Verification After The Cold War

Trust, but Verify uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The contributors to this volume look at how the "emotional" side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.

Originally published in 1985, the level of anxiety and suspicion between the USA and the USSR had rarely been higher. Many advocates of arms control believed that effective verification would reduce tensions and lessen the risk of war. This book analyses the two main issues of verification. One is technological: what are the present capabilities of various verification techniques and what is their potential? The devices and methods currently employed by the two major nuclear powers and by international organizations to monitor the compliance of states with arms control or disarmament treaties are examined. The second issue is political: how do US and Soviet approaches compare, what are the roles of domestic and bureaucratic politics, and on what criteria can a workable standard of adequacy be based? In short, how much is enough? Although the study concludes that a number of significant arms control measures can already be adequately verified, modern weapons are becoming more mobile and it is becoming easier to conceal them. There is a danger that the ability to hide weapons will outstrip the ability to find them. Verification cannot promise to detect all violations; a workable standard of adequacy in verification must derive from the ability to detect militarily significant violations.

Jörg Vogelmann looks into one of the central political and economic relationships of the 21st century. The author finds Sino-U.S. ties marked by strong, slightly asymmetric (economic) interdependence, a relatively fast economic power transition under way as well as slow to moderate shifts in military power. He develops a neoliberal and a neorealist grand theory picture of Sino-U.S. and international relations, and empirically verifies these influential perspectives by analyzing post-Cold War Chinese and U.S. foreign policies in the major flashpoints the Taiwan and the North Korea issue. Despite and due to globalization, ties between ascending China (as a potential regional or once even global U.S. challenger) and the hegemonic United States may likely continue to be marked by strategic power politics - and will decisively affect trans- and international relations. Contents China and the United States in the World Economy and the Military Realm Neoliberalism and Neorealism The Taiwan and the North Korea Issue Sino-U.S. and International Relations since the End of the Cold War Target Groups Researchers and Students of International Relations, Political Science and Related Disciplines Experts in Politics, Diplomacy, Business and the Military The Author Dr. Jörg Vogelmann studied Political Science, Business Administration and Geography. He was a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stuttgart and received his doctorate from the University of Cologne.

After Stalin's death in March 1953, the Cold War changed almost overnight. The Soviet Union embarked on a course of reconciliation and greater openness. However, despite an end to the Korean War and progress on many other outstanding East-West questions, the Western world remained mistrustful of Soviet motives and policies and Soviet leaders remained suspicious of Western intentions. Less than a decade after Stalin's death the Berlin Wall was erected and the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world close to nuclear annihilation. Was this development unavoidable? Was an opportunity missed to overcome and terminate the Cold War? Was there a possibility for the creation of a more stable, less threatening, and less costly world in both human and material terms? It is only now, after the end of the Cold War and based on recently declassified western documents and revelations from once-closed archives in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, that new light can be shed on the nature of international Cold War policies in the years after Stalin's death. The essays in this book offer a historical understanding of this crucial period of the Cold War, assessing both the possibilities for change and the obstacles to d tente. The book draws on the collective talents of an international group of scholars with a wide range of historical, geographical, and linguistic expertise. All of the essays are based on original research, many of them drawing from previously inaccessible archival documents from both the East and West. This book should be read by everyone interested in the final stage of the defining conflict that was the Cold War. Contributions by: Csaba B k s, G nter Bischof, Jeffrey Brooks, Ira Chernus, Jerald A. Combs, Lloyd Gardner, Jussi M. Hanhim ki, Hope M. Harrison, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Mark Kramer, Klaus Larres, Vojtech Mastny, Kenneth Osgood, Kathryn C. Statler, and Qiang Zhai

Verification in an Age of Insecurity takes the reader into some of the most urgent arms control issues facing the world community, including the nuclear activities of rogue states and threats from sophisticated non-state actors. In the book, national security expert Philip D. O'Neill, Jr. identifies and addresses issues from the resuscitated disarmament agenda, from the comprehensive test ban to fissile material and biological weapons. O'Neill examines the need for shifts in verification standards and policy suitable for our volatile era and beyond it. He surveys recent history to show how established verification procedures fail to produce the certainty necessary to meet today's threats. Verification in an Age of Insecurity goes beyond a discussion of rogue states like North Korea to offer suggestions on how best to bring compliance policy up to date with modern threats.

This book presents an interdisciplinary collection of expert analyses and views of existing verification systems. It provides guidelines and advice for the improvement of those systems as well as for new challenges in the field.