Universals Of Legal Reasoning By Judges

It is twenty-five years since the publication of Neil MacCormick's book Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, a book that has been in print continuously since its first publication. This book looks at how examining legal reasoning can bring up important theoretical and ethical issues, as MacCormick revisits the issues anew in his current work.

Universals in Legal Reasoning by Judges explores and expounds the usage of rules to justify judicial decisions. Inspired by Savigny's canons of interpretation, and informed by the author's years of study and teaching in Germany, the book constructs a matrix for all legal argumentation in place of the so-called rules of interpretation, classifying justificatory arguments into four categories: textual, historical, purposive, and system-contextual. Along these categories, the book reveals certain universals while dispelling the confusion and mystery surrounding reasoning from judicial case decisions. This it does — simply and elegantly — by equating reasoning from case decisions with reasoning from statute. A myriad of examples, primarily from Germany, California, and the United Kingdom, show how these arguments find universal application. From start to finish, this book is itself an argument: an argument for judicial transparency and candour, which requires that judges reveal their thoughts and motivations-their ultimate reasons. This is necessary to enhance the persuasiveness and efficacy of judicial precedents, to foster democratic legitimacy, and to permit political accountability.

How do judges influence the development of law in Germany and should their behaviour set a precedent for others to follow? This book explores whether or not German judicial methods should serve as a model for the development of European law, both by the European courts and by the courts of other European member states.

This book is about judicial reasoning in human rights cases. The aim is to explore the question: how is it that notionally universal norms are reasoned by courts in such significantly different ways? What is the shape of this reasoning; which techniques are common across the transnational jurisprudence; and which are particular? The book, comprising contributions by a team of world-leading human rights scholars, moves beyond simply addressing the institutional questions concerning courts and human rights, which often dominate discussions of this kind, seeking instead a deeper examination of the similarities and divergence of reasonings by different courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. These differences, while partly influenced by institutional concerns, cannot be attributed to them alone. This book explores the diverse and rich underlying spectrum of human rights reasoning, as a distinctive and particular form of legal reasoning, evident in the case studies across the selected jurisdictions.

As the dedication ofthis book suggests, the genesis ofthis book arises from my association with Cha'im Perelman. Because I was one of the few Americans to comment on his TraUe de l' argumentation: la nouvelle rhetorique, before it was translated into English, I was invited to a conference celebrating the translation ofthat monumental work into English that was held in August 1970 in Santa Barbara, Califomia at the Center for the Study ofDemocratic Institutions, which was then under the directorship of the late Robert M. Hutchins. From that beginning, Professor Perelman and I developed a strong and warm friendship which was cemented when Professor Perelman and his wife, Fela, came to North Carolina in 1979 as a fellow at the National Humanities Center. I enjoyed the occasions on which I was able to participate in the activities of the Centre National de Recherehes de Logique which had been established, under Professor Perelman's aegis, in Belgium. A trip to Brussels was always something to which I looked forward. Since Professor Perelman's sudden and untimely death in January 1984, shortly after he had been singularly honored by being made a baron by King Baudouin, I have benefited greatly from my participation in the programs of the Perelman Foundation which was established through the generosity and efforts ofBaronne Fela Perelman; a remarkable woman in her own right who has now sadly also passed away.

This edited volume examines the very essence of the function of judges, building upon developments in the quality of justice research throughout Europe. Distinguished authors address a gap in the literature by considering the standards that individual judgments should meet, presenting both academic and practical perspectives. Readers are invited to consider such questions as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality with regard to judicial reasoning? Are there any attempts being made to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? The focus here is on judges meeting the highest standards possible in adjudication and how they may be held to account for the way they reason. The contributions examine theoretical questions surrounding the measurement of the quality of judicial reasoning, practices and legal systems across Europe, and judicial reasoning in various international courts. Six legal systems in Europe are featured: England and Wales, Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, France and Hungary as well as three non-domestic levels of court jurisdictions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The depth and breadth of subject matter presented in this volume ensure its relevance for many years to come. All those with an interest in benchmarking the quality of judicial reasoning, including judges themselves, academics, students and legal practitioners, can find something of value in this book.

Organized simply and logically, The Five Types of Legal Argument shows readers how to identify, create, attack, and evaluate the five types of legal arguments (text, intent, precedent, tradition and policy). It also describes how to weave the arguments together to make them more persuasive and how to attack legal arguments.In this book, Huhn demonstrates exactly why the legal reasoning in a case is difficult to analyze. Each type of legal argument has a different structure and draws upon different evidence of what the law is. Thus this book does not merely introduce readers to law and legal reasoning, but shows how the five different legal arguments are constructed so that various strategies can be developed for attacking each one.

This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wróblewski ́s three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonen ́s three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.