Unpatriotic History Of The Second World War

Sixty million people died in the Second World War, and still they tell us it was the Peoples War. The official history of the Second World War is Victors History. This is the history of the Second World War without the patriotic whitewash. The Second World War was not fought to stop fascism, or to liberate Europe. It was a war between imperialist powers to decide which among them would rule over the world, a division of the spoils of empire, and an iron cage for working people, enslaved to the war production drive. The unpatriotic history of the Second World War explains why the Great Powers fought most of their war not in their own countries, but in colonies in North Africa, in the Far East and in Germanys hoped-for Empire in the East. Find out how wildcat strikes, partisans in Europe and Asia, and soldiers mutinies came close to ending the war. And find out how the Allies invaded Europe and the Far East to save capitalism from being overthrown. James Heartfield challenges the received wisdom of the Second World War. ,

What caused the terrible events of World War II--and how do the repercussions still affect us today? And what was it like to be part of a nation fighting for its life? The answers to these and other questions make a fascinating story...one that those who didn't live through this turbulent time need to know. Follow the relentless spread of war, from the initial German blitzkriegs to the Russian campaign, from the Far East to the African front. 336 pages, 36 b/w illus., 6 x 9. NEW IN PAPERBACK

In the spirit of historians Howard Zinn, Gwynne Dyer, and Noam Chomsky, Jacques Pauwels focuses on the big picture. Like them, he seeks to find the real reasons for the actions of great powers and great leaders. Familiar Second World War figures from Adolf Hitler to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin are portrayed in a new light in this book. The decisions of Hitler and his Nazi government to go to war were not those of madmen. Britain and the US were not allies fighting shoulder to shoulder with no motive except ridding the world of the evils of Nazism. In Pauwels' account, the actions of the United States during the war years were heavily influenced by American corporations -- IBM, GM, Ford, ITT, and Standard Oil of New Jersey (now called Exxon) -- who were having a very profitable war selling oil, armaments, and equipment to both sides, with money gushing everywhere. Rather than analyzing Pearl Harbor as an unprovoked attack, Pauwels notes that US generals boasted of their success in goading Japan into a war the Americans badly wanted. One chilling account describes why President Truman insisted on using nuclear bombs against Japan when there was no military need to do so. Another reveals that Churchill instructed his bombers to flatten Dresden and kill thousands when the war was already won, to demonstrate British-American strength to Stalin. Leaders usually cast in a heroic mould in other books about this war look quite different here. Nations that claimed a higher purpose in going to war are shown to have had far less idealistic motives. The Second World War, as Jacques Pauwels tells it, was a good war only in myth. The reality is far messier -- and far more revealing of the evils that come from conflicts between great powers and great leaders seeking to enrich their countries and dominate the world.

This book examines attitudes towards German held captive in Britain, drawing on original archival material including newspaper and newsreel content, diaries, sociological surveys and opinion polls, as well as official documentation and the archives of pressure groups and protest movements. Moving beyond conventional assessments of POW treatment which have focused on the development of policy, diplomatic relations, and the experience of the POWs themselves, this study refocuses the debate onto the attitude of the British public towards the standard of treatment of German POWs. In so doing, it reveals that the issue of POW treatment intersected with discussions of state power, human rights, gender relations, civility, and national character.

The popular image of railway travel during the Second World War is that of a sparse service of dirty and grossly overcrowded trains that were forever being delayed. The iconic ‘is your journey really necessary’ poster campaign is credited with discouraging the public from traveling by train. This book questions these assumptions and examines the mobility requirements of the British public during the war years and aligns these to the level of service provided by the railways. Throughout the war the railways were managed by the Railway Executive Committee (REC) whose members were all senior railway officers. The conflicts between the REC and the government in respect to controlling passenger numbers on the railway system, which was overcrowded with essential additional war related freight traffic, are examined; as are the propaganda campaigns aimed at restricting ‘unnecessary’ travel. The public’s response to the travel restrictions are analyzed to determine how railway passengers’ attitudes and reactions corresponded to the publicly accepted mythology. Many British citizens did reduce their railway journeys, but for others who had previously had little need to travel by train, the exigencies of war resulted in them having to make long and often difficult journeys by rail.

Perhaps the most long overdue work ever written about World War II and Americas role in winning it. Bold, fresh, unique, extremely well documented, and brutally honest, in To Win the Lost War Lawrence Cambria examines and analyzes the war at numerous levels and spaced intervals in order to provide the reader with an ongoing assessment of the overall situation as the war progressed. He examines, analyzes, and compares the major turning points of the war in Europe in order to determine which has the best claim to being the decisive turning point. He also takes a fresh look at Americas war experience, bringing into focus numerous aspects of the war which are unknown to most Americans. Finally, he brings greater context to the importance of the American military effort. With To Win the Lost War the author joins a growing number of contemporary scholars who are making many of the same observations that he has. In fact, his work draws on a bibliography of works from more than 200 scholars on the war and has more than 1,100 supporting footnotes. In To Win the Lost War Lawrence Cambria separates popular myth from reality and provides his readers with observations on the war from perspectives that many have never considered. Read To Win the Lost War. It will change the way you look at World War II forever.

The liberal order is decaying. Will it survive, and if not, what will replace it? On the eightieth anniversary of the publication of E.H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, Philip Cunliffe revisits this classic text, juxtaposing its claims with contemporary debates on the rise and fall of the liberal international order. The New Twenty Years' Crisis reveals that the liberal international order experienced a twenty-year cycle of decline from 1999 to 2019. In contrast to claims that the order has been undermined by authoritarian challengers, Cunliffe argues that the primary drivers of the crisis are internal. He shows that the heavily ideological international relations theory that has developed since the end of the Cold War is clouded by utopianism, replacing analysis with aspiration and expressing the interests of power rather than explaining its functioning. As a result, a growing tendency to discount political alternatives has made us less able to adapt to political change. In search of a solution, this book argues that breaking through the current impasse will require not only dissolving the new forms of utopianism, but also pushing past the fear that the twenty-first century will repeat the mistakes of the twentieth. Only then can we finally escape the twenty years' crisis. By reflecting on Carr's foundational work, The New Twenty Years' Crisis offers an opportunity to take stock of the current state of international order and international relations theory.