Virtue And Self Knowledge

The acquisition of self-knowledge is often described as one of the main goals of philosophical inquiry. At the same time, some sort of self-knowledge is often regarded as a necessary condition of our being a human agent or human subject. Thus self-knowledge is taken to constitute both the beginning and the end of humans' search for wisdom, and as such it is intricately bound up with the very idea of philosophy. Not surprisingly therefore, the Delphic injunction 'Know thyself' has fascinated philosophers of different times, backgrounds, and tempers. But how can we make sense of this imperative? What is self-knowledge and how is it achieved? What are the structural features that distinguish self-knowledge from other types of knowledge? What role do external, second- and third-personal, sources of knowledge play in the acquisition of self-knowledge? How can we account for the moral impact ascribed to self-knowledge? Is it just a form of anthropological knowledge that allows agents to act in accordance with their aims? Or, does self-knowledge ultimately ennoble the self of the subjects having it? Finally, is self-knowledge, or its completion, a goal that may be reached at all? The book addresses these questions in fifteen chapters covering approaches of many philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to Edmund Husserl or Elisabeth Anscombe. The short reflections inserted between the chapters show that the search for self-knowledge is an important theme in literature, poetry, painting and self-portraiture from Homer.

The first systematic study of Socrates' interest in selfhood, examining ancient philosophical ideas of what constitutes the self.

This volume brings together recent work by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of virtue epistemology. The prospects of virtue-theoretic analyses of knowledge depend crucially on our ability to give some independent account of what epistemic virtues are and what they are for. The contributions here ask how epistemic virtues matter apart from any narrow concern with defining knowledge; they show how epistemic virtues figure in accounts of various aspects of our lives, with a special emphasis on our practical lives. In essence, the essays here put epistemic virtues to work.

Self-knowledge - a person's knowledge of their own thoughts, character, and psychological states - has long been a central focus of philosophical enquiry. The concerns which occupy ancient thinkers with regard to self-knowledge, however, diverge in critical ways from contemporary investigations on the topic. In this volume, based upon the eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, leading scholars explore the treatment of self-knowledge in ancient Greek thought, particularly in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus. A number of chapters identify specific modes of self-knowledge in ancient thought, such as knowledge of one's individual moral or political character in Plato, or one's own discursive thought as compared to that arising from the self-presence of intellect in Plotinus. Others identify interesting points of convergence with contemporary thinking to make interventions in existing debates as well as to articulate new research questions, such as whether Plato regarded self-knowledge as synoptic and diachronic in the Republic, or whether self-knowledge is a condition on virtue for Aristotle. By exploring the distinctions between the fundamental assumptions and conceptual frameworks in which ancient and modern philosophers examine self-knowledge, this volume makes a novel contribution to current scholarship in the field.

You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment.

This is the first book to bring together Western and Chinese perspectives on both moral and intellectual virtues. Editors Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote, and Ernest Sosa have assembled some of the world’s leading epistemologists and ethicists—located in the U.S., Europe, and Asia—to explore in a global context what they are calling, "the virtue turn." The 15 chapters have never been published previously and by covering topics that bridge epistemology and moral philosophy suggest a widespread philosophical turn away from Kantian and Utilitarian issues and towards character- and agent-based concerns. A goal of this volume is to show students and researchers alike that the (re-)turn toward virtue underway in the Western tradition is being followed by a similar (re-)turn toward virtue in Chinese philosophy.

In 'The First Alcibiades', Socrates converses with the ambitious and proud Alcibiades, who seeks guidance before entering public life. As they discuss the essence of politics, Socrates challenges Alcibiades' knowledge of justice, and the youth concedes that he knows nothing about politics. Socrates warns him of the education, might, and richness of foreign rulers and stresses the importance of self-knowledge.