Union Combined Operations In The Civil War

In his introduction John D. Milligan considers Reed's provocative thesis that General George B. McClellan's concept of a grand strategy would have ended the bloodshed sooner.

Despite a wealth of books on the campaigns of the American Civil War, the subject of combined or joint operations has been largely neglected. This revealing book offers ten case studies of combined Army-Navy operations by Union forces. Presented in chronological order, each essay illuminates an aspect of combined operations during a time of changing technology and doctrine. The essays cover the war along the "rebel coast," including the operations in the North Carolina Sounds in 1861, the Union thrusts up the York and James rivers during the Peninsular Campaign in 1862 and 1864, and the various Union efforts to seize rebel seaports from the Texas coast to Charleston and Wilmington in 1863-65. Concluding the volume are two essays that evaluate the impact of Union combined operations on subsequent doctrine in both the United States and England.

History has demonstrated that amphibious assaults are among the most complex and challenging of all joint operations. The myriad of factors that evolved independently throughout the war did not become fully integrated until the winter of 1864-65. This thesis explores the maturation of joint amphibious operations during the U.S. Civil War, specifically through the assaults on Fort Fisher. This analysis will use modern joint doctrine as the framework to compare and contrast the two assaults. It will elaborate on how seaborne assaults differ from riverine assaults. Utilizing Fort Fisher as the focus develops an understanding of the interrelationship of these various factors and the challenges posed in their synchronization to achieve success. This study concludes that the operations reflected jointness, but also marked the emergence of modern amphibious assault concepts.

During the Civil War some of the earliest examples of joint operations in American military history were undertaken. Except for General Scott's landing at Veracruz during the War with Mexico, joint undertakings in the form of amphibious operations were rare. Army and navy commanders had little experience dealing with the problems associated with the ideas of jointness. Doctrinal guidance was unavailable and commanders worked together often with mixed results. In eastern North Carolina, the Union attempted several joint operations during the course of the war. Attacks were crudely planned and executed by modern standards. The North appeared not to have drawn lessons from preceding campaigns in any systematic way. Nevertheless, a basic pattern did develop and was improved upon over time as seen by the progressive sophistication of the operations against Hatteras, New Bern, and Fort Fisher. Today, the United States military has certain fundamental principles of joint warfare that it employs. When they are applied to Civil War campaigns certain trends become evident. The success rate increased when careful planning and preparation were present and the modern principles of joint warfare were followed. Where these elements were missing, Union forces often met with defeat. Failure to anticipate and provide for contingencies doomed many Civil War campaigns and would do the same to modern-day joint operations. The principles of joint warfare are a tool; one designed to make the transition to fighting as a team easier. Using them does not guarantee the warfighter success, but can greatly improves his chances.

The University of North Carolina Press and the George and Ann Richards Civil War Era Center at the Pennsylvania State University are pleased to announce the launch of The Journal of the Civil War Era. William Blair, of the Pennsylvania State University, serves as founding editor. The journal takes advantage of the flowering of research on the many issues raised by the sectional crisis, war, Reconstruction, and memory of the conflict, while bringing fresh understanding to the struggles that defined the period, and by extension, the course of American history in the nineteenth century. The Journal of the Civil War Era aims to create a space where scholars across the many subfields that animate nineteenth-century history can enter into conversation with each other. Table of Contents for this issue, Volume One, Number One: Editor's Note William Blair Welcome to the New Journal Articles Edward L. Ayers and Scott Nesbit Seeing Emancipation: Scale and Freedom in the American South Melinda Lawson Imagining Slavery: Representations of the Peculiar Institution on the Northern Stage, 1776-1860 LeeAnn Whites Forty Shirts and a Wagonload of Wheat: Women, the Domestic Supply Line, and the Civil War on the Western Border Review Essay Douglas R. Egerton Rethinking Atlantic Historiography in a Post-Colonial Era: The Civil War in a Global Perspective Book Reviews Books Received Professional Notes Aaron Sheehan-Dean The Nineteenth-Century U.S. History Job Market, 2000-2009

This study is a historical analysis of selected joint Army Navy operations conducted along the East Coast during the American Civil War. It begins with a description of the ante-bellum conditions of the Army and Navy and the organizational structure of the War and Navy Departments. Three joint operations are analyzed; the Fort Sumter Relief Expedition of 1861, the Port Royal Expedition of 1862, and the Charleston Campaign of 1863. In none of the joint operations covered by this study was there a unified command structure between the Army and Navy. Mutual support between the services was dependent upon voluntary cooperation between the respective service commanders. This study determines what factors influenced the degree of cooperation between the service commanders of joint operations during the Civil War. Many of the factors which either facilitated or hindered joint cooperation during that time could affect contemporary joint operations, particularly in the early stages before a unified command structure is established. An appreciation of those factors is both helpful in understanding the outcome of Civil War joint operations as well as providing some insight into the problems faced by contemporary commanders in a joint environment.

The Civil War fascinates Americans like no other war in their history. Many Americans are still fighting some of the war’s issues in an Odyssey that stretches back to the first settlement and will persist until the end of time. The war itself was an Iliad of brilliant generals like Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan for the Union, or Lee, Jackson, and Forrest for the Confederacy; epic battles like Gettysburg and Chickamauga; epic sieges like Vicksburg and Petersburg; and epic naval combats such as Monitor versus Merrimack, or Kearsarge versus Alabama. It was America’s most horrific war, with more dead than all others combined. Around 625,000 soldiers and 125,000 civilians died from various causes, bringing the total to 750,000 people. Of 31 million Americans, 2.1 million northerners and 880,000 southerners donned uniforms. Why did eleven states eventually ban together to rebel against the United States? President Jefferson Davis began an answer when he said: ‘If the Confederacy falls, there should be written on its tombstone, Died of a Theory.’ That theory justified the enslavement of blacks by whites as a natural right and duty of a superior race over an inferior race; a theory, it was believed, that morally and economically elevated both races. Although slavery was the Civil War’s core cause, there were related chronic conflicts over the nature of government, citizenship, liberty, property, equality, wealth, race, identity, justice, crime, voting, power, and history – some of which issues have never entirely gone away. America’s Unending Civil War is unique among thousands of books on the subject. None before has explored the Civil War’s related and enduring conflicts of ideas and principles through four centuries of a nation’s history.