Usn Submarine Vs Ijn Antisubmarine Escort

This fully illustrated study examines and compares the roles of the US Navy submarines and the Imperial Japanese Navy's anti-submarine warfare capabilities during World War II. In 1941 and 1942, US Navy submarine operations in the Pacific were largely ineffective, hampered by faulty torpedo design, conservative tactics, and insufficiently aggressive submarine captains. Eventually, though, a new generation of wartime submarine commanders, combined with reliable torpedoes, new generation boats, improved intelligence, and advanced radar, inflicted devastating losses on Japanese shipping. Antisubmarine warfare was initially accorded a low priority by the Imperial Japanese Navy; the lack of ASW escorts and modern weaponry, and an inability to develop tactics, resulted in devastation to vital convoys, and hampered its ability to deter and destroy enemy submarines. This book explores all these factors, and the role that US submarines played in supporting the major fleet operations in the Pacific Theater, notching up almost 500 patrols by war's end for the loss of 52 submarines to the Japanese. The technical and tactical developments implemented by the opposing sides are documented in detail, including US improvements to submarine design and weaponry and more aggressive tactics, and the Japanese development of destroyer escorts, changes to depth charge design, and improved submarine detection capacity.

This fully illustrated study examines and compares the roles of the US Navy submarines and the Imperial Japanese Navy's anti-submarine warfare capabilities during World War II. In 1941 and 1942, US Navy submarine operations in the Pacific were largely ineffective, hampered by faulty torpedo design, conservative tactics, and insufficiently aggressive submarine captains. Eventually, though, a new generation of wartime submarine commanders, combined with reliable torpedoes, new generation boats, improved intelligence, and advanced radar, inflicted devastating losses on Japanese shipping. Antisubmarine warfare was initially accorded a low priority by the Imperial Japanese Navy; the lack of ASW escorts and modern weaponry, and an inability to develop tactics, resulted in devastation to vital convoys, and hampered its ability to deter and destroy enemy submarines. This book explores all these factors, and the role that US submarines played in supporting the major fleet operations in the Pacific Theater, notching up almost 500 patrols by war's end for the loss of 52 submarines to the Japanese. The technical and tactical developments implemented by the opposing sides are documented in detail, including US improvements to submarine design and weaponry and more aggressive tactics, and the Japanese development of destroyer escorts, changes to depth charge design, and improved submarine detection capacity.

In 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) went to war with a marginal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. This was a lamentable state of affairs for a nation dependent upon imports to sustain its war economy. There were only a few purpose-built ASW escorts available at the start of the war and these were augmented by a handful of second-class destroyers and a dozen torpedo boats. Once the magnitude of the threat to Japan's shipping became fully apparent in 1943, the IJN made plans for mass production of ASW escorts. These arrived in 1944, but could not stop the massacre of Japanese shipping by increasingly bold and effective American submarines. This volume will detail the history, weapons and tactics of the IJN's ASW escorts. These include the Momi class of second-rate destroyers, the Tomodzuru and Ootori classes of torpedo boars, and the several types of ASW escorts built from 1937 up to the end of the war.

In 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) went to war with a marginal anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. This was a lamentable state of affairs for a nation dependent upon imports to sustain its war economy. There were only a few purpose-built ASW escorts available at the start of the war and these were augmented by a handful of second-class destroyers and a dozen torpedo boats. Once the magnitude of the threat to Japan's shipping became fully apparent in 1943, the IJN made plans for mass production of ASW escorts. These arrived in 1944, but could not stop the massacre of Japanese shipping by increasingly bold and effective American submarines. This volume will detail the history, weapons and tactics of the IJN's ASW escorts. These include the Momi class of second-rate destroyers, the Tomodzuru and Ootori classes of torpedo boars, and the several types of ASW escorts built from 1937 up to the end of the war.

This volume covers day-to-day naval actions during March-June 1943. The Allies attacked German U-boats day and night, forcing their withdrawal from the vital North Atlantic convoy routes, clearing the way for the eventual invasion of Europe from Britain. In the Bismarck Sea, Allied aircraft destroyed an entire Japanese troop convoy bound for New Guinea. In the Komandorski Islands, the U.S. Navy engaged a superior Japanese force and out fought them. After this loss, the Japanese commander was fired in disgrace. The Allies isolated the German and Italian troops fighting in Tunisia with an air and sea blockade. Without support from Italy, Tunisia fell. U.S. aircraft ambushed Japanese Admiral Yamamoto while he was en route to an inspection visit in the Solomon Islands. The U.S. 7th Infantry Division liberated Attu Island in the Aleutian Islands.

Prior to entering World War II, the Japanese Navy did a considerable planning and force development in preparation for a single “decisive battle” with the American fleet. The Japanese submarine force entered the war with highly trained crews operating some of the most capable submarines in the world. Even so, they accomplished little. This study will analyze the genesis and evolution of the technological basis of the Japanese submarine fleet before and during the war. Along with the technological evolution, it will also review the strategic and tactical evolution of the force. It will further analyze the employment of submarines as they apply to two major forms of naval warfare: guerre de course and guerre de main. While the entire study will use comparison with the American and German, the majority of the focus will be on the unique aspects of the Japanese employment of their submarines. These analyses will answer whether the Japanese submarine force would have been capable of influencing the results of major battles and the overall campaign in the Pacific Ocean. Could the Japanese submarine force have influenced the result of the war allowing it to end with a more favorable outcome for the Japanese?

In April, May and June 1944, there were three major areas of naval conflict: In New Guinea: United States (US) and Australian forces landed at Aitape and Hollandia, then at Arare, Wakde and Biak Island. In Europe: The battle for the control of the English Channel heated up. The German navy attacked what they thought was an Allied convoy along the English southwestern coast. They had actually stumbled upon Operation TIGER, the Allied training exercise for the upcoming Normandy landing. RAF Bomber Command mined Biscay, Bretagne, La Pallice, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Den Helder, Texel, the Friesian Islands, the German Bay, Kattegat, Kiel, Swinemünde, Gotenhafen, and Pillau. The Allies initiated Operation NEPTUNE to conceal the real Allied landing location from the Germans. All this culminated in the Allied landing in Normandy, France, in Operation OVERLORD. In the Pacific: The US landed on Saipan, considered Japanese territory, in Operation FORAGER, which caused the Battle of the Philippine Sea.