Weapons Acquisition

With the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Soviet threat, the United States is reevaluating its defense policy and its acquisition of weapons. James Lebovic shows that, although current military missions are adapted to post-Cold War realities, the self-defeating bias of bureaucrats and military services toward Cold War weaponry is still prevalent. He examines the impact of this bias on the armed services as they assess threat, generate requirements, develop and change weapon concepts, set production rates, and engage in testing. The author asserts that bias compromises service interests and broader military objectives and he offers general policy recommendations to put U.S. weapons acquisition on a more effective track.

In Learning to Love the Bomb, Sean M. Maloney explores the controversial subject of Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Based on newly declassified Canadian and U.S. documents, it examines policy, strategy, operational, and technical matters and weaves these seemingly disparate elements into a compelling story that finally unlocks several Cold War mysteries. For example, while U.S. military forces during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were focused on the Caribbean Sea and the southeastern United States, Canadian forces assumed responsibility for defending the northern United States, with aircraft armed with nuclear depth charges flying patrols and guarding against missile attack by Soviet submarines. This defensive strategy was a closely guarded secret because it conflicted with Canada's image as a peacekeeper and therefore a more passive member of NATO than its ally to the south. It is revealed here for the first time. The place of nuclear weapons in Canadian history has, until now, been a highly secret and misunderstood field subject to rumor, rhetoric, half-truths, and propaganda. Learning to Love the Bomb reveals the truth about Canada's role as a nuclear power.

Why are certain weapons acquired in the United States and others not? Theo Farrell addresses this question by examining the strategic, institutional and budgetary issues surrounding four major weapon programmes. Extensive use is made of primary sources in analysing the origins, development and outcomes of these programmes. This book presents alarming evidence to show how the military services manipulate weapons acquisition to suit their own ends rather than national security. It also analyses how Congress, motivated by concerns over cost, comes to play a greater role in shaping programme outcomes once weapons enter production.

GAO reviewed the processes that France, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Israel, and the Soviet Union use to acquire weapon systems. GAO found that, in the four countries visited: (1) the Ministries of Defense have a separate directorate or agency responsible for the entire procurement function for all new weapon system acquisitions although the military services play a role in the acquisition process; (2) each country follows roughly the same general acquisition phases for its major weapons systems; (3) each country conducts two major types of tests, developmental and operational; (4) the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel generally use a specific monetary level to designate a major weapon system, but France and West Germany use more general criteria; (5) the extent of ownership or control over the defense industrial base varies; and (6) each country's legislature exercises varying degrees of oversight of the defense budget and most major acquisition programs. The Soviet Union offered the most contrast because it has a planned command economy which is hierarchically organized with a single political party. In general, the Soviet Union prefers: (1) modest technology advances; (2) low cost; (3) weapons in quantity; (4) disciplined system acquisition; (5) conservative design; and (6) extensive operational testing. However, even with this data, it would be difficult to compare the efficiency of the other countries' acquisition processes to the United States' because of fundamental political, cultural, and economic differences. Significant variations make it difficult to determine if the United States should adopt any of the acquisition practices of the other countries.

Americans spend more than $100 billion a year to buy weapons, but no one likes the process that brings these weapons into existence. The problem, McNaugher shows, is that the technical needs of engineers and military planners clash sharply with the political demands of Congress. McNaugher examines weapons procurement since World War II and shows how repeated efforts to improve weapons acquisition have instead increased the harmful intrusion of political pressures into that technical development and procurement process. Today's weapons are more complicated than their predecessors. So are the nation's military forces. The design of new systems and their integration into the force structure demand more care, time, and flexibility. Yet time and flexibility are precisely what political pressures remove from the acquisitions process. In a series of case studies and conceptual discussions, McNaugher tackles concerns at the heart of the debate about acquisition—the slow and heavily bureaucratic approach to development, the preference for ultimate weapons over well-organized and trained forces, and the counterproductive incentives facing the nation's defense firms. He calls for changes that run against the current fashion—less centralization or procurement, less haste in developing new weapons, and greater use of competition as a means of removing the development process from political oversight. Above all, McNaugher shows how the United States tries to buy research and development on the cheap, and how costly this has been. The nation can improve its acquisition process, he concludes, only when it recognizes the need to pay for the full exploration of new technology.

In 1993, Canada’s Liberal Party cancelled an order to replace the navy’s Sea King helicopter. It claimed that the Tory plan was too expensive, but the cancellation itself actually cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. Aaron Plamondon connects this incident to the larger evolution of defence procurement in Canada, revealing that partisan politics, rather than a desire to increase the military’s capabilities, have driven the military procurement process. This saga of the government playing havoc with weapons acquisition offers an explanation for, and clues for resolving, the under-equipped state of Canada’s military.