War Revolution And Peace In Russia

The American historian Frank Golder (1877–1929) was an eyewitness to some of the most historic events in modern Russian history. He was in St. Petersburg when tsarist Russia entered World War I in 1914. He returned to the city—now Petrograd—eleven days before the fall of Nicholas II in 1917 and witnessed the February Revolution that overthrew Russia's autocracy. He served as a relief worker and unofficial political observer for the US government during the Great Famine of 1921. In later visits, he beheld the changes in Soviet society after the death of Lenin. Golder faithfully recorded his impressions in diaries and letters, now in the holdings of the Hoover Institution Library & Archives. His writings from Russia detail the dramatic events he observed, from the final years of the Romanov dynasty to the beginnings of Stalinism. Among the events he describes are encounters with key figures in the Russian Revolution, backdoor negotiations between Washington and Moscow on the issues of trade and political recognition, and meetings with prominent Russian ÉmigrÉs from which learned the fate of the old-regime intelligentsia. Golder's writings provide a firsthand account of the tumultuous events that transformed Russian politics, society, and culture.

In December 1917, nine months after the disintegration of the Russian monarchy, the army officer corps, one of the dynasty’s prime pillars, finally fell—a collapse that, in light of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, historians often treat as inevitable. The Imperial Russian Army in Peace, War, and Revolution, 1856–1917 contests this assumption. By expanding our view of the Imperial Russian Army to include the experience of the enlisted ranks, Roger R. Reese reveals that the soldier’s revolt in 1917 was more social revolution than anti-war movement—and a revolution based on social distinctions within the officer corps as well as between the ranks. Reese’s account begins in the aftermath of the Crimean War, when the emancipation of the serfs and consequent introduction of universal military service altered the composition of the officer corps as well as the relationship between officers and soldiers. More catalyst than cause, World War I exacerbated a pervasive discontent among soldiers at their ill treatment by officers, a condition that reached all the way back to the founding of the Russian army by Peter I. It was the officers’ refusal to change their behavior toward the soldiers and each other over a fifty-year period, Reese argues, capped by their attack on the Provisional Government in 1917, that fatally weakened the officer corps in advance of the Bolshevik seizure of power. As he details the evolution of Russian Imperial Army over that period, Reese explains its concrete workings—from the conscription and discipline of soldiers to the recruitment and education of officers to the operation of unit economies, honor courts, and wartime reserves. Marshaling newly available materials, his book corrects distortions in both Soviet and Western views of the events of 1917 and adds welcome nuance and depth to our understanding of a critical turning point in Russian history.

This book explores the 1917 Russian Revolution from its February Revolution beginning to the victory of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in October.

Author's Note -- Part I: Last Years of the Old Empire, 1904-1914 -- Part II: The Great War : Imperial Self-Destruction -- The Great War Begins -- Germans, Jews, Armenians -- Tearing Themselves Apart -- Conflict and Collapse -- Part III: 1917 : Contest for Control -- Five Days that Shook the World -- The Provisional Government and the War -- August-September : From Putsch to Coup -- Bolshevik October -- Death of the Constituent Assembly -- Politics from Below -- Part IV: Sovereign Claims -- The Peace that Wasn't -- Treason and Terror -- Finland's Civil War -- Baltic Entanglements -- Ukrainian Drama, Act I -- Colonial Repercussions -- Part V: War Within -- The Unquiet Don -- Foreign Bodies -- Trotsky Arms, Siberia Mobilizes -- Kolchak : the Wild East -- Ukraine, Act II -- War Against the Cossacks -- Miracle on the Vistula -- War Against the Jews : 1919-1920 -- The Last Page -- War Against the Peasants -- Part VI: Victory and Retreat -- The Proletariat in the Proletarian Dictatorship -- The Revolution Turns Against Itself -- Conclusion: Revolution Against Itself

Vladimir Fedorovich Dzhunkovsky was a witness to Russia’s unfolding tragedy—from Tsar Alexander II’s Great Reforms, through world war, revolution, the rise of a new regime, and finally, his country’s descent into terror under Stalin. But Dzhunkovsky was not just a passive observer—he was an active participant in his troubled and turbulent times, often struggling against the tide. In the centennial of the Russian revolution, his story takes on special significance. Highly readable, Overtaken by the Night captivates on many levels. It is a gripping biography of a man of many faces, a behind-the-curtain look at the inner workings of Russian politics at its highest levels, and also an engrossing account of ordinary Russians engulfed by swiftly moving political and social currents. Dzhunkovsky served as a confidant in the tsar’s imperial court and as governor in Moscow province during and after the 1905 revolution. In 1913 he became the empire’s security chief, determined to reform the practices of the dreaded tsarist political police, the Okhrana. Dismissed from office for daring to investigate and warn Tsar Nicholas about Rasputin, his path led him into combat on the battlefields of the First World War. A natural leader of men, he held his units together even as revolution spilled into the trenches. Arrested as a counterrevolutionary in 1918 and imprisoned until 1921, Dzhunkovsky avoided execution thanks to an outpouring of public support and his reputation for treating revolutionaries with fairness and dignity. Although later he consulted for the Stalinist secret police, he was tried and executed in 1938 as an enemy of the people. Based on Dzhunkovsky’s detailed memoirs and extensive archival research, Overtaken by the Night paints a fascinating picture of an important figure. Dzhunkovsky's incredible life reveals much about a long and crucial period in Russian history. It is a story of Russia in revolution reminiscent of the fictional Doctor Zhivago, but perhaps even more extraordinary for being true.

Written in 1918, this volume attempts to give an un-biased account of the Russian Revolution and what it stood for, by asking to what extent the Revolution was the result of the War and how far the struggle for peace which followed the Revolution was inherent in it. It discusses whether or not the peace policy of the revolutionary democracy expressed the true purpose of Russia at the time or were the soviets really alien to the people and to the Revolution. It also questions whether the disintegration of Russia and the dissolution of the Russian Army inevitable.

This book analyzes the evolution of Russian military thought and how Russia's current thinking about war is reflected in recent crises. While other books describe current Russian practice, Oscar Jonsson provides the long view to show how Russian military strategic thinking has developed from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. He closely examines Russian primary sources including security doctrines and the writings and statements of Russian military theorists and political elites. What Jonsson reveals is that Russia's conception of the very nature of war is now changing, as Russian elites see information warfare and political subversion as the most important ways to conduct contemporary war. Since information warfare and political subversion are below the traditional threshold of armed violence, this has blurred the boundaries between war and peace. Jonsson also finds that Russian leaders have, particularly since 2011/12, considered themselves to be at war with the United States and its allies, albeit with non-violent means. This book provides much needed context and analysis to be able to understand recent Russian interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, how to deter Russia on the eastern borders of NATO, and how the West must also learn to avoid inadvertent escalation.