Universalizing Nuclear Nonproliferation Norms

This book suggests a new bargain between the NPT nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT nuclear weapons possessor states, mainly India and Pakistan, through a regional arrangement to help move towards universalization of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The author analyses nuclear proliferation drivers to understand why states acquire and justify possession of nuclear weapons even though most nuclear weapon states no longer are faced with an existential threat to their national security. This study also identifies various challenges being faced by the NPT based nuclear nonproliferation regime, which if left unaddressed, could unravel the nonproliferation regime. It also offers the history of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, which could be a useful reference for negotiating a Regional Nonproliferation Regime (RNR) in the future.

Too often, our focus on the relative handful of countries with nuclear weapons keeps us from asking an important question: Why do so many more states not have such weapons? More important, what can we learn from these examples of nuclear restraint? Maria Rost Rublee argues that in addition to understanding a state's security environment, we must appreciate the social forces that influence how states conceptualize the value of nuclear weapons. Much of what Rublee says also applies to other weapons of mass destruction, as well as national security decision making in general. The nuclear nonproliferation movement has created an international social environment that exerts a variety of normative pressures on how state elites and policymakers think about nuclear weapons. Within a social psychology framework, Rublee examines decision making about nuclear weapons in five case studies: Japan, Egypt, Libya, Sweden, and Germany. In each case, Rublee considers the extent to which nuclear forbearance resulted from persuasion (genuine transformation of preferences), social conformity (the desire to maximize social benefits and/or minimize social costs, without a change in underlying preferences), or identification (the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other). The book offers bold policy prescriptions based on a sharpened knowledge of the many ways we transmit and process nonproliferation norms. The social mechanisms that encourage nonproliferation-and the regime that created them-must be preserved and strengthened, Rublee argues, for without them states that have exercised nuclear restraint may rethink their choices.

This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework involving the eclectic use of national security based realism, economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea, a case is built that a state’s leadership decides whether to keep or give up “the Bomb” based on interlinked security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter, frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability. This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, WMD analysts and post graduate or undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related courses

The volume investigates to what extent the international and European Union legal frameworks applicable to Chemical, Biological and Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) events are adequate to face current challenges. It is innovative in many aspects: it adopts an all-hazard approach to CBRN risks, focusing on events of intentional, accidental and natural origin; it explores international obligations according to the four phases of the emergency cycle, including prevention, preparedness, response and recovery; and it covers horizontal issues such as protection of human rights, international environmental law, new technologies, the role of private actors, as well as enforcement mechanisms and remedies available to victims. The book thus offers a new way of looking at the applicable rules of international law in this field.

This concise text presents a focused, well-rounded, and clear-eyed introduction to the concept of human security. Questioning the utility of traditional national-security frameworks in the postDCold War era, Paul Battersby and Joseph Siracusa argue that we must urgently reconsider the principle of state sovereignty in a global world where threats to humanity are beyond the capacity of any one nation to address through unilateral action. A welcome alternative to state-centric approaches to security, this balanced book will be a valuable supplement for courses in international and national security.

Developed over six chapters, Pakistan’s Nuclear Exclusion provides an account of how orientalism is a lived experience of post-colonial racism, injustice, and inequality amongst members of the nuclear community in Pakistan. The account is produced through interviews with members of the community consisting of students, academics, and physicists in Pakistan. Rahim offers unique insights into how Pakistan’s nuclear community is not only perceived and represented but also how it seeks to operate in a wider nuclear community dominated by Western nuclear powers. The provision of such highly contextualised insights is enabled by the book setting out to both (a) provide analytical space for and (b) ‘give voice’ to how orientalism is experienced in the everyday of their lives. Consequently, the work provides (1) an analysis of how ‘dominant discourses’ of nuclear management and their ‘pictures of reason’ are exclusionary, (2) an analysis of the core features of orientalism as they pertain to Pakistan’s nuclear community; and (3) empirical findings which produce categories of the experience of orientalism into areas of the everyday – exclusion, making a career, Islamophobia, technology denial and self-reliance. Pakistan’s Nuclear Exclusion is enormously valuable to the research community as well as extremely well-conceived and researched. In addition, much of the methodology chapter offers a level of sophistication and self-reflection that translates well in the interview material and its subsequent analysis.