Weber And Rickert

Philosophers and social scientists will welcome this highly original discussion of Max Weber's analysis of the objectivity of social science. Guy Oakes traces the vital connection between Weber's methodology and the work of philosopher Heinrich Rickert, reconstructing Rickert's notoriously difficult concepts in order to isolate the important, and until now poorly understood, roots of problems in Weber's own work.Guy Oakes teaches social philosophy at Monmouth College and sociology at the New School for Social Research.

Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) was one of the leading neo-Kantian philosophers in Germany and a crucial figure in the discussions of the foundations of the social sciences in the first quarter of the twentieth century. His views were extremely influential, most significantly on Max Weber. The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science is Rickert's most important work, and it is here translated into English for the first time. It presents his systematic theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, and deals particularly with historical knowledge and the problem of demarcating the natural from the human sciences. The theory Rickert develops is carefully argued and of great intrinsic interest. It departs from both positivism and neo-Hegelian idealism and is worked out by contrast to the views of others, particularly Dilthey and the early phenomenologists.

This book examines the Werturteilsstreit ("value-judgment dispute"), from its initial stages in the debates between the eminent German social historian Max Weber and his contemporaries, to more recent contributions from scholars such as Karl Popper, Talcott Parsons, and Jurgen Habermas.

In the wake of the renewed interest in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the neo-Kantian theories of Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) are increasingly drawing attention. This monograph is an attempt to rescue Rickert from an undeserved oblivion by an analysis of his systematic philosophy of values. The author discusses Rickert’s epistemology and ontology which lay the foundation for a methodology of the Natural Sciences and the Humanities. In Rickert’s view these types of science are not in opposition to each other but operate on a continuum between two extremes: a ‘generalizing’ (natural-scientific) and an ‘individualizing’ (cultural-scientific) approach to reality. The social sciences in particular operate on this continuum in a flexible manner, sometimes close to the natural-scientific pole as in the case of experimental psychology or econometrics, sometimes close to the cultural-scientific approach, as in the case of cultural sociology or cultural history. Thus there is in Rickert’s logic of science no room for any methodological quarrel.

This book brings together - for the first time in any language - all of Weber's articles, letters and conference interventions on methodology. It provides a completely new, accurate and reliable translation of Weber's extensive output, including previously untranslated letters.

First published in 1972, this book on Weber's methodological writings is today regarded as a modern classic in its field. In this new expanded edition, the author has revised and updated the original text, and translated the numerous German quotations into English. He has also added a new introduction, where he discusses major issues raised in the relevant secondary literature since 1972. The author traces the relationship between values and science in Max Weber's methodology of its central aspects: value freedom, value relation (Wertbeziehung), value analysis, the ideal type and the special problems which pertain to the sphere of politics. Weber's thought is presented and discussed on the basis of a meticulous analysis of all available, published or unpublished, original material. The book is indispensable for all serious Weber scholars and provides the general student with a clear, accessible and authoritative exposition of major aspects of Weber's methodology.