Us Military Innovation Since The Cold War

explains how the US military transformation failed in the post-Cold war era Harvey Sapolsky is a leading defence scholar in the US will be of interest to students of strategic studies, defence studies, military studies, US politics and security studies in general

This book explores Turkish military innovation since the Cold War. The major questions addressed are how Türkiye has been able to innovate, the production of new weapon systems, its philosophical background, how the country overcame bureaucratic and economic obstacles, and how these innovations resonated in military doctrine and organization. Focusing on two main defense industry projects that trigger an overall change in the military doctrine and organization, the text examines the innovative inclinations of the Turkish military realm and reveals the societal, economic and political consequences of military innovation. This book fills a gap in the literature by providing an interdisciplinary and comprehensive overview of Turkish military innovation. Contributors include those involved in and affected by the military innovation process, as well as scholars who monitor the process using primary sources. Military Innovation in Türkiye will appeal to academics, politicians and military professionals interested in understanding the evolution of the Turkish military.

This book examines how the US Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War and how this has effected US intervention policy after the Cold War.

Trillions for Military Technology explains why the weapons purchased by the U.S. Department of Defense cost so much, why it takes decades to get them into production even as innovation in the civilian economy becomes ever more frenetic, and why some of those weapons don't work very well despite expenditures of many billions of dollars. It also explains what do about these problems. The author argues that the internal politics of the armed services make weapons acquisition almost unmanageable. Solutions require empowering civilian officials and reforms that will bring choice of weapons "into the sunshine" of public debate.

This book provides an authoritative account of how the US, British, and French armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War. All three armies have sought to respond to changes in their strategic and socio-technological environments by developing more expeditionary capable and networked forces. Drawing on extensive archival research, hundreds of interviews, and unprecedented access to official documents, the authors examine both the process and the outcomes of army transformation, and ask how organizational interests, emerging ideas, and key entrepreneurial leaders interact in shaping the direction of military change. They also explore how programs of army transformation change over time, as new technologies moved from research to development, and as lessons from operations were absorbed. In framing these issues, they draw on military innovation scholarship and, in addressing them, produce findings with general relevance for the study of how militaries innovate.

A military's ability to adapt its organization, doctrine, and technology strategy to meet the threats of its time influences the state's capacity to maintain great power status. This thesis uses a historical overview of military innovation among great powers throughout history to draw lessons for the U.S. military today. In this heuristic analysis, it is determined that great powers that integrated between and among their various elements of national power were able to maintain their positions better than those that did not. The study transitions from a descriptive to a prescriptive mode, concluding with the caution that, if the U.S. military does not begin to transform itself from a Cold War organization to an adaptable, resilient force for the future, it could hasten America's loss of global power. Measures that the U.S. military should take to innovate organizationally, doctrinally and in terms of technology strategy are prescribed. Finally, and most importantly, this study finds it essential to foster a climate and institutional culture receptive to innovation.

Did a "doctrine race" exist alongside the much-publicized arms competition between East and West? Using recent insights from organization theory, Kimberly Marten Zisk answers this question in the affirmative. Zisk challenges the standard portrayal of Soviet military officers as bureaucratic actors wedded to the status quo: she maintains that when they were confronted by a changing external security environment, they reacted by producing innovative doctrine. The author's extensive evidence is drawn from newly declassified Soviet military journals, and from her interviews with retired high-ranking Soviet General Staff officers and highly placed Soviet-Russian civilian defense experts. According to Zisk, the Cold War in Europe was powerfully influenced by the reactions of Soviet military officers and civilian defense experts to modifications in U.S. and NATO military doctrine. Zisk also asserts that, contrary to the expectations of many analysts, civilian intervention in military policy-making need not provoke pitched civil-military conflict. Under Gorbachev's leadership, for instance, great efforts were made to ensure that "defensive defense" policies reflected military officers' input and expertise. Engaging the Enemy makes an important contribution not only to the theory of military organizations and the history of Soviet military policy but also to current policy debates on East-West security issues. Kimberly Marten Zisk is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Faculty Associate of the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University.

The Allies claimed victory at the end of the Second World War, but the United States’ invention of the atomic bomb and its replication by the Soviet Union posed new dangers for all nations. In Peace Prepared examines what Canada’s Cold War Army did to prepare for war – and why and how it did it. Although a Third World War never happened, army officers supported by a large civilian defence workforce of scientists, engineers, and designers responded aggressively to the challenges presented by the possibility of nuclear attack. Through innovation and adaptation, they developed a collaborative and systematic approach to problem solving that not only played a significant role in the evolution of Canada’s national force but also shaped how armies in the Western Alliance related to one another during the Cold War and beyond.