Vanguard To Trident

This work examines British thinking about nuclear weapons in the period up to about 1970, looking at the subject through the eyes of the Royal Navy, in the belief that this can offer new insights in this field. The author argues that the Navy was always sceptical about nuclear weapons, both on practical grounds and because of wartime and pre-war experiences. He suggests that this scepticism can teach us a good deal about military technological innovation in general.

I bogen redegøres der for udviklingen i britisk, maritim tænkning og flådepolitik fra 2. Verdenkrigs slutning (med det sidste britiske slagskib "Vanguard") og frem til 1980ernes "TRIDENT-program".

This book explores innovation within the Royal Navy from the financial constraints of the 1930s through to the refocusing of the Royal Navy after 1990.

This book explores innovation within the Royal Navy from the financial constraints of the 1930s through to the refocusing of the Royal Navy after 1990.

This book describes the fate of South Africa's drive, which began in 1949, to associate itself with Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium in an African Defence Pact. It describes how South Africa had to settle for an entente rather than an alliance, and how even this had been greatly emasculated by 1960. In light of this case, the book considers the argument that ententes have the advantages of alliances without their disadvantages, and concludes that this is exaggerated.

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyses the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

Between 1945 and 1960, Great Britain constructed a substantial nuclear-armed bomber force. The creation of this force had ramifications that extended well beyond the confines of military policy. The process played a large part in defining relations with the United States, and the belief that these bombers could replace conventional forces convinced successive British governments that Great Britain could maintain a significant global military role. Originally published in 1995 and drawing on both archives and oral testimony, this book analyses British strategic discourse and its influence on British foreign policy in the early decades of the Cold War.