Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks.

Failed states-states in which government authority has collapsed, violence has become endemic, and functional governance has ceased-have emerged in the period since the end of the Cold War as one of the most difficult challenges confronting the international community, especially in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Transnational terrorist groups use the chaos of failed states to shield themselves from effective counterterrorism efforts by the international community. The potential nexus of failed state-based terrorism and terrorists' access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), especially nuclear WMD, escalates the risk that such groups pose to the United States and to its allies in the Global War on Terror. In this monograph, the author finds that current counterterrorism strategies have yielded limited results in addressing the threat posed by terrorist groups operating in and from failed states. He argues that the uniquely challenging conditions in such states require a new approach to counterterrorism.

United States-Africa relations have experienced four major cycles. The first cycle was during the Cold War(1960-1990). During this period, the U.S. developed a one-sided relationship with various African states in which the latter served as "foot soldiers" for the U.S. in its competition with the Soviet Union for global domination. Among other things, the various client African states provided the U.S. with access to airfields, deep water ports and sites for the establishment of various intelligence gathering facilities. In addition, the U.S. used various groups like UNITA led by Jonas Savimbi in Angola to undermine and fight pro-Soviet regimes on the continent. The second cycle of the relationship covered the period 1991-1998. During this time, the U.S. scaled down its security activities in Africa. The major reason was that with the end of the Cold War Africa(with few exceptions like Egypt) was no longer a major front for the promotion of U.S. Security interests. The third cycle commenced in 1998 and ended in 2001. This period was characterized by the U.S.’ search for an approach to frame its security relations with Africa. In this vein, the U.S. undertook various military-security initiatives . The fourth cycle began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the American homeland. Since then, the U.S. has expanded the scope of its security relations with Africa, as reflected in the establishment of various initiatives and programs. At the core is the prosecution of the American "war on terror." Against this backdrop, this book examines some of the major dimensions of the U.S.’ security relations with Africa, including American security interests on the continent, the "war on terror," AFRICOM, and military cooperation. Using the book’s integrative theoretical framework, each of the chapters in the volume examines the various factors that shape the issue of focus.

Acts of terrorism and forms of counter-terrorism have been evolving for quite a long time. Although we have been living with these phenomena for centuries, they have only recently become part of the daily lives of many in the West since the dawn of the millennium. In some countries, they have become so prevalent that they shape the daily lives and habits of citizens. For these reasons, it is of utmost importance for all of us to understand the root causes, the drives and the motives behind terrorist activities, preferably even before they can materialize. In this challenge, counter-terrorism activities play a crucial role. In this book, contributors from various disciplines discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism on the African continent through case studies from Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, Ghana, or Mozambique and the Sahel region. In addition to analysis, they offer possible steps for improving the situation.