Weapons Systems Annual Assessment And Cybersecurity

DOD acquires new weapons for its warfighters through a management process known as the Defense Acquisition System. Chapter 1 contains GAOs 16th annual assessment of the Department of Defenses (DOD) $1.66 trillion portfolio of 86 major weapon systems acquisition programs. It examines changes in the portfolio since 2016, including DODs progress implementing acquisition reforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. Chapter 2 addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.

October 2018 DOD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities This report presents the argument that Department of Defense (DOD) weapons systems under development are riddled with vulnerabilities that make them an easy target for adversaries trying to control them or disrupt their functions. GAO was asked to review the state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity. This report addresses: (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon system

This is GAO's annual assessment of DOD major weapon system acquisitions, an area on GAO's high-risk list. DOD and Congress have taken meaningful steps to improve the acquisition of major weapon systems, yet programs continue to experience cost and schedule overruns. Further, GAO has emphasized the need to sustain the implementation of acquisition reforms and for programs to complete developmental testing before beginning production, thereby avoiding concurrency and its associated cost and schedule growth. With the continuing budgetary pressures, DOD cannot afford to miss opportunities to address inefficiencies in these programs to free up resources for higher priority needs. The joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009 includes a provision for GAO to annually review DOD's portfolio of weapon systems. This report includes observations on (1) the cost and schedule performance of DOD's 2015 portfolio of 79 major defense acquisition programs; (2) the knowledge attained at key junctures in the acquisition process for 43 programs that were in development or early production; and (3) key acquisition reform initiatives and program concurrency. To develop the observations in this report, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's December 2014 Selected Acquisition Reports. GAO also collected data through two questionnaires to program offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; the use of knowledge-based acquisition practices; and the implementation of acquisition reforms

This is an annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisitions, an area that has been on GAO’s high-risk list for more than 20 years. The report includes observations on (1) the cost and schedule performance of DOD’s 2012 portfolio of 86 major defense acquisition programs, including the Missile Defense Agency’s Ballistic Missile Defense System; (2) the knowledge attained at key junctures in the acquisition process for 40 major defense acquisition programs that were selected because they were in development or early production; and (3) key acquisition reform initiatives and program concurrency. Major defense acquisition programs are DOD’s costliest weapon system development and procurement programs. Tables and figures. This is a print on demand report.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat various threats to U.S. security. While the weapons that DOD ultimately develops have no rival in superiority, weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from those investments. DOD can help resolve these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing new weapons. This report provides congressional and DOD decision makers with an independent, knowledge-based assessment of selected defense programs that identifies potential risks and needed actions when a program's projected attainment of knowledge diverges from the best practice. It can also highlight those programs that employ practices worthy of emulation by other programs. GAO plans to update and issue this report annually.

Technology and digitization are a great social good. But they also involve risks and threats. Cybersecurity is not just a matter of data or computer security; cybersecurity is about the security of society. Why "Philosophy"? To understand how to reason and think about threats and cybersecurity in today’s and tomorrow’s world, this book is necessary to equip readers with awareness. Philosophy of Cybersecurity is about the user’s perspective, but also about system issues. This is a book for everyone—a wide audience. Experts, academic lecturers, as well as students of technical fields such as computer science and social sciences will find the content interesting. This includes areas like international relations, diplomacy, strategy, and security studies. Cybersecurity is also a matter of state strategy and policy. The clarity and selection of broad material presented here may make this book the first book on cybersecurity you’ll understand. It considers such detailed basics as, for example, what a good password is and, more importantly, why it is considered so today. But the book is also about systemic issues, such as healthcare cybersecurity (challenges, why is it so difficult to secure, could people die as a result of cyberattacks?), critical infrastructure (can a cyberattack destroy elements of a power system?), and States (have they already been hacked?). Cyberspace is not a "grey zone" without rules. This book logically explains what cyberwar is, whether it threatens us, and under what circumstances cyberattacks could lead to war. The chapter on cyberwar is relevant because of the war in Ukraine. The problem of cyberwar in the war in Ukraine is analytically and expertly explained. The rank and importance of these activities are explained, also against the background of broader military activities. The approach we propose treats cybersecurity very broadly. This book discusses technology, but also ranges to international law, diplomacy, military, and security matters, as they pertain to conflicts, geopolitics, political science, and international relations.