Us Intelligence And The Soviet Strategic Threat

The author examines in detail the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, its attempts to monitor and predict the development of Soviet forces from the early days of the cold war, and how these attempts affected American policy and weapons production.Originally published in 1987.The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The author examines in detail the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, its attempts to monitor and predict the development of Soviet forces from the early days of the cold war, and how these attempts affected American policy and weapons production. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Bruce Berkowitz and Allan Goodman draw on historical analysis, interviews, and their own professional experience in the intelligence community to provide an evaluation of U.S. strategic intelligence.

Presents papers from the conference: "CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991" at Princeton University on 9-10 March 2001. Focuses on the organizational evolution of the CIA's analysis of the Soviet economic, political, military, and scientific and technological developments during the Cold War. Assesses the extent to which Western analyses of the Soviet Union may have influenced the USSR's policy making process.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U. S. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias shows that U. S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them&—with sometimes disastrous results. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. S. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the &"unconditional surrender&" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. S. intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of missed opportunities the U. S. government had to conduct a more responsible foreign policy that could have avoided large losses of life and massive expenditures on arms buildups. While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.

The Description for this book, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, will be forthcoming.

Draws on interviews with emigres, samizdat, and U.S. intelligence sources for a picture of the functions and dysfunctions of today's Soviet military machine.